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
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
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




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NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY  
VOL. XLVII.

SIR WILLIAM MONSON'S  
NAVAL TRACTS

VOL. V.



THE NAVAL TRACTS  
OF  
**Sir William Monson**

IN SIX BOOKS

EDITED

WITH A COMMENTARY DRAWN FROM THE STATE PAPERS  
AND OTHER ORIGINAL SOURCES

BY

M. OPPENHEIM

VOL. V.



PRINTED FOR THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

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
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## ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

### VOLUME I

Page li. line 22, for 'before 1630' read 'after 1630.'

Page 76, note 1. Since this note was written newly discovered inscriptions have brought to light the interesting fact that Thothmes III, in 1476 B.C., desiring to take Kadesh, in northern Syria, transported his army from Egypt by sea to Simyra, the nearest port to Kadesh, and made that place his base for the siege. It is likely that if we had a full knowledge of the early naval history of the eastern Mediterranean we should find that Pharaonic, Lycian, and Phoenician admirals had little to learn concerning the application of strategical principles.

Page 172, line 31, for 'train-bands' read 'trained-bands.'

### VOLUME II

Page 125, note 4. 'The Low Country *cromstevens*, from which crompters were imitated, were hoy-rigged with a lateen mizen and had either beaks, or stems that projected beak-wise' (note by Mr. R. Morton Nance).

Page 161, line 12, for 'over the poop' read 'under the poop.'

Page 217, 'Berkeley Boy' (*sic* in Purchas) should no doubt be 'Berkeley Hoy.'

Page 292, line 25, for 'Sebastian' read 'John' Cabot.

### VOLUME III

Page 327, line 3. The asterisk belongs to line 2.

Page 358, line 7, 'boyltinge'; see a note by Mr. Alan Moore in *Mariner's Mirror*, iii. p. 374.

Page 361. 'The Wolf rock.' Mr. Morton Nance writes to me:—'The Wolf is still called the Gulf by Mousehole fishermen. There is a very ancient prejudice against pronouncing the name of any land animal in a fishing boat and the name Gulf is preferred as being harmless.'

## VOLUME IV

Page 48, line 20. Mr. Morton Nance has suggested that if fore mast be read instead of main mast the description of the position of the manger makes good sense because in early ships it was sometimes abaft the fore mast. Of that fact I was ignorant. This subject of the position of the manger has been discussed by Mr. Nance in the *Mariner's Mirror*, iii. p. 223. The statement in the footnote that the manger was always on the forecastle is too general; it depended on the size of the ship and the position of the hawses, and was often below, on the capstan deck, in two and three-decked vessels.

Page 209, line 30, 'catthe.' This is an error made by the transcriber. It reads 'catch.'

## THE FIFTH BOOK.

### To the Projectors of this Age.

IF I could think of a more proper word than 'Project,' to entitle this ensuing book I would do it. For the name of projects, and the inventors of them, are grown so hateful and contemptible that all honest men abhor and detest them.

There are no burthens, which the sharpness of lewd brains can invent to vex the commonwealth with, but they style by the name of projects, when indeed the name 'promoter' were more proper, as people fitter to be loathed than cherished in a well-governed kingdom. Such men are a curse to the country that breeds them, to their friends and parents that nourished and fed them, and to God himself that created them ; for there is no man, directly or indirectly, but finds himself hindered or injured by them ; their courses incite God to punish, and men to abhor them. A father of the church saith, ' It is a greater sin to project and lay unlawful things on the poor, than a merit to relieve them.' A favourite to Alexander the Great, whom we may rather term a projector, advised him, after his great expense in war, and wealth decayed, to impose taxes upon his subjects : but Alexander answered, ' That gardener did ill

who ploughed up the herbs and roots of his garden': for the King is like a gardener; roots, trees, and herbs, like the Kingdom. A flatterer told Antiochus, 'That all things a King did were lawful.' 'Yea,' he said, 'to barbarous Kings; but not to him that respects justice.'

St. Louis, King of France, was angry with one that advised him to lay new taxes upon his subjects, saying, 'That God punished such examples in Kings.' This King well deserved the name he bore, who had more respect to his subjects than to his profit.

A King of Persia being desired by his favourite, to grant him an unjust suit, he told him, 'No: but that he would give him the value of the thing he requested because it would not make him poor;' but said, 'I will not do what you desire because it is unjust.' Projectors should have as little employment under this King as they have reputation amongst honest men.

Though Augustus Cæsar did not by name dislike the condition of these people that vex the commonwealth, yet in his precepts, given to the governors of his provinces, he intimated a detestation of them when he told them, 'I do not send you to rule that you should envy the innocent or be a hangman to offenders; but that with one hand you should be a helper to the good and encourage the evil to amend; that you be a tutor to the fatherless, a pleader for widows, a staff to the blind, and a father to all.'

I have heard of a judge in our time who by his audacity, and forced authority and impudence, was able to pervert and wrest laws to his appetite and liking. This wicked judge had got a popular applause and esteem amongst the ignorant multitude, and by his friends was commended to King

James of Great Britain, for a good minister to his State. The King answered, 'Yea, if I would become a tyrant.' Intimating that the judge who misconstrues laws were a fit servant for such and not for upright Kings. Solon was such an enemy to the projectors that he established a law, 'That whosoever proposed any thing to the prejudice of the commonwealth should die.' He also decreed, 'That it should be lawful to revenge an injury that should be offered to one another, that every man might have a feeling of the party injured.'

The difference betwixt the projectors of our age and the projects I tender in the ensuing discourse, is this:—they pretend evil under the colour of good; they set a fair countenance on a foul face; they smile on those whose throats they would cut; they do, like Scipio and all other rebels, pretend reformation and taking away the abuse of the commonwealth when themselves are abusers of it.

In my projects I have no other end but the common good of the kingdom; I neither expect nor desire gain; I set up no new devised taxes nor tolls; I invent no impositions, nor raise contributions; I force no man to undertake or compel people to adventure; but I persuade like a philosopher who advised four things to be considered before the taking of any important thing in hand, 'To examine the beginning, to consider the middle, to approve the end, and to consult with the wise.'

If any of my propositions prove profitable to the State, and acceptable to the subject, I have obtained my wish: if not, I desire they may die without any more appearing in the world.

## BOOK V.

*Containing divers Projects and Stratagems,  
tendered for the Good of the King and  
Kingdom, with some other things to be  
seen in the Catalogue.*

The first Project shall be for the Safety of his Majesty's Navy; and the Convenience and Inconvenience in keeping it at Chatham or Portsmouth.

As there is no man that builds a house but at the first groundwork of his building will be sure to make his foundation firm and stable, for on the strength thereof all the rest of the building must depend, even so it is with Kings and princes. For that King who means to live in safety, and to avoid dangers at home or from abroad, must first seek to make his State firm and sure, as well in defence upon an invasion as before he enterprise any action of offence upon his enemy, or else his building is upon glass and ice and will suddenly fall for want of a settled foundation.

Therefore, like a careful builder that will provide to encounter a danger, in my ensuing projects I will first lay down a means and remedy how to secure this kingdom against the attempts of our neighbours, if in time they become our enemies, before there shall be cause of hostility or before we make any enterprise upon them in a



warlike manner. And the first thing I will handle, as the greatest importance to the kingdom, is the safety of his Majesty's navy, and the convenience or inconvenience in keeping them at Chatham or Portsmouth, as I have said before.

*The Convenience of Chatham.*

1. Chatham is so safe and secure a port for the ships to ride in that his Majesty's navy may better ride with a hawser at Chatham than with a cable at Portsmouth.

2. The reason of the long continuance of the navy at Chatham is the convenience of docks, and all other places, for the commodity of ships. And considering that the Officers of the Navy\* are there seated, with their whole families, it would breed a great innovation and change to bring them to Portsmouth.

3. The nearness from Chatham to London, from whence they may be supplied with all things they shall stand in need of, for that London is the storehouse of all England. It is necessary therefore that the navy should be kept at Chatham rather than at Portsmouth.

4. Woolwich, Blackwall, Deptford, Limehouse, and Ratcliffe yield more docks for the building and repairing and trimming of ships, if there be sudden occasion, than all other places of England.

5. All England cannot furnish sailors like to London and the Newcastle trade, which last once in three weeks repairs to the port of London.

6. No part of England can victual a navy so conveniently, speedily, and at so small a charge as London; all the corn for bread, beer, butter, and cheese, &c., is brought by water from the adjacent countries thereabouts. And for beef,

\* *I.e.* the Principal Officers.

pork, and bacon, London is placed in the centre, far more conveniently than Portsmouth, which has never a river to bring commodities from other shires ; nor the country of Hampshire so fruitful as to furnish it.

7. Our trade to the Eastland returns their commodities to London, which furnishes us with all materials belonging to shipping, as, namely, cables, cordage, pitch, tar, rosin, masts, yards, &c., which cannot be done at Portsmouth, the place yielding nothing that creates a trade.

8. The water at Chatham flows sufficiently every spring tide to grave the greatest ships. And it is a doubt whether it can be made to heighten so much in Portsmouth as to do the like.

9. No wind or weather can endanger the coming home of an anchor in Chatham, and the river affords sufficient space for every ship to ride without annoying one another. As to the contrary, a storm, with a wind from the north-east to the south-south-east, will stretch the cables of the ships in Portsmouth ; and if any of their anchors come home they cannot avoid boarding one another, to their exceeding great damage and danger, the channel being so narrow.

10. A navy lying in the harbour of Portsmouth, the safety of them depends upon the strength of the town of Portsmouth. And if Portsmouth should be surprised, or taken at any time, the whole navy falls into the enemy's hands.

11. Not a cable, anchor, mast, yard, barrel of powder, or any other thing that belongs to the furnishing of our fleet, but must be brought from London or Chatham to Portsmouth, with an exceeding great charge, and no less delay and danger, considering the uncertainty of winds, the peril to be intercepted by enemies, and the hazard of shipwreck.

12. The excessive charge in sending down carpenters, caulkers, and other several workmen belonging to ships, with impress of mariners, will amount to an extraordinary great expense. All which will be eased by being at Chatham.\*

*The Exceptions to the Navy lying at Chatham.*

1. The several winds to carry them to Portsmouth.

2. The hazard of the shoals and sands in going thither.

3. The distance from Chatham thither, if the French should attempt anything upon us.

4. And some there are that advise part of the ships to be kept at Portsmouth, and the other part at Chatham.

Whosoever shall allege these reasons, must distinguish of the service in hand, whether it be offensive or defensive, or against Spain, France, Holland, or any part of the east country.

If Holland or the Eastland become our enemies, then doth Chatham lie most with our advantage to annoy them, if they attempt any part of our north coast, or Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, and Kent, which are places of most peril considering their nearness to the city of London.

If we have wars with France there is little advantage gotten betwixt Chatham and Portsmouth. For being at the Downs at Dover, we shall be over against France, and nearer to the Isle of Wight than Brest is, or any part of Brittany, where I suppose the fleet of France will be made

\* These arguments against Portsmouth were of course all ancient history and, together with the prevalence of the *Teredo Navalis* in the waters of the harbour, were the reasons why it had almost ceased to be a naval centre during the reigns of Elizabeth and James.

ready. And for the two navies, English and French, meeting at sea, no place or time can be assigned them, ships being in continual action, and sailing one day on one coast and another day on another.

And whereas the several winds are objected as an impediment to our navy at Chatham, you must know that an easterly wind keeps in a fleet at Chatham; and so it doth the French, if they be in any part of Brittany,\* and our ships also if they should be at Portsmouth; though they should be in the Channel, yet, with that easterly wind, they cannot go to the eastward. So that you see an easterly wind brings an equal inconvenience, as well to the one as to the other.†

\* It would not prevent them coming out from the Breton ports; presumably, Monson means that it would prevent their passage up Channel.

† Under Mary the Privy Council took the opposite view and recommended Philip to use Portsmouth in place of the Thames by reason of the facilities it offered for work in the Channel (*S. P. Dom. Mary*, vi. 17). Of course in 1554 Chatham, as a dockyard, was not yet existent and the Medway had only been in use for a few years as an anchorage for ships lying up, but the argument as to the winds would apply as well to the Medway as to the Thames. In later years, as ships grew bigger, the narrow and tortuous fairway of the Medway, which was always silting up, was an additional disadvantage, and as early as 1680 the Admiralty commenced dredging operations in the river (*N. Bd. Letters*, vii. 757). In 1670 a new yard at Greenhithe was proposed but eventually Sheerness, founded in 1665 tentatively, was established permanently as ancillary to Chatham. During the eighteenth century, even with improvements in build and handiness of working, but with larger ships, the question of the winds grew a very serious one in both rivers. From Deptford and Woolwich vessels could only go down the Thames in winds from five and seven points of the compass, respectively; in the Medway there were only six points of the compass that would take down ships of the line and ten that would take them up. This was a serious disadvantage, but it must be understood

And whereas from Chatham we must have two winds to bring us into the Channel, or to Portsmouth, the one southerly or westerly to carry us to the Downs, the other northerly or easterly to bring us to Portsmouth in three tides; with fair weather, from the Downs, we shall be able to fetch Portsmouth howsoever the wind is.\*

that it was not inhibitory; ships of any size could work the tides, backing and filling when necessary, but this was a slow process. In 1802 a committee of enquiry recommended the Admiralty to establish a new yard and arsenal on a small promontory between Greenhithe and Northfleet. This proposal was approved by Pitt, and by St. Vincent and Barham among the seamen, and it was probably the best site ever suggested for a river yard, for it gave sufficient depth, easy access and good protection. In 1818 Sir John Rennie, the engineer chiefly responsible for the recommendations of 1802, proposed making a navigable cut between Rochester bridge and Upnor and then to enclose the natural curve of the Medway with gates, thus converting the section into a gigantic wet dock.

The steady decrease in depth, both in the Thames and Medway and at Portsmouth, was a ceaseless anxiety to the Admiralty. It was most marked in the Thames and at Portsmouth because dredging work was frequently carried on between Chatham and the sea. It was said in 1810 that the moorings off Woolwich were in five feet less water than previously, attributed to the effect of London Bridge in acting as a dam, and that men-of-war lying there 'sewed' three or four feet. Deptford was even worse off. One bad effect of this was that there was a tendency to build large ships with an eye to the accommodation afforded by the yards instead of attempting to attain the best type of fighting machine. In 1785 Lord Howe caused the Brunswick, 74, to be designed to draw two feet less water than other ships of her class, but with unsatisfactory results. In 1807 'a very alarming' diminution in the depth of water at Portsmouth was recorded. In 1693 there had been 18 feet on the bar at low water, but in 1724 that had fallen to 15 or 16 feet, and in 1784 to 14 feet. There was a rise of 16 feet at spring tides, but as a first-rate, ready for sea, drew 26 feet or 27 feet there was little to spare.

\* By working the tides.

In which traverse we shall be as likely to meet a fleet of France, as in any other part of the Channel.

To answer the objection of sands and shoals to endanger us in our coming about from Chatham, we see that by the care and skill of pilots no memory or record can tell of a ship of his Majesty's so lost, as out of Portsmouth it is fresh in old men's mouths, and the ribs of the ship I have often seen, called the Great Henry, a principal ship belonging to the Crown of England in the days of King Henry VIII., there perished.\* I likewise remember in the days of Queen Elizabeth, and in the year 1586, that the *Revenge*, after taken by the Spaniards, was near doing the like coming out of the harbour of Portsmouth.

And to satisfy the advisers that wish part of the navy to be kept at Chatham, and the other at Portsmouth, this I say:—that an enemy being first at sea—as I will make the comparison with France and Holland—if our ships be thus divided they will be able to cut us off before we meet together, or to keep us in that we shall not budge out of harbour, so dangerous a thing it is to divide a fleet, especially in our Channel that doth not afford a spacious sea to avoid them by cunning, for our sea is no better than a strait considering the narrowness betwixt France and us. And, besides, an enemy cannot desire a greater advantage upon us than they shall have, for, riding at St. Helen's Point, they will be able to keep us in

\* I have no MS. authority for the 'I have often seen' of the Churchill text, nor for the 'likewise' in the succeeding sentence.

In his statement about the Great Henry (Henry Grâce de Dieu) Monson seems to be copying Leland who says (*Itinerary*, iii. 97), that in the dock at Portsmouth 'lyith part of the Rybbes of the Henry Grace of Dieu, one of the biggest shippes that hath beene made *in hominum memoria*.' This must have been between 1536 and 1542 when Leland performed his

at Portsmouth and to cut off the other fleet that shall come to Portsmouth. Or, if they should ride at the Downs or Gore End, two roads that of necessity both the squadrons must pass by, they will be able to cut them off before they shall join together. But upon a present employment during a time of war betwixt Spain and us I do hold Plymouth a more convenient harbour than either of the other two so long as the war shall last, for in the winter, which is the time that ships must keep harbour, they shall have space sufficient to make provision against the spring, and ease a great charge in carrying the ships from Plymouth to Chatham, and after from Chatham to Plymouth. Secondly, the ships will be clean, which is a great advantage in sailing, for we may allow from the time of the graving at Chatham, until their coming to Plymouth very near two months. Thirdly, at Plymouth they shall be sooner and better manned, sooner victualled and sooner at sea than if they were furnished at Portsmouth or Chatham.\*

travels about England; Mr. L. Carr Laughton is of opinion that he is clearly referring to the rebuilding of the ship. Her destruction by fire at Woolwich is precisely dated by Machyn (*Diary*, p. 43), as occurring on August 15, 1553.

\* Notwithstanding some obvious advantages Plymouth was always unpopular in the Navy until the construction of the breakwater, the Sound being an open and dangerous anchorage in hard winds between S.E. and S.W., and the navigation up to Hamoaze being tricky and difficult in view of the strong tides and ill-known rocks and shoals. It was almost in spite of themselves that the Admiralty authorized the foundation of Plymouth Yard in 1690 after much hesitation and after having repeatedly sent committees round the coast as far as Bideford in the hope, apparently, of being able to select some other port. Circumstances, however, were too strong both for the Admiralty and the Admirals, of whom one, the famous Blake, had complained of 'the unsafeness and hazard of this road' when compelled to put into the Sound.

Therefore I conclude, in comparison betwixt Chatham and Portsmouth, Chatham is the best and safest place, and I wish that our whole navy may be kept at Chatham, and not make any continual residence but there only, considering the former reasons. Never hurt befell any of them that made their being there, either by weather or attempt of enemy. And yet, I must confess, they are not altogether so safe and secure from the assault of a fleet that shall be brought with an easterly wind; and therefore it behoves us to be cautious and wary of it, as follows:

In the stratagems contained in this Fifth Book, I advise a General to provide to withstand an enterprise to be made upon ships in harbour where they are usually moored, to which directions I refer you; but, with leave, somewhat I will say in particular of the state of our navy at Chatham, and the danger that may befall us from Holland, if they become enemies to us, as also shew the way of prevention.

The advantages of Plymouth in a war to the westward had made themselves felt during Elizabeth's reign, the Commonwealth had been forced to keep workmen, stores and a small staff there, and now the elimination of Holland as an enemy and the enlargement or establishment of the French military ports south of Ushant made the selection of Plymouth or Dartmouth, which was very nearly preferred, certain. But for many years Plymouth was regarded at the Admiralty as a necessary evil and as little building and repairing as might be was done there. It was no easy matter to get big ships into Hamoaze as they had to work round between St. Nicholas Island and the mainland, avoiding various reefs and shoals in the process; eventually, early in the eighteenth century, buoys were laid down by which vessels could be warped round the corkscrew curves. On the administrative side, in the matter of wages and stores, Plymouth was even more expensive than Portsmouth.



Holland, by reason of their abundance of shipping, the number of soldiers quartered in all the parts of their country, and their daily and speedy use in gathering their forces together for present service, will give us the less suspicion if they should intend any sudden stratagem upon us. And the first thing that they will attend is the opportunity of a settled easterly wind, to bring their ships, without striking sail, as high as Gravesend, and there suddenly, without resistance, put eight or ten thousand men on the Kentish shore to march to Upnor Castle not above four or five miles from thence, which castle all men know is able to make no resistance, the castle being both weak and weakly provided. Suppose they possessing it, and directing their ships at Gravesend to repair thither, they have his Majesty's navy at their mercy which is a thing it fears me to think on. And their ships, after they have done this wicked stratagem, being ready at hand to receive their people on board again, have no other end in their coming than the destruction of our navy. Our ships themselves are evil able to make defence ; the most part of their ordnance usually lieth on shore and they are altogether unfurnished of munition and powder which is always kept in the Tower of London until the ships be employed. And the supplying of them at that time will be taken away by the Hollanders who will be able to cut off all provisions that shall be sent by water ; if we have a thought to transport them by land there is neither sudden preparation for that purpose nor it cannot be done so speedily but our navy will, in the meantime, be vanquished. And, lastly, they are as ill-furnished with men, being no more than the shipkeepers proportionable to every ship according to its

bigness, that they are hopeless of any sudden aid or supply of people.

For prevention thereof it were fit and convenient that Upnor Castle be strongly and sufficiently fortified, as well to the landward as to the river, that it may be out of the power of an enemy suddenly to surprise it ; with order that all the trained soldiers thereabouts upon every alarm do repair to the defence of it, for if it can be made so strong as to hold out but ten days not five times the force of eight or ten thousand men can take it. I will therefore wish that there might be no lingering but that the safety of this castle may be presently put into execution seeing that it imports us so greatly and, indeed, more than any other part of the kingdom, as the case stands with our ships.

And so much as concerns the defence of the river, by booming, and making sconces upon it, I say sufficiently in my stratagems ; but seeing this is a matter of so great import as the safety of our navy I advise and wish in case our ships shall be assailed that the ordnance, or greatest part of them, be continually kept aboard the ships, both mounted and fitted. The powder and shot to be likewise kept continually on board, with the powder to be double barrelled for fear of taking moisture for the nature of the water is to take away the strength, and that, as in the case of Upnor Castle, the trained soldiers of the country have order to repair on board the navy with their arms. That the ships themselves be warped and towed as low as the innermost boom, and there to moor themselves ahead and astern to have all their broadsides ready to play upon the enemy. And if all these fail, as God forbid, then, as the last refuge, the ships to sink themselves

as they shall there ride that they shall not fall into the hands of an enemy. Which ships, after the enemy have quitted the harbour, we shall weigh again with little hurt or damage to the ship.\*

Having left a remedy, as you have heard, for the securing our navy, my next project shall be to hinder French attempts upon us, they being a nation of most danger by reason of their nearness and greatness, and especially if they be assisted with the help of Holland with shipping, as no doubt, but in matter of State France will labour to gain Holland from us, and to settle it with a firm league and friendship with them to redeem their loss of Scotland, who for many hundred years made their dependence upon that kingdom. And, if Scotland prove honest to England, they may fear by our conjunction; of foes we are become friends, and Scotchmen may as well turn their swords upon their breasts as they have done heretofore upon ours.

\* All that need be said is that as Upnor was not strengthened to any measurable extent the Dutch, when they came in 1667, did not even pay it the compliment of a flank attack from the land, but ignored it. The events of June 1667 may be used in support of their theories by those who believe that a sufficiently strong fleet can always prevent even raids, for there was no fleet, and by those who believe that coast fortifications are always necessary, for there were no fortifications. But they do not support those who would put their faith in diplomacy and kindly expressions, for diplomacy was expanding itself at Breda and Louis XIV. took care that Charles was well fed with good reasons for disarmament. The advocates of coast fortification may, however, justly point out that Harwich dockyard was saved by the fact that Landguard was able to make a defence sufficient to beat off the Dutch attack, although the 'blue water' school would of course rejoin that if there had been a fleet at sea the Landguard fortifications would not have been brought into use. As to the possibility of surprise, see *ante*, i. 90.

## A Project to prevent the French landing in England, if they become our Enemies.

WE in England do esteem of France to be a strong and potent country and the people in it to be both warlike and valorous. But it lying upon a main continent, and ours an island, divided with a sea, we think we may easily offend them and not be offended by them.

This opinion is generally received; and, indeed, not to be confuted but by such as understand the sea better than the ordinary sort of men. But for the explaining it, if ever there happen a war betwixt France and us, I will truly set down the danger that may redound to us by France, and the means how to prevent it, as I have already done, or will do, if a war happen betwixt Spain, or Holland, and us.

The general position is that France is no way able to compare with us for number and strength of shipping; and, by consequence, we are to fear no danger from thence upon any attempt they shall make.

In answer hereof, it is true, if the meeting and encountering a fleet at sea were certain, the strongest are likely to prevail against the other. But, as I have declared in my former discourses, there are three principal things to be required in a sea-action: the first is providence, to learn the design of an enemy to prevent him: the second is secrecy, to keep the enemy from intelligence:

and the third is how to work for advantage of wind and weather.

If the French intend to invade us we may easily conjecture by their preparation by land and sea, and the drawing down their army to their sea side. But where they mean to attempt us, if they keep their design secret, it will be hard to discover; and the chief reason, we are to conceive, is according to the parts where they make their rendezvous, the observation of winds to bring them from thence to seize our coast, and the weakness of our harbours, where we may conceive they think to land. If there were no more difficulty than the vulgar and common conceit it were probable not to be in the power of France to hurt us. But, speaking like a seaman, for that their actions must be governed by the winds, thus much I must discover for a secret that a southerly wind, which brings them for our coast, keeps our ships in harbour that we cannot budge; so that they shall neither fear our force by sea, nor our ships be any way able to impeach them, unless by chance and accident they arrive in the same harbour our ships retire to. So you see it is neither the number or strength of fleets that can withstand them if they observe the advantage of a southerly wind.

And believe me this is a peril that every man conceives not. For if France can of themselves afford a quantity of vessels to transport an army, or by hiring ships abroad, or compelling strangers to serve that come into their ports to trade, it is not much material whether they be of strength, or no; for with a southerly wind they shall not fear any force to meet them at sea.

There was never sore but God provides a salve; and this fearful hazard must be cured

by prevention, as thus, our fleet must divide into three several squadrons; and being at sea, and forced to seek the shore, every squadron be appointed a particular harbour to repair to. By which means every port on the south coast shall be defended and guarded by our ships; which will be a force sufficient to withstand the strength of France by sea if they be not assisted by Holland or other countries.\* The ports being thus guarded they are prevented of landing; for he is mad that will enterprise an occasion of invasion by sea and will not provide to have a harbour for his security which no road nor bay can give him against an outwardly wind. Neither can they land their men with such a wind, the siege† on shore will be so great an impediment to their landing.

But it may be objected that though this serve for the southern coast, yet the north part of England, Scotland and Wales lies open to their landing. The answer to this is that if our three squadrons be divided, the one to make good the Downs and the others the west country, no fleet can pass betwixt Dover and Calais but they of the Downs shall have a view of them; and the same wind the others have will serve them to follow and to prevent their landing. The western squadron will do the like upon any attempt that shall be made upon Milford Haven, Wales, or any of that part of England.

But our surest course, of all others, will be with some ships to beleaguer their harbours of rendezvous in France a good distance from the

\* On the question of division of the English fleet compare what Monson says *ante*, iii. 371 and in the preceding section, p. 10. See also i. p. 89.

† Surf.

shore, for fear of embaying. We must consider that such winds as serve to bring them for England make a secure road upon that coast to ride in. And such winds as are dangerous to keep that shore make it impossible for the French to put out of harbour; as I will shew more particularly when I treat of the way to prevent the French and Hollanders meeting.

Thus, you may perceive, that an invasion out of France into England or Scotland is to be prevented. But his Majesty has another kingdom of more danger, the conditions of the people and the openness of the harbours considered; and that is Ireland, which I will a little handle.

Ireland, as it is an island, is in the case of England, though more dangerous, in respect the people are more rebellious, and being divided from England it cannot be with celerity relieved if an enemy do land. Besides, the Irish nation and their natures do not so well symbolize with the French as with the Spaniards; or, if they did, the French have less advantage to invade that kingdom than the others. For so much as the same wind that carries a fleet out of France into Ireland, the same wind serves us to follow them out of England.

But seeing I am upon this subject I will let you know the difference betwixt the danger of a French invasion and a Spanish into Ireland. You must consider that a south-west wind, that brings a fleet from Spain into Ireland, is not only against us to go into Ireland but keeps our ships in harbour that we cannot put to sea: by which occasion the Spaniards may land in despite of us. Moreover, if with that wind they land to the northward of Ireland, though it be no further than to the river of Shannon, we must have not

only a north-east wind to carry us to Mizen Head, or Cape Clear, but when we are at either of the two places we must have a contrary wind to carry us in pursuit of them that land to the northwards, which is a southerly wind ; and how this is like to happen, and what danger may befall us in the mean space, is a main point of consideration. And therefore it fell out very luckily to us that in the Spaniards' last expedition to Ireland they landed at Kinsale, to which place one wind carried us directly out of England, to give a relief to our army and to prevent a second supply from Spain. If they had landed further to the northward of Mizen Head we should have had, as I have said, two contrary winds before we could have come to them. Besides, they would have been near to the Roane \* where they might have found relief, far from our army by land, where our march had almost been impossible, considering the season of the year and the weak help that the country would have yielded us. By this it is apparent that the danger of an invasion out of Spain into Ireland is far greater than out of France, not only in the hearts of that nation to the Spaniards but in the situation of their country.

My advice therefore is, when an enemy is feared in Ireland, that there be a care to keep our fleet at sea off of Mizen Head, as a place to take advantage of all winds. And that the beacons be well watched on shore, with directions to the watcher that he give notice to our fleet at sea by some secret token to distinguish the enemies landing to the northward or to the eastward of that place. For our ships lying off the headland and having this warning, they will be able instantly

\* Perhaps a clerical error for Tyrone.



to follow them, whether they shall go to the northward or eastward, and shall be as ready to surprise them as they shall be to land.

But this caution I give, that no occasion but necessity compel the fleet to seek a harbour. For I have shewed before the inconvenience of it, and the difficulty to get them out again, that in the mean time an enemy may work his mischief.

How to prevent the French and the  
Hollanders meeting to rescue one  
another, if they become Enemies to  
England.

CONSIDERING how things stand, or may hereafter stand betwixt France and Holland, to the prejudice of England, for that every State changes with time and advantage to themselves and commonwealth, it will not be amiss, for prevention of evil that may happen to this kingdom, to follow the practice of a skilful physician in the cure of his patient, to give him cordials to avoid the disease rather than afterwards, when it has seized upon him, to go about with physic to recover him. And according to this example it will be better for us beforehand to withstand the peril than seek to shun it when it is too late.

The dangers are of two kinds: the one by an increase of ships in France that may in time prove prejudicial to this State, for it is perilous to have neighbourhood with danger. The other is the assistance they may have from foreign parts by sea, and, above all other nations, the Hollanders, who are nearest able to equal us in shipping.

The fear of an invasion out of France our ancestors never much dreaded. For our ships were still the walls and bulwarks of our defence, and ever made that nation recoil with dishonour and loss, as our histories do at large declare. And rather than the French ambitious thoughts should now aspire to greatness of shipping it were

far better, happier, and safer for us, to proclaim an everlasting war against them than by a suffering peace they should attain to a strength by sea. For princes in matters of most importance ought to govern by rules of State, and to be directed by precedents of times. We will not oppose the French greatness amongst themselves at home when it shall have no relation to us abroad. But if France will not be contented with what they have been, but labour to be greater than we think fit they should be, wisdom bids us provide for the best ; which we cannot better do than to abate the pride and power in the beginning. For it is an old saying that peace and power are incompatible and live not long together ; and the strongest pillar of peace is to take away the occasion that may breed a war, therefore our opposition is grounded upon reason and to be approved in wise men's opinions.

But in case, according to my proposition, that France, out of matters of State, shall seek to give assistance to Holland, and we to impeach it at sea, this that follows shall direct those that shall have the command of so great and weighty a charge as the government of our seas.

Our fleet, consisting of a number of ships, must be divided into three squadrons, and appoint three several places for their rendezvous (*viz.*) the Downs, the isles of Wight, and Guernsey, all of them opposite to the harbours in France, betwixt Calais in Picardy and Ushant in Brittany. Our squadrons are to work according to winds ; for that wind which is dangerous for us to keep the French coast is impossible for their ships to put out of harbour, as I have formerly shewed. And therefore we need not hazard our ships when we know there is no peril nor danger to us.

Although some of their ports are better than others, yet there is none of them in the distance aforesaid but is a barred harbour, and dry from half tide to half tide, that ships cannot get either in or out until the tide serve that will give them sufficient water.

And it is moreover to be considered that there is no wind that will carry a ship from any of those harbours of France into Holland or Zealand, but a south to west-south-west wind. For though they may put out to sea with an easterly wind, yet it is in their teeth to go for Holland; and of the two they had better keep in harbour than put forth and keep the sea where they cannot possibly avoid taking.\* And besides that such winds as aforesaid will carry them out of harbour into Holland, we shall be as ready to take the advantage of them from our own coast as themselves can be from theirs, considering what time they must have to embark their men and provisions, and observe their tides for going forth of their ports. For in that space we shall be as ready to meet them from our own shore as if we had anchored upon theirs. The Downs lie conveniently to guard Calais, Boulogne, St. Valery, and Havre de Grâce; the Isle of Wight for Dieppe, Cherbourg,† and all the creeks betwixt that and St. Malo, and Jersey for St. Malo. But their ports of greatest importance for the entertainment of their best ships are Brest, Blavet,‡ and some others that lie east-south-east and south-east from Ushant, and not within the Channel opposite to England.

But our safety is that those French ships that shall there ride must have two contrary winds to

\* Qy. avoid capture—or tacking?

† 'Sherbrook,' in Churchill text.

‡ 'Bluitt,' in MS.

carry them to Holland, for, whereas, a southerly or westerly wind will bring them out of the harbours aforesaid into our Channel, out of Brest and Blavet they must have an easterly wind to bring them to Ushant and then a south-west wind to carry them to Holland. In which course they must pass our three squadrons aforesaid, and will find it impossible to escape us.

Havre de Grâce, or Newhaven, which is the second good harbour, next to St. Malo, lying betwixt Calais and Ushant, is in the same state as Brest for both of them lie to be kept in with a westerly wind, and though Havre de Grâce be nearer to Holland by many leagues, yet putting out of harbour with a good wind that wind will prove perilous being out of harbour. By this you see how easy a thing it is to prevent any design of the French and Hollanders if they should combine together for any hurt to this kingdom, if there be a care had to follow these directions and commanders of experience appointed that know what belongs to the charge imposed upon them.\*

For the better information of those that shall be employed I will set down the state and condition of every harbour in France.

*The State of the Harbours in France.†*

There is a bank in the middle betwixt Dover and Calais, south from Dover, and west and by

\* See, on this section, *ante*, i. p. 89.

† This section, and that of the harbours in Spain and Portugal (*post*, pp. 56 *et seq*), are found, and in an incomplete form, only in R. The Churchill editor either had a fuller MS. or inserted some additional places on his own responsibility. Monson used contemporary atlases, especially the standard one of his manhood, Wagenhaer's *Mariners Mirror*, of which the first English edition was published in 1588.

south from Calais, that has but four fathoms at low water, and four leagues long.\*

The Old-Man is a good road for north-east, east or south-east winds, six or seven fathoms deep. St. John's road, nigh to it, is a good road for the same wind, and is fifteen or sixteen fathoms deep.†

Bullen ‡ is a barred harbour, and dry at low water.

The river of Somme, where St. Valery stands, if it were not for a bank that lies at the entrance thereof, were a good harbour.

From the Old-Man to Dieppe, six leagues south-south-west; betwixt them lies the river of Hen §; the town of Tréport is upon it; at low water dry.

Dieppe at full sea three fathoms: there are three buoys to direct you; at half flood small ships may go in, at low water dry.

St. Valery (en Caux), or Valdry en Canch, four leagues from Dieppe,|| a dry harbour; Feckhan,¶

\* There are two shoals, the Varne and the Ridge, formerly called Gunmans, and the Ripraps, or Calbarde, (French). The MS. reads 'a fathom'; there is one spot on the Ridge which has little more than a fathom at low water spring tides. The Varne is about five, and the Ridge about eight miles long.

† Opposite Ambleteuse, or between Cape Grisnez and Ambleteuse. The 'Old Man' here appears to be the northern part of the same anchorage, but the 'Old Man,' *par excellence*, was the Tour d'Ordre at Boulogne said to have been built by Caligula as a lighthouse and used by the English as a fort during their occupation of Boulogne 1544-50. There may have been some other tower in the vicinity also known by the same name, but it is more likely that the reference belongs to the Boulogne sentence and has got misplaced.

‡ Boulogne.

§ No doubt a clerical error or misprint for 'river of Eu,' really the river Bresle.

|| Really 16 or 17 miles.

¶ Fécamp.

four leagues from thence,\* west-south-west, a good harbour, two fathoms at low water.

Havre de Grâce,† at high water three fathoms ; and at low water one. There is no sailing from hence up the river of Seine to Rouen without a pilot.

Caen is six leagues south-west from Sand Head,‡ a barred harbour and full of sands going in.

Four leagues eastward lies the island of St. Mark, and to be sailed about, but faulty ground.§

The bay of Hogs is a good road for north-north-east winds, and, indeed, for all winds.||

Cherbourg ¶ is a small dry creek.

From thence is Faux Moberil, a dry haven.\*\*

A league from hence is cape de la Hague. Three leagues from this cape, lieth Alderney, west-and-by-north, almost three leagues long, east and west.†† The east is good to sail near the shore, but the west is bad, and the south side worse.‡‡

From Alderney to Guernsey, west-south-west, eight leagues ; §§ the east end of Guernsey is

\* Really about 15 miles. † Newhaven in MS.

‡ Sane Head in MS., i.e. Seine Head, Cape la Hève.

§ Evidently the isles St. Marcou or St. Marcouf, twelve leagues W. by N. of the mouth of the river Orne (Caen), are meant.

|| The road of La Hougue. It is exposed from N.E. to S.S.E.

¶ 'Chiremberke' in MS. In Wagenhaer it is called 'Chierenburch.'

\*\* Now Port d'Omonville, but it is not a dry haven. In the atlas of Pieter Goos (Amsterdam, 1667) it is marked as Fosse de Moberille ; it is not in Wagenhaer.

†† Alderney lies W.N.W. about  $8\frac{1}{2}$  miles from La Hague, and is  $3\frac{1}{4}$  miles long.

‡‡ The sailing directions say that the approach to Alderney is 'extremely dangerous' on every side but the north.

§§ Really 16 miles.

flat, the west slopy. Beware of the island of Aron; \* it is full of rocks. Betwixt the castle and the land it is a good road at six or seven fathoms, and without the castle at twelve or thirteen fathoms: it ebbs or flows here six or seven fathoms up and down.† There is good anchoring round about the island.

From Guernsey to St. Malo seven leagues south-south-east, and to Sark, east-and-by-north, one league.‡ You may anchor about it at twenty-six or twenty-seven fathoms.

From Guernsey to Jersey, south-east, eight leagues.§ There is good anchoring at Jersey round about it; and yet there lie rocks to the west side: on the north side there is a good road for a north-west wind. St. Catherine Bay, on the east side, is a very good road. You may go between Jersey and the rocks, called Paternoster, eleven fathoms, and anchor at Trinity Bay.||

From the west end of Jersey to St. Malo, south-and-by-east, eight or nine leagues. In the way there are rocks called the Monks.

The course from the Hague to St. Malo by Granville, Mount St. Michael, and Cancale, is full of rocks and dangerous.

The island near St. Malo, called Cézembre, a ship may go round about it safely.

The tides hereabouts rise and fall seven fathoms. There is no entrance but for small ships into St. Malo.

About five leagues west from thence lieth

\* Herm.

† Twenty-six to thirty feet is the extreme limit.

‡ Sark is distant from Guernsey about seven miles S.E.

§ Fifteen miles S.S.E.

|| *I.e.* Bouley Bay.



a great sandy bay where one may ride six or seven fathoms at all winds.\*

You may ride about the islands of Brisack ; † and a league and a half from hence are the islands of Pickle, ‡ islands which you may sail about ; as also the Seven Islands, § at four fathoms, as likewise Greeveland. ||

The haven of St. Jean de Dieu, three leagues from Morlaix, is a barred harbour ; from whence you may go to Morlaix through the rocks, and anchor in five fathoms water.

All havens thereabouts are barred but Roscoff, which is deep water, and has many good ships belonging to it. It is the Isle de Bas that makes Roscoff so good a harbour.

Brest is the best harbour in all France, and Blavet the next. Odogerne ¶ is a good harbour ; the bank before it is five or six fathoms deep on both sides ; there are three fathoms within at low water.

West Penmark is a good harbour, three fathoms at low water. Bindett \*\* is a dangerous harbour for rocks.

There is good anchoring about the islands of Mutton and Groye. ††

Blavet is an excellent harbour, four fathoms at low water.

\* Baie de la Fresnaye.

† Brehat.

‡ These are not marked in Wagenhaer, but in the atlases of Goos and of Jacob Colom (*The Fierie Sea-Columnne*, Amsterdam, 1647) they occur as the 'Pickels,' the Dutch name. They are probably the modern les Héaux.

§ Les Sept Isles.

|| Oy. St. Michel en Greve.

¶ Hodiérne.

\*\* Bay of Benaudet.

†† Isles aux Mouton and Groais.

Morbeau \* is a good harbour, but forceable tides, eight or nine fathoms; within the east side is a bold shore.

Behind the west point of Croisic there is a good road, at five, six, or seven fathoms, and safe as in a harbour.

The river of Nancy † is a good harbour, seven or eight fathoms water; but you must have a pilot.

The island Heyes ‡ has no good road; but the best is a south-west, or west-south-west wind.

St. Martin § twelve leagues, east-south-east from Heyes.

From St. Martin to St. Jean de Luz, is fifty-four leagues, and never a harbour in the way, but Bordeaux, worthy to be accounted, being all of them barred harbours.

\* Probably Morbihan, or Quiberon, bay is meant.

† Nantes, *i.e.* the Loire.

‡ Isle d'Yeu.

§ Isle de Rhé.

A Project how to war upon Holland, if hostility ever happen betwixt us.

\* IF the Hollanders shall neglect our favours and friendships, or become obstinate, perverse, and insolent, and so proud withal as to disdain us, I have not that mistrust of the force of England but that it will prove the revenge and punish their unthankfulness, as well by what I have said in the precedent project, as by this that follows. For, as in natural bodies, the longer they live in health sickness is the more dangerous when it assails them, so it will prove in an unsuccessful war of the Hollanders, who have so long sailed with a prosperous and fortunate gale, when at last they taste of the perverseness of fortune.

What can they value themselves upon, to speak truly, but England deserves the honour of it? We were the first that gave them life; and it is such a life, if they would consider it, that if we feed them not they faint and famish. Let them remember an old observation of State, *That he who entertains an army of strangers, takes a wolf by the ear*; for as it is dangerous to detain them so it is more perilous to let them go. And if his Majesty at any time call home his subjects from their service, that have been the wolves to their enemies, they will soon become

\* In MSS. the section commences at 'I will imitate herein the Marquis of Santa Cruz . . .' (p. 32).

silly sheep for others to prey upon. For things easily and unlawfully gotten are soonest lost and consumed if they be not supported.

If England at any time excepts against their ill usage, and calls them to account for injuries, they will find that we are the stronger and able to give them laws, and they the weaker to accept of the less evil. For where can they trade but they shall find interruption by us, laying aside their passage through our seas so that without our leave and harbours they cannot subsist in their navigations. But now to my purpose, to what I have in hand.

I will imitate herein the Marquis of Santa Cruz, a man eminent in Spain for his experience, employment, and good success in sea actions, who upon the breach of peace with England in 1585 presented to the King, his master, a relation how his territories and trade should be defended and the English annoyed. And as an imitator of the Marquis, I advise, seeing as the Hollanders' insolences are such as I know not how soon matters of unkindness may burst out betwixt Holland and us, that in the mean time we inform ourselves of the true state of their provinces by sea. And that there be a choice made of two sufficient seamen to be sent in a secret manner into the Low Countries, to take a view of their shipping, as namely, the number of vessels, their ordnance, and quality of them; to enquire of their ships abroad, and the conditions of them at large; of their number of mariners, and to distinguish betwixt the fishermen and sailors; to enquire of the decay of their trades, if their men and ships be employed in warfare; to observe how a war with England will relish with the multitude, and where and how they think most

to annoy us. For these things are necessary to be known from an enemy.

The next must be to supply and guard our forts and castles on the sea coast, for it is a main and important thing to keep the Hollanders from the succour of our harbours. And if they be forced to keep the sea in foul weather, with contrary winds and long nights, with the length and narrowness of our Channel they will take little comfort and have little profit in their navigation and the cliffs of England and France will be enriched with their wrecks.

Such towns seated opposite to Holland and Zealand, ought to be extraordinarily guarded and fortified, but especially Sandwich, Harwich, and Yarmouth, in respect of their harbours and roads to entertain fleets, their natural situation for strength, and the number of people there resident that are descended from Holland.

But how all these places should be guarded and defended by shipping that are so far distant and remote from one another, there rests the difficulty.

In this case we must work and foresee according to the winds that bring ships from Holland upon our coast, which is a north-east or easterly wind. And suppose the Hollanders with that wind direct their course for Harwich, Yarmouth, or other northern parts of England or Scotland; and that our ships with that north-east wind lie in the Downs, which is our ordinary road, this northerly or north-east wind is full in our teeth to pursue them, so that in lying at the Downs our fleet shall serve for no use nor purpose.

Or by keeping the sea with our ships our meeting is as uncertain, the sea being wide and spacious; and many other casualties may happen,

as if we be taken with a hard gale of wind and put to leeward. Whilst we seek to fetch it up again they shall have time and leisure to land where they list, as I can instance in this case many precedents. And therefore, instead of the Downs, I conclude Yarmouth to be the only road for the rendezvous and seat of our shipping. For there we shall be ready upon all occasions to set sail, what wind soever shall bring an enemy from Holland, upon news of their landing, be it in the river of Thames or any other place they can fetch upon the coast of England, we shall have notice of it in two hours either from the shore by fire beacons or by keeping pinnaces at sea which may repair unto us, and we able to play room \* upon them before they can put their men on shore or order their affairs. And as the advantage of an invader is to work with the advantage of the wind, so must the defendant seek as well to prevent them by the same advantage of wind.†

The next thing I would wish to be put in execution, which rather should be the first as of most importance, as I have already declared, is the guard of his Majesty's ships in harbour

\* Bear down.

† During the Dutch wars the anchorage within the Gunfleet Sands was frequently employed as a rendezvous or shelter which, in principle, is the same as Monson's recommendation of Yarmouth Roads. It will be noticed that he assumes throughout that the English are standing on the defensive and awaiting the Dutch attack; there is not a word suggesting that it should be the object of a navy strong enough to fight, as he believed the English to be, to seek the enemy and destroy him. On this section see also *ante*, i. p. 88.

On the other hand the weaker fleet is not necessarily compelled to await passively the will and initiative of the stronger one. Pitted against a Commander-in-Chief of genius there might be surprises in store for the latter. At sea, as on land, the man is of more importance than men—and ships.

at Chatham, for the prosperity and welfare of England consists in their safety. And if Holland should prove an enemy, now that Flushing is in their possession, and within fourteen or fifteen hours' sail from Chatham, they may easily give an enterprise upon them. I think good to give this caution, that an attempt upon his Majesty's navy is more perilous from an enemy to the eastward of us, as Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, than from the southward, as France, Spain, or the Straits. For ships from the eastward are able to come directly with one wind, without striking sail, from the countries aforesaid, as those from the southward must have two contrary winds, the one at south-west, to bring them to the Downs, and after, an easterly wind, to carry them to Chatham, which perhaps will not happen in an age.

And it is not unworthy consideration how fatal those easterly countries have been to this kingdom, first by the Saxons, and after by the Danish conquest.

My next advice is that we strive by all means possible to possess ourselves of the town of Flushing, being of more importance to our State than any ten towns of Europe, as I will declare in my next project. First, we shall be strengthened with as many ships as belong to Middleburg and Flushing: secondly, it will draw all the rest of Zealand into our subjection, the principal harbour being Flushing: thirdly, it will be a bridle to Holland; for they can no more maintain their navigations to the southward, which afford them their greatest profit, than a subject to live under a King and disobey his laws. For we having Flushing, and guarding the Downs in Kent, all succours and safety for their ships upon

that coast is taken from them and they shall be forced to submit themselves into our harbours, for by keeping the sea they shall run a greater hazard.

Now to proceed to the Hollanders encountering us at sea ; for that it must come to, not once but often, if wars ever happen betwixt us.

They will in reason labour to put their fortune upon the first battle at sea because their State cannot maintain a long and lingering war with us. Secondly, their ships and mariners, by which they live to support their State, their revenues being contributions raised out of trade, necessarily must fail when their ships and men are converted to any other use than merchandize. But especially when the same ships and men must be maintained out of this kind of revenue that was wont to bring in gain. Thirdly, the victory first gotten redoubles the courage of the victor ; it astonishes and discourages the vanquished ; it shakes the fidelity of subjects, many whereof are too much inclined to the Holland faction ; it gets reputation, and gains friends and alliances abroad, who commonly sway with good success. And therefore I wish we never present them, at the first encounter, with less force than to determine the quarrel.

The benefit the Hollanders shall have upon our coast is the use of our roads though we debar them our harbours. Which roads are open, spacious, indefensible, and will succour them in all winds and weathers, as namely, the Isle of Wight, Portland, Torbay, &c.

And, to prevent them herein, must be to divide our fleet into three squadrons, as I have said before, the one to lie in the Narrow Seas, the second at the Isle of Wight, and the third on the



western coast. They being thus divided no ship can escape them, for though they shall pass one squadron in the night unseen, or in a fog, they cannot avoid falling into the lap of one of the other two. And we shall make our East India voyage no farther than our own Channel, for their ships must pass it going and coming.

I will not omit to put in execution a stratagem when our fleet shall be thus divided, *viz.* to place along the sea shores fires like beacons from the cape of Cornwall,\* to the North Foreland in Kent, with a care they be well watched and guarded; that when a fleet shall be descried at sea, or ships arrive in the road aforesaid, the beacons next adjoining to be fired, and, like a running post, one fire to take it of another that in a little space an easterly squadron shall have notice what happeneth to the westward, and the west to the east. So that howsoever the wind is one of the squadrons shall come room upon the other, and upon the ships in the roads aforesaid.

But perhaps some will say that if so few ships as those of Dunkirk did so great a spoil to us in time of war what can we expect but destruction from the Hollanders that have a hundred vessels to one of the others in those days. To which I answer that though the Dunkirkers took many ships in the Queen's time, yet they never lessened ours nor the Hollanders' numbers. For by reason the harbours of Flanders are barred and not to be entered at all hours and tides, but only at a full sea, they used after they took any ships of ours to attend for a wind and tide to enter. Besides, they were in continual danger to have them rescued by the Hollanders and the Queen's ships

\* The Lizard.

which always kept the coast guarded. Therefore the Dunkirkers were wont to take forth the masters and merchants\* of their prizes for pledges, and bind them to pay the sum agreed on between them for redemption of their ships and persons, whereby they lessened not a ship of ours nor of the Hollanders.†

But with us it will be otherwise ; for all such ships as we take we shall be able to enjoy without danger or fear, our coasts and harbours being nigh us, our ports capable at all times and tides to receive us. And I dare boldly say and aver that if his Majesty will give free liberty to his subjects to take and spoil as many Hollanders as they can in their trades at sea, in a little space they will be able of themselves, without his Majesty's help or assistance, to take or destroy the better part of their vessels within their provinces.

For let us compare them with the pirates of Algiers, and Tunis who till of late years, that they were instructed by Christians, were ignorant in what belonged either to ships or mariners. And if we consider in what little space they increased to the number they are now of, being all of them ships of Christians, and not one of their own, it is to be marvelled and our case to be compared with it. For if in like manner we fit, furnish, and man such ships as we shall take from the Hollanders, and employ them against the Hollanders themselves, the natural inclination of our men to the sea considered, the small expense in rigging, victualling, and furnishing them, the little distance they shall sail both outward and homeward and the continual supplies from land

\* Pursers or factors.

† The Churchill text also has ' they durst not keep their prizes longer than they had made this contract aforesaid.'

they shall receive—for one ship the pirates of Algiers have taken, as aforesaid, we shall become owners of forty, and make one of them the destruction of another, without farther help either at home or abroad.

For securing our Newcastle trade, it must be to fortify our ships with ordnance, to go in fleets, and to sail near the shore, that if they be chased, or in danger of taking, to run on land. The countries upon the sea coast must be commanded to keep a good watch and to be ready to rescue any ships that shall be so distressed.

And because I have named the ships of Newcastle I will deliver my opinion of them, and compare them with the ships of Holland which all men hold so terrible that they are frightened with the name of them, so great esteem they have of them above ours. What I shall say may perhaps be wondered at, and my judgment by some be taxed; but, if well considered, it will not seem so great an error as upon the first apprehension.

I will compute two hundred sail of ships, betwixt two and three hundred tons in burden, to belong to the trade of Newcastle, vessels for their strength in building, for their spaciousness within board, for the decks to place their ordnance, and all other convenience to make men of war, I dare say Holland has not the like. If these ships be fortified with English ordnance, which Holland affords not but with grief I may say is supplied from us; and if one hundred of our trained soldiers be put on board every one of them, which we may do of our own nation,\* and which Holland

\* The passage 'and which . . . the enemy' does not occur in MS.

cannot do, unless they dissolve their land army and put themselves into the mercy of the enemy, I will be bold to say that these ships alone will be able to encounter the whole force of the Netherlands, for, as I have said, they have no ordnance of their own in Holland but must be beholden to us for it. And, as I have computed but two hundred ships, by a project contained in this book we shall double the number of two hundred and, by consequence, be as strong again.

Though this trade seems to be but of small account, in respect of the meanness of the commodity, that it is amongst ourselves and in the kingdom only, and that the ships return from London unladen, yet we may account it of most importance and consequence to the State of England considering the multitude of mariners it breeds, and the readiness of them for his Majesty's service when he has sudden occasion to use them. For every three weeks these ships never fail to make their repair into the river of Thames, if they be not hindered by wind. As all other trades but this is out of the kingdom, and upon their voyages in summer, so that if his Majesty have need to furnish but two of his ships to sea there will not be found mariners sufficient to man them if it be not for the Newcastle trade.\*

Leaving this, I will once more return to our annoying the Hollanders. If we go further from home to seek out the Hollanders, yea, as far as the East Indies, a place that has puffed them up with pride, and has bred a heart of disdain against us, more for the number of their ships that resort thither and the length of their navigation than for any profit they find there. The next voyage

\* This section ends here in the MSS.

we undertake shall be to seek them in their return from thence, in a desolate and uninhabited island, called Mauritius, after the name of the last Prince of Orange, lying in the course betwixt those places of the Indies they trade to and the Cape of Good Hope. This island affords them great comfort and refreshing, which makes their navigation much the easier and commodious; and as the meeting of ships is more certain in a harbour than at sea so is ours the more sure to find and take them there.

If it happen that the Hollanders fail falling in with that island, which must proceed more out of negligence than will for they are to expect a great succour in their way home by that island, then they are to repair to Saldanha bay, near the Cape of Good Hope. Or, missing that, then to the Island of Santa Helena, well known to us and long frequented by the Portuguese; for no other places can succour their unsufferable wants. And, though we should fail to meet them in any of these places aforesaid, nevertheless they cannot account themselves safe at home when they remember the long distance they have to sail, and the dangers they are to pass through our Channel if we become their enemies, unless they avoid us, by going into the north part of Scotland, which in my fishing project I have handled.

There are many other ways to offend the Hollanders, which I forbear to speak of, referring them to my breast, till there be occasion. And I will prosecute my design upon the Island of Wakerland.

A Project how to Compass the Possession of the Island of Wakerland,\* and Flushing, if the King of England will compound with the King of Spain for that island.†

‡ In my former project I wished, as a matter of greatest importance to our State, to seek and get the possession of the island of Wakerland, wherein Flushing is seated. The reasons whereof I have in some kind declared; and now shall follow the manner how to compass it with consent and liking of the inhabitants, if they will accept and hearken to reason, before we attempt them with violence or force. For it is a maxim, 'He that is master of the sea shall be able both to take and defend Flushing or most islands.'

The first thing we must put in execution is to have a book printed and divulged in the name of some person, pretending to be born there, and advising the inhabitants of the island to hearken to his reasons, being moved to write out of a natural affection he bears his country.

His first reason is for them to consider the end for which they have so long fought, (*viz.*) their religion, their liberty, their security, and their commodity, and have not as yet attained

\* *I.e.* Walcheren.

† Thus in MS., but the Churchill text has 'compound with the natives,' which, it will be seen, is more consonant with the subject-matter.

‡ In MS. this section commences below at 'The first thing.'

them, nor like to do, so long as the King of Spain is made able to subsist in that war. The second consideration, is how to compass these four ends by a more gentle and easy course than by war, which may be effected if they will judiciously weigh and consider the ensuing reasons. The book must make it appear what discourtesies and oppressions Holland imposes continually on them, which indeed are insufferable; but that both their security depends upon their mutual agreement because of the third that is enemy to them both. To wish them to consider that though their payments in the Island of Wakerland do equal Holland in their proportion, and that their men of war of Zealand are esteemed and known to be more warlike and to have done braver exploits than the Hollanders by sea, yet, notwithstanding, what service is done either by land or sea is all attributed to Holland. For Zealand and Wakerland are not once mentioned; and therefore to advise them to divide themselves from Holland that their worths and virtues may appear to the world.

The way for them to attain to happiness must be by the countenance and assistance of some powerful neighbour prince to rely upon; and England, above the rest, would be able to obtain that for them, in a peaceable manner, which with the loss of their blood they could not enjoy in the sixty odd years of war. And if the ensuing conditions may be yielded to by the King of England they may boldly sheathe up their swords and never have cause hereafter to draw them again.\*

\* Zealand was perhaps the most intensely patriotic province of the Republic, and the Zealand seamen hated the English as much as Monson did the Dutch.

*The commodious Conditions which the Inhabitants  
are to contract with the King of England.*

The beginning of all men's actions must tend to the service of God, every one according to his private conscience. No other King in these parts of the world but the King of England does maintain the religion by them professed. And for the better proof thereof his Majesty's father, of famous memory, shewed himself a principal pillar and the absolute cause to settle the true religion in their provinces ; as it appeared by the council of Dort against the innovation of Arminius. Which sect Wakerland was never known to favour or embrace : nor will his Majesty assume the nomination of their elders or preachers, nor meddle with their church discipline, but refer it to themselves.

Whereas they are overcharged with contributions and excises, in the government they now live under, they may condition with his Majesty to ease them the moiety of what they now pay, and the other moiety be reserved for defence against an enemy, or in fortifications or maintenance of garrisons. All which soldiers to be English, as people that are no strangers to them in acquaintance or conditions, as they have made proof when they lived together without any kind of discourtesies.\* Whereas, also, many times they appeal to the general States, residing in the Hague, or upon occasion they are often called thither to their great expense and discontent, they shall be eased of that trouble and

\* When an English garrison held Flushing during Elizabeth's reign



charge, and determine all questions and settle their affairs amongst themselves, by authority from his Majesty, without having relation to any other provinces. This will prove a greater freedom and liberty than they could all this while compass by the sword, or can otherwise do by any other course they can think of.

His Majesty by this grant, and other immunities he may give, without innovation or infringing their ancient laws and customs, will make them freer than ever they have been. And his protection will be so strong a defence to them that no prince or nation dare offer to injure them, either at home or abroad.

It is apparent what benefit they shall reap by these privileges. First, in easing them of the moiety of their excises ; but most especially if his Majesty will be drawn to grant them the privilege of his subjects in their customs within his own dominions, and to have a freedom of their ships to take freights within his Majesty's ports, which the laws of the land prohibit to any but his own subjects. Many other things his Majesty may grant that will prove more profitable to them than living under the government they now do. Perhaps his Majesty may be drawn to consent to the remove of the English staple from Delft to Middelburg, where it had long continued heretofore, to the commodity of the whole island as themselves best know.

In yielding their obedience to his Majesty it is no new precedent amongst themselves ; for in the years 1431-6, after Holland, Friesland and Zealand, with the Island of Wakerland, had continued in the line of Thierry of Aquitaine the space of six hundred years, Jacqueline, widow and heiress of these provinces, resigned them to

Philip I. Duke of Burgundy.\* By which resignation these three States became joined to Flanders and the rest of the provinces, and still continues in the line of Philip.

If these people may enjoy their religion quietly, their liberties freely, their security peaceably, their commerce, trade, and wealth plentifully, and have the honour to be subject to so mighty a King, no man can justly pity them if by refusing it they fall into the hands of enemies. And if their pride and obstinacy refuse this solid advance of a friend, as the state of England now stands, that by our permission the Hollanders are grown to so great a strength by sea, it behoves us to seek a remedy for our safeties ; which cannot be better done than by possessing the Island of Wakerland which does more concern us than any plot of ground elsewhere.

And if we be put by force to obtain it there is no more to be said than I have often repeated, *viz.* that so long as we are stronger by sea, that we keep our ports guarded and armed, and prohibit their entrance into them, not only all Wakerland, but Holland and Zeeland, will be at our devotion as aforesaid, as may appear by the project that went before.

\* Much as the lamb ' resigns ' itself to the wolf.

Of the Harbours of Holland, Zealand, and Flanders, in order, if we have Wars, to take advantage of them.\*

THE Texel has three channels, whereof the Spaniard's, or the King's, is the best. When you are within there is a good road under the island of Texel, and from thence you go up to Amsterdam and all places within the Zuider Zee.†

To the northward of the Texel lies the Vlie, a good channel but narrow. For ships that come out of the Zuider Zee there are two channels going out of the Vlie.

From the Texel to the Maas, S. S. W. twenty-four leagues; the Maas goes into the Brill and has three channels, whereof one is better than the rest and has sixteen feet at a full sea. Within the Brill the channel carries them to Schiedam, Rotterdam, Delft Haven, and other places thereabouts. The old Maas carries them up to Dort.

From the Maas, or the Brill, up to Goeree two leagues S. W. The Goeree hath eighteen feet at low water; and so you may go up at Helvoetsluis, where you may ride with the greatest ship of Holland.

From Goeree to the island of Wakerland, six

\* This section does not occur in MS. It is largely a repetition of the description of the Dutch coast in Book II. (*ante*, iii. p. 228).

† Zurick Sea in the Churchill text.

leagues S. W. The island of Schouwen is betwixt them, and Brouwershaven is in that island.\*

Flushing is the best harbour in all Zealand, and lies in the island of Wakerland. The channel has four fathoms, at the water going in.

From Flushing to Gravelines, twenty-four leagues W. S. W. These harbours following lie betwixt them, and all upon the coast of Flanders, (*viz.*) Ostend, twelve leagues; from thence to Nieuport, three leagues; from thence to Dunkirk, five leagues; from thence to Gravelines, four leagues. Mardike lies betwixt the two last, and is the best harbour upon all that coast, as it is now made.†

From the Texel to the Foreland in England, S. W. forty-seven leagues.

From the Texel to Yarmouth, west, thirty-two leagues; from the Maas to Harwich, west, a little southerly, twenty-nine leagues; from the Maas, or Goeree, S. W. and by W. thirty-six leagues; from Flushing to the Foreland, west, twenty-four leagues.

\* Scowden and Bruers Haven in the Churchill text.

† From Ostend to Nieuport is 9 miles; Nieuport to Dunkirk, 12 miles; Dunkirk to Gravelines, 10 miles.

A Project how to make War upon Spain,  
written in the Queen's Time, and pre-  
sented to Sir Robert Cecyll, by her  
Majesty's Appointment.\*

THE continual annoyance our small ships of war have for many years offered the Spaniards upon their own coasts makes them of late more provident than before they were, by drawing home their ships in fleets, that were wont to come straggling. As may appear by the West Indies trade, whose ships strove to be first at home to take the better market, but now they use to repair to the Havana, where they attend the coming of the Plate fleet; into which ships they put their silver, gold and things of value, and are wafted themselves by the same fleet. By which means few of the India ships have been of late years taken into England. The Portuguese trade is more general than the Spaniards' trade; as namely into the East Indies, Brazil, St. Thomé, Castle de la Mina, and other parts of Guinea. From the two latter they use to send their gold brigantines to St. Thomé, and transport it into Portugal with the fleet which returns in September. Both into Brazil and hither they freight the fly-boats of Holland and the east country that are of good force, which defend themselves and their lesser ships in their company from the English.

\* There is no MS. authority for this section.

These fleets of later years have avoided touching at the Terceira Islands, which were wont to afford them relief and succour, because they were continually haunted by the English. And such armadas as were wont to be sent to those islands now keep off the headlands on their own coast as the surest means to defend them. For whosoever seeks a coast will first fall with a headland or cape.

*How to employ our Fleets against Spain.*

The last summer's good fortune that Holland and we both had, in taking each of us a carrack, may encourage us both to employ our sea forces against Spain, being a means to work us both security and for Holland to prosecute their wars with more advantage. And if by one consent we agree together we must resolve upon the employment of two several fleets ; the number, the time, and manner how to employ them, with the hopes of what we are to make by them, are as follows :

The carracks outward : the Plate fleet homeward.

The Tierra-firme and New Spain fleets outward.

The carracks and New Spain fleet homeward.

The carracks' departure from Lisbon is certain. For if they exceed the 15th of April they are commonly forced back, not being able to double the Abrolhos shoals on the coast of Brazil in the eighteenth degree.

And, as I have said before, that the meeting of a ship or fleet is more certain upon a headland, nigh a port whither they are bound, than in an open sea where they may escape by night, by fog, by being to leeward, or many other casualties.

Therefore, besides the gross fleet that should make good the coast of Spain, it were fit the enemy were busied in both his Indies, and how to offend him in his East Indies, I have set down in this book ; to which I refer you. Our second, and most material hope, is upon the Plate fleet, whose coming home is uncertain, though for the space of four or five years past, they have observed the months of March and April. The ports whither they resort are San Lucar or Cadiz ; the likeliest place of meeting them is Cape St. Mary, the headland they commonly make before they put into San Lucar. The greatest doubt of meeting this fleet is the intelligence they may receive out of Spain, considering the small distance betwixt them and the Indies and the certainty of the winds, whereby they may give warning to their fleet to winter there if they see cause. And therefore the subtlest and securest course to prevent them is to send two or three pinnaces, excellent choice sailers, to lie before the Havana to attend the coming out of their fleet, and after to pursue them astern till they bring them into the height they mean to haul in. Which done, one of the three pinnaces may repair with all speed to our fleet, where they shall have directions to find them, and give relation in what state and in what height they left them : the other two pinnaces are not to leave company of the fleet, unless the fleet alter its height, which, if they do, one of the two pinnaces is to follow the same directions the other did—with this caution, that if they find themselves in danger of being taken they throw their instructions overboard.

The third and last hope of our fleet is the ships of *Tierra-firme* or the Firm Land, which go for the next year's plate, and are commonly

to depart from Spain at the coming home of the other fleet: the place to meet them is eighteen or twenty leagues from Cape Cantin in Barbary. We may know by the wind, within a point or two, how they will steer, as also the time of their departure from San Lucar by the moon, for they must observe the spring tides to come over the bar. We may likewise provide to have intelligence by the way of Mamora or Sallee, two towns in Barbary opposite to that part of Spain.

If we should prove so unhappy as to miss this fleet, if her Majesty will purpose this squadron to the Indies they will not fail meeting with them at the northernmost part of Dominica where they use to water. Or, being departed from thence, their course is certain to cape de Vela, and after to Nombre de Dios, where commonly they take in their treasure, and where they may be easily surprised. I will suppose our second fleet to be at sea, upon return of our first, who have these several hopes likewise: the carracks and New Spain fleet homeward; and the New Spain fleet outward. If her Majesty will resolve to keep a continual fleet, as is proposed, few of these ships can possibly escape us, either going or coming, seeing we know the course they sail, the season of the year they must needs pass, and the harbours whither they are bound.

The New Spain fleet, outward, is to depart from the same part, through the same seas, and in the same course, the *Tierra-firme* or *Firm Land* fleet doth; only they differ in the time of the year, for they exceed not their midsummer day to set sail from Spain because of their safe getting to the port of San Juan de Ulua before the entrance of the northerly winds which are perilous upon that coast. Their watering-place



is Guadalupe, where a small strength were able suddenly to surprise them ; their men and ships being out of order and form by their rummaging them, and doing other works about them when they come to water ; and their force consisting but of two galleons of war, the one Admiral, the other Vice-Admiral.

*The Security to our State.*

These undertakings being followed according to the designs set down, and taking that good success that is hoped for, are one great means to breed security to our State ; the enemy being impoverished and we enriched.

Our only security must be to cut off Spain's forces by sea, seeing their means of invasion and strength of defence depends upon their shipping. How this service may be effected, and the benefit that will arise by it, is here briefly handled.

First, and principally, we must keep employed two main fleets upon the coast of Spain eight months in the year, that is, from March to November. Every fleet to consist of forty-five ships, to be divided into three squadrons ; one to lie off the Rock \* to intercept all traders of Lisbon ; the second at the South Cape, to stop all intercourse to San Lucar and Cadiz, and to and from the Indies ; the third to the Islands, lest they should there stop and put their goods ashore, having intelligence of our being upon the coast of Spain. Our fleet being thus divided, no army at sea can be prepared, or at least gathered to a head, but we shall intercept them. We shall not only debar the Spaniards and Portuguese their

\* Cape Roca.

own trade but all nations to them. They will not be able to feed without our permission, nor no nation can be brought to greater extremity than they will be. Perhaps the number of these ships will exceed the proportion her Majesty is willing to employ. But if Holland will be drawn from the trade of Spain, and join with us the number may be easily raised by them and our maritime towns in England, so that her Majesty needs employ but six ships of her own in each fleet, to serve for Admiral and Vice-Admiral of every squadron.

It is not the meanest mischief we shall do the King of Spain, if we war thus upon him, to force him to keep his shores still armed and guarded, to the infinite vexation, charge, and discontent of his subjects. For no time or place can secure them so long as they see or know us to be upon the coast. The terror is so great they conceive of her Majesty's ships, that a few of them presenting themselves in view do commonly divert their actions, as may appear by these brief observations following.

~~507~~ In the year 1587 Sir Francis Drake, with twenty-five ships, prevented an expedition for England that summer, which they attempted the next year, 1588, because they were not molested as in the year before. Our action to Portugal following so suddenly upon the overthrow of 1588 made the King of Spain so far unable to offend that, if it had been prosecuted with judgment, he had been in ill circumstances to have defended it or his other kingdoms. From that time till 1599 he grew great by sea because he was not busied by us as before, as it appeared by the fleet that took the Revenge. Which navy it is very likely had been employed against

England if it had not been diverted by my Lord Thomas Howard in 1591. And for four years together he employed his ships to the Islands, for the guard of his merchants, which made him have no leisure to think of England. The expedition to Cadiz, in 1596, did not only frustrate the intended action against England but destroyed many of his ships and provisions that should have been employed in that service.

In 1597 he meant a second revenge upon England but was prevented by the expedition of my Lord of Essex to the Islands. Which action, if it had been well carried, and that my Lord would have believed good advice, it had ruined the King of Spain. The next year that gave cause of fear to the Queen was 1599, the King of Spain having a whole year, by our sufferance, to make his provisions, and brought his ships and armies down to Coruña. Which put the Queen to a more chargeable defensive war than the value of an offensive fleet would have been maintained upon his coast.

This great expedition was diverted by the fleet of Holland, which the Adelantado pursued to the islands.\*

The year that followed was 1600, which gave hope of peace; for nothing was attempted on either side till the year 1601 that he invaded Ireland, but with ill success as you have heard. The last summer, 1602, he was braved by her Majesty's ships in the mouth of his harbours, with the loss of a carrack, so that he was not able to prosecute his affairs against Ireland. For no sooner was Sir Richard Leveson returned but I was sent again upon that coast, as you have

\* The Canaries.

heard, who kept the King's forces so employed that he betook himself only to the guard of his shores.

The sequel of all these actions being duly considered we may be confident that, whilst we busy the Spaniards at home, they dare not think of invading England or Ireland, for by their absence the fleet of their Indies may be endangered. And in their attempts they have as little hope of prevailing.

Thus have I ventured to deliver to your Honour so much as you desired at my hand ; and so much as I think is convenient for our present actions.\*

How to work for intelligence out of Spain, I have shewed in my First Book;† but will proceed to the state of the harbours in Spain, for us to take advantage of.

#### *Of the Harbours in Biscay.*

From cape Machicaco to cape de Peñas, lies the coast of Biscay.‡

From cape Machicaco to Bilbao thirteen leagues, S. S. W. Bermeo is in the way ; a barred haven.

Plencia, W. from it ; a barred haven.

Bilbao, a good harbour ; but in it there is a sand, called la Barse.§

\* On this section see *ante*, i. pp. 86, 87.

† *Ante*, ii. p. 253 *et seq.*

‡ I do not know Monson's authority for the geographical limits he assigns to the province of Biscay. They do not correspond with those of old maps.

§ Probably a variant of *les basses* (shoals) or of the Spanish *la barra*, the bar.

Castro Urdiales, five leagues from Bilbao ; no safeguard for ships but with a S. W. wind.

From Castro to Laredo, six leagues, W., a good harbour for great ships.

From Bilbao to St. Antonie,\* W. and by N. nine or ten leagues.

From St. Antonie to cape Kesgo,† W. three leagues.

From cape Kesgo to Santander, five leagues, W. and by S. a good harbour.

Betwixt Santander and cape Peñas, thirty-seven or thirty-eight leagues, W. and these havens betwixt them :

The haven of Santillana, W. five leagues from Santander ; a barred harbour.

San Vicente de la Barquera, five leagues, a barred haven, from Santillana.

To Llanes ‡ three leagues, in a barred harbour.

Roi Sella — five or six leagues ; a barred harbour.§

From thence to Villaviciosa two leagues ; a barred harbour.

From thence to Sanson,|| seven leagues ; betwixt it and a little island, there is a good road.

In the west side of Sanson is likewise a good road.

Orion, where fishermen lay their nets.

Torres,¶ a good road for a S. W. wind.

The cape Peñas, three leagues.

\* Santoña.

† Cape Ajo. It is marked as Kesgo in seventeenth-century atlases.

‡ 'Chares' in Churchill text ; omitted in MS.

§ Ribadesella. The whole sentence is omitted in MS.

|| So Churchill ; Gion in MS., *i.e.* Gijon.

¶ Cape Torres. I cannot identify Orion.

From cape Machicaco to cape Peñas, sixty-eight leagues.

But coming from St. Jean de Luz in France, Fuenterrabia, four leagues; from thence a good road for a N. W. wind.

Los Pasages is the next, a good harbour, at seven fathoms.

San Sebastian, three leagues W. from it; a good harbour, five, six, or seven fathoms before the town.

From hence to cape Machicaco thirteen leagues.

It is good anchoring in all the bays upon the coast of Biscay, twenty fathoms.

### *The Coast of Galicia.*

From cape Peñas three leagues S. S. W. to Avilés a good harbour, and a good road without; seven or eight fathoms within the harbour.

From Avilés to Ribadeo, three leagues, S. W. and by W. a good harbour, three fathoms water.

N. W. from Ribadeo eight leagues, cape Brilo; \* and within Vivero, a good harbour, one may go about the island of San Cyprian.†

From Vivero to Ortegal nine leagues, W. N. W. St. Mark's,‡ in the way, a good road, at seven or eight fathoms without; safe for a S. W. and a W. wind all the coast along.

A good road under Ortegal for a N. W. wind, and a S. W. wind.

To cape Prior, S. W. eleven leagues; betwixt

\* C. de Burela.

† Anzuela island in the bay of San Cyprian. Anzuela is marked as San Cyprian by Wagenhaer.

‡ Oy. Barquero.

them is the haven of Sequera,\* a good harbour ; ten fathoms within.

Three leagues from cape Prior lieth Ferrol, an excellent harbour at twelve fathoms.

South, and S. and by W. to the Groyne, three leagues, a good harbour.

It is foul about the island of Cizarke.†

Queres ‡ is a good harbour for great ships.

From Cizarke, to Mongie § S.W. and by W. thirteen leagues.

Cocobayno || hath eight or nine fathoms.

Rio Roxo, ¶ full of rocks ; but being in a good harbour.

Pontevedra, eight or nine fathoms ; in some places forty fathoms deep.

You may anchor under the Islands of Bayona ; ten, eleven, or twelve fathoms.

Vigo, a good harbour ; ten or twelve fathoms before the town.

Bayona, five fathoms ; but a blind rock before the town.

Camena,\*\* a tide haven.

### *Portugal.*

Viana, a barred haven ; a narrow channel, but a good road without.

Villa do Conde, a barred harbour.

Metelema, †† two fathoms full sea.

\* Cedeira.

† Sisarga Islands.

‡ Now Cores ; Corme bay is the roadstead.

§ Mugia.

|| Corcubion.

¶ Arosa bay (Wagenhaer).

\*\* Caminha, at the mouth of the R. Minho.

†† Metellin in Wagenhaer, now Mattosinhos on Rio Leça. A new harbour, Porto Leixoes, now exists at the mouth of the Leça.

Porto, two channels ; the south is the best, but alters sometimes ; before the town ten or twelve fathoms.

Aveiro,\* two fathoms ; but within four or five fathoms.

Peniche, a tide haven : the islands Berlingas off at sea, a good road, at ten fathoms.

Lisbon has two great channels going in before you come to Belem castle.

Cezimbra is a good road ; fifteen or sixteen fathoms.

Setubal † has three fathoms and a half at half flood.

Cape St. Vincent, a good road for a northerly wind.

#### *Algarve.*

Lagos, Villanova,‡ and Faro, all barred and small havens.

Tavira, a crooked, dry haven, and alters every year.

#### *Andaluzia.*

Ayamonte parts Portugal and Spain, and is one of the best havens in all the Condado ; three fathoms half-flood.

Lepe, or St. Michael's, not to be entered without a pilot, the channel alters so.

Palos, or Saltes, six fathoms within ; at the bar three and a half at half flood.

San Lucar has a great bar, but deep within for any ship.

\* The name of the port is omitted in MS.

† ' St. Vues ' in MS.

‡ Villa Nova de Portimão.



Cadiz, a brave bay at eight, ten, twelve, or fifteen fathoms : from thence to the Straits mouth eleven leagues.

*Barbary.*

Opposite to this part of Spain lies Barbary, though the King of Spain has most harbours in it, as namely, Oran, Ceuta, Tangier, El Araish,\* Mamora, Asamor, and Mazagan. The Moors have only Sallee on the north, and Saphee and Santa Cruz † on the west.‡

Arzila, the north channel, good ships may enter.

El Araish, the river crooked, but a good road without, at fifteen or sixteen fathoms.

Mamora, two fathoms at entrance, but a good harbour within.

Sallee, a barred harbour all that coast ; a good road at fourteen or fifteen fathoms.§

Mazagan must have a pilot to bring in a ship.

To cape Cantin thirteen leagues ; only a cape to ride under.

Saphee, a good road, ten, eleven, or twelve fathoms.

The island of Mogador, a good road for small shipping.

Santa Cruz, such a road as Saphee.

\* Alaracke in Churchill.

† Or Agadir.

‡ This paragraph does not occur in MS.

§ The MS. reads 'Sallee from thence to Algasse (El Araish) and to Asamor where you anchor in the road at fourteen or fifteen fathoms.' Neither version is very clear, but probably the meaning is that Sallee is the only harbour between El Araish and Asamor.

## A Project how to increase two hundred Sail of Ships.

I WILL leave my long and late navigations that these latter ages have brought to light and return home to exercise and execute such projects as may be more profit and safety to the King and Commonwealth. The next voyage I will undertake shall be to sail to Newcastle, which we may properly call our North Indies, because of the commodity and strength that arises to the kingdom by it, as shall appear by what follows.

The chief trade we have now-a-days to increase mariners and shipping, is our trade to Newcastle. There are yearly set to work in that trade two hundred sail of ships, which ships and mariners are once in three weeks in the port of London, ready for his Majesty's service if there happen any sudden occasion. All other trades are out of the kingdom, and upon their voyages in the summer time, so that if his Majesty has occasion but to furnish two of his ships with men the kingdom cannot afford them at that time of the year if it were not for the trade of Newcastle.\*

The course how to effect this project must be by increasing this trade, whereby more ships may be set to work, (as thus) to prohibit all strangers to fetch coals at Newcastle; and for

\* This statement is quite incorrect. The manning of an ordinary squadron during a period of peace was not dependent on any one trade, port, or county.

us to make our staple at London or Woolwich for all strangers to fetch their coals from thence after we have with our own ships brought them thither. For whereas there are two hundred sail of strangers' ships set to work to the trade of Newcastle, the same number of ships would be increased if his Majesty's subjects had the bringing of them for London or Woolwich.

*I will now prove it to be rather beneficial than hurtful to strangers.*

1. The stranger will be able to perform this voyage in ten or twelve days to London, when many times he is five or six weeks to Newcastle. So that he shall make three returns for one.

2. Whereas the stranger carries only ballast in his ship to Newcastle, because that country cannot vent such merchandize as they would otherwise carry, they need not come empty to London. For that London will take off all such commodities as they bring, to the increase of his Majesty's customs.

3. Whereas most of the strangers that come to London go away in their ballast, by which means they carry out of the kingdom such moneys as they receive for freight, if the staple of coals be settled in London they will be glad to employ their moneys in coals, which will be profitable to them; and we keep our moneys in England, which is now carried away.

4. The bar going into Newcastle, and there lying on ground with their ships, consumes and weakens them having their weight of coals on board; I mean the strangers' ships that are not built with the strength that ours are. As in London their ships will ride and float, and take

in their coals out of one ship into another, which will lengthen their ships four years in the ordinary age of ships. So that they will gain the third part of a ship in changing their ports.

5. They shall not be subject to the spoil of pirates as they have been of late years to Newcastle; for pirates never resort into the Narrow Seas because his Majesty's ships are continually there.\*

*The Stranger cannot except against this because the like is used in other Countries.*

1. The Venetians have a law that no strangers shall take in goods into their ships, in any of their ports, before their own ships be laden. Or else they will take the lading out of other ships to lade themselves.

2. In France there is a penalty that our Englishmen may not bring salt for their own spending. If they do, it is loss of ship and goods.

3. In Calais they will not suffer any passenger to go for England in other vessels than their own town.

4. In Dunkirk they have lately taken up the Venetian law.

5. In Holland they will not suffer any ship of another town to take in goods from one town to another, but they must transport it in a ship of their own town. As, for example, a ship of Flushing to go to Rotterdam, to carry to Flushing, but it must be sent in a ship of their own town. And this they do because they will make an equality in setting their ships and men to work.

6. The Biscainers have the same privilege

\* An extraordinary statement !

over all other Spaniards the Venetians have over strangers. And the reason is because Biscay affords all the best mariners in the kingdom of Spain ; and to encourage them to sea this privilege is granted them.

*The Profit London shall reap by it.\**

It is a trade that enriches all cities, and London having the trade of 200 ships more than now will prove a great increase of commerce and consequently of wealth. London will never be unfurnished with coals, as it hath been, to the great hurt and damage of the people who paid 30s. for a chaldron of coals that were sold for 14s. at the beginning of the year. A thousand of people will be set to work, more than now are, with lading, unlading and carrying. The stranger carries away the best coals from Newcastle and gives an extraordinary price for them, by which means London was wont to have the refuse, which now they shall not. Such prohibited goods as are carried secretly out of Newcastle by strangers shall perforce be brought to London, and there sold, which will make a cheapness of such things in London. As namely, wool, beef, hides, tallow, and butter for they carry these commodities in great quantity and no provision can be made to prohibit them.

This project in few years would increase 200 ships, every ship of 200 tons apiece, which, in time of war, will carry 14 or 16 pieces of ordnance and 20,000 soldiers. Which, being added to his Majesty's strength at sea, he may boldly say he

\* These two paragraphs, not given in Churchill, are found only in B.

is the mightiest prince that ever was in Europe, in ships and men.

\* Now I have strengthened this kingdom with defensive forces to withstand the power of an invasion, and shewed the means how to invade our neighbouring enemies, if they become so. I will not contain myself in the temperate zone, but seek what projects may be produced in the torrid zone, where the sun has such a scorching power, that the philosophers thought it was uninhabitable. And I will take Guinea in my way to the East Indies, it being the place from whence they were first discovered.

\* This paragraph is not found in MS.

A Project in the Days of Queen Elizabeth  
for the settling her Subjects in Guinea,  
shewing of what Convenience it would  
be. Writ in the Year 1597.

THE neglecting the opportunity in times past, by refusing the offer made by Columbus to Henry VII. for the discovery of the Indies, which Spain then accepted of, has made Spain, which was one of the inferiorest kingdoms in Europe, now become the mightiest in wealth, greatness, and esteem. And to think how to lessen them in those parts where they are grown so mighty is now too late, their footing is so strongly seated in America, and especially between the two tropics, which by nature of heat affords gold and precious merchandizes; for in colder climates we can expect little good, by what we have found in Norambega.\*

\* On Norambega see also *ante*, ii. p. 293. To that may be added, on the derivation of the word, a reference to *Notes and Queries*, Ser. viii., vol. viii., pp. 138, 190. The late Canon Isaac Taylor thought that it was a corruption from 'some earlier Spanish map (*i.e.* earlier than 1570) on which Norway, spelt Norbega in Spanish fashion, was joined on to Greenland and Labrador.' It may be noticed that Norway is called Noruega in the 'Book of Knowledge,' a work on travel and geography, by an unknown Spanish Franciscan, which is assigned to 1350-60 (*Hak. Soc.*). But M. Harris and Canon Taylor do not seem to have been aware that Richard Hakluyt appears to have known it in another form, 'Arambec, corruptly called Norumbega' (*Voyages* (ed. 1904), viii. p. 1), and this introduces a difficult complication.

But many are erroneously carried away with an opinion of Guiana, that there is plenty of gold in it, which makes them forward to settle a habitation in that country. The only reason I conceive men can have to induce them to it is the climate, that may afford gold, but no proof of any hitherto found there. And I have given my reasons of the unlikeliness of finding any there in my Fourth Book.

My reasons for disapproving our planting in Guiana are these: first, it is in the continent of America, fronting upon the Spaniards, whom we shall find very ill neighbours to us, and without their favour it is folly to think there to inhabit. The second is that the men we send must be by sea, and that far off; and the number cannot be so great to cope with the Spaniards that are there already: and it will so much concern the King of Spain not to accept of our neighbourhood in those parts that he will rather employ his whole strength to remove us, it concerning him so deeply not to have any partakers with him in his Indies. Thirdly, we shall enter upon a poor and barbarous country; the people wild and rude, that can give us no assurance of their fidelity, being destitute of wit and reason. The victuals we must live on must be carried by us, the country having no strength but by nature, no towns or houses to lie in; and requires a long time and great charge to be furnished with victuals, fortifications, and buildings.

But leaving Guiana for the reasons here given, I will a little handle the planting and inhabiting Guinea, and will prove it the most convenient place for us, now in time of war, to possess and keep.

The country is nearer to us than Guiana, the



trade certain to the Portuguese for gold and other commodities, which Guiana affords not. Our settling in it in times past was so much feared by the Portuguese Kings that they sought by all means possible to divert us; and King João II. understanding of a preparation of a fleet in England for a voyage to Guinea, doubting it would prove prejudicial to him, sent Ruy de Sousa, a principal man of his country, ambassador into England, to confirm the old league with Edward IV. and to acquaint him with the title he had to the seigniory of Guinea, desiring him to lay aside his fleet that was preparing for that coast under the command and conduct of John Tintam, as also not to suffer or permit any of his subjects to trade for Guinea. The King was willing to yield to his request, and desirous to accept of his league, for in respect of his domestic troubles at home he could not have leisure to seek the enlargement of his kingdom abroad. Thus for necessity sake our country lost the opportunity of trading and inhabiting part of Guinea in the days of Edward IV.\*

And since the year 1553, there was a voyage undertaken by the persuasion of Antonio Yañez Pinteado, who being a man of good regard with the King of Portugal, by false information was cast out of his favour, and forced to fly his country. And, coming into England, he discovered to certain merchants the benefit and commodity of Guinea, he having lived there some years himself. The King of Portugal hearing of this fleet wrought by all means how to intercept his courses, first, by promise of great rewards to procure his return; which failing, his death was practised by some

\* Hakluyt, *Voyages* (ed. 1904), vi. 123.

Portuguese in England, which he, having knowledge of, prevented. Then, lastly, the King thought to frustrate his designs, and armed a galleon to intercept him at sea. This galleon met the English but durst not offer any violence.

The voyage was proceeded on with great hope of good to follow. But through the wilfulness of Windham,\* who had the command of it, a man both rash and headstrong, preferring his own wilfulness before Pinteado's experience, the voyage was overthrown. For after they grew rich by trade Pinteado advised their return for that year, alleging the danger of sickness by their longer stay upon that coast. But Windham neglecting his counsel, in few days after there grew a most contagious sickness amongst them, that they both died and many of their company before they could recover home.

Doubtless if this voyage had been discreetly carried, as it was projected, it had returned great profit for the present, and had settled a continual trade into Guinea in a small space. For the negro kings offered them great privileges, and a place to dwell and fortify ; and this happened at the beginning of the Portuguese plantation, which in little time it would have been occasion for us to have eaten them out of that trade. Besides that, we should have had the same possibility to discover the East Indies which afterwards the Portuguese did.

Many more voyages have been attempted by the English, upon that coast, with profitable returns. But at the chief place, which is the Castle de la Mina, we could never attain to have a trade ; but, if her Majesty please, there is no

\* Thomas Windham, of Marshwood Hall, Somerset.

time yet overpast but that the country may be subdued, her subjects settled in it, and the trade maintained with a yearly and certain benefit to her Majesty as now it is to the King of Spain. The place of importance for strength and wealth is the Castle de la Mina, the taking whereof makes all the rest of the country tributary of course, it being the only place defended by the Portuguese and where they have settled the chief trade of the whole country.

John Baptista de Revolasco, at my being in Portugal, had the country of Guinea in farm from the King, no man having licence to trade thither but himself. His course was not to seek the negroes in their own ports, and make the voyage long and uncertain, but he sent his merchandize to Castle de la Mina, whither the negroes resorted, as well from the inward part of the country as from the sea side, to utter their commodities. By which means he made Mina a continual mart, being always furnished with great quantity of gold. The place being taken, the wealth in it will be great, the keeping it not chargeable, and the living in it secure, it being strongly fortified to our hands, with helps that we shall add unto it. It yields plenty of victuals: the town is fairly built, the people civil, the country pleasant and delightsome. All these are sufficient encouragements and motives for us to inhabit it.

Though many object the sickness of that climate by example of divers ships of ours that have felt it, yet the true cause has grown from want of experience. For there are divers observations to be followed by them that shall resort there to live. The first is the time of the year in going, which is in September: the second, is the time of staying, which must not exceed

March. And whilst they abide there they must keep and observe a certain diet; for there are three things principally to be avoided, (*viz.*) the unmeasurable eating of fruits, the serene\* or dew that falls morning and evening, and the company of the negro women.

I have examined the voyages made thither by our English nation and find the greatest death of our men is in their return home, coming out of the hot countries into the cold, which proceeds principally from want of clothes in the poor mariners; and this is ordinary in our shorter voyages. But for such as shall live in the country no time of the year is to be respected for their health; for it is to be supposed that no man is so gluttonous as to over-eat himself where he shall find so great a plenty and so good a choice. For nothing breeds a surfeit so soon as, after a scarcity and want, to come to plentiful feeding and want of government and discretion to temper themselves in their diet. Moreover, those that live ashore in Guinea shall have houses to defend themselves from the serene, or other infection of the air. And, in answer of the negro women, I think no Englishman so barbarous as to imagine it.

By possessing the Mina it may give us a great encouragement of other discoveries from thence as it did the Portuguese. Neither do I see any reason but from thence we may find a way by land to Tombagoto† and Gogo; that would afford as great plenty of gold to the Queen as Peru does to the King of Spain. The King of Morocco has a trade to those places and the chief merchandize carried thither is salt. If we could get thither by land I doubt not but from

\* French *sercin*, night dew.

† Timbuctoo.

thence, or near thereabouts, we shall find some river to fall into the sea so that in time we may come at it by water. And then shall her Majesty become as great and rich in the eastern parts of the world as the King of Spain is now in the western.

Her Majesty, having Guinea, may turn it to her best profit and commodity, as by planting such things as the earth will bear, the soil affording as great plenty of all things it is capable of, as for example, Guinea and Brazil yield as good and as great store of ginger as the West Indies. But the King of Spain commands that no ginger shall grow in either of those two countries but such as they preserve for their own use; for if he would give leave to plant it in Guinea the increase would be so great that he would make it of no value in the West Indies. Likewise the West Indies, Guinea, and Brazil, will yield a better grape, and a greater quantity of wine will be made there than in Spain; but the King will not grant it nor permit the general planting of grapes. Thus does he by policy keep one country under another in their commodities, and bars the earth from bringing forth the increase for the use of man as God hath appointed.

There is requisite for this voyage five hundred soldiers, and convenient shipping to transport them, with all things necessary for such an action. The men that go must be choice in their abilities of body, and clear from sickness and diseases; for infected men carried from home have been the overthrow of many enterprises. The greatest force the Portuguese presume upon is their number and the valour of their negroes, whom they do make believe we desire to conquer and kill, and that our wars with them is for their sakes who they

defend against us. But to prevent this policy of theirs we will carry negroes with us that speak their language, and have lived in Europe, and seen the difference of our usage of them and of the Portuguese; for in Portugal they buy and sell them, as we do horses, in markets. When these things shall be known to the negroes it will be a means, not only to desire peace and friendship with us, but to animate and provoke them to rise against their masters and make them ours more faithfully than the Portuguese.

In this journey there must be special care and choice in victualling, both for the goodness, quantity, and diversity. For our ordinary victualling with salt meats breeds a putrefaction of blood in hot countries and is one great cause of their sickness in those parts. The men that go, ought to have shift and change of apparel, for the nature of the serene is to rot any kind of garment.

\* Though this voyage was not undertaken in

\* Instead of this paragraph B. and R. have, 'This journey was not proceeded upon in the reign of Queen Elizabeth yet since that time the Hollanders, who spare not for cost or adventure of life to annoy the King of Spain, attempted the surprise of the Castle de la Mina, but it proved disgraceful and unfortunate to them though their charge was double that propounded unto the Queen to have possessed it. Wherein is to be observed the force and power of the Spaniards in their far and remote countries now in comparison with times past. I have a rutter of the coast of Guinea that shews the distance . . . East Indies which was pretended by me in the life of the late Queen.'

Here, as in so many other places, Monson ignores the fact that a power which is not to hold its foreign settlements or conquests on sufferance must command the sea roads to them and maintain a fleet commensurate with the resistance to be expected. He considers the necessary garrison but neglects the fleet which alone could maintain the garrison.

the reign of Queen Elizabeth, which was the active age for such enterprises, and the time gave great advantage by the weak provision the King of Spain had thereabouts, yet since the war ceased, by our laborious endeavours, we have attained to a profitable trade on that coast of Guinea. I must confess I much laboured to put this voyage in execution at the time we were authorized by a war with Spain to justify our doings. And to shew my willingness the more at my release out of my imprisonment in Spain, in 1591, I procured a rutter of the coast of Guinea that shewed the distance, the height, and course from port to port; the dangers, and how to shun them; the conditions of the people; the commodities the country affords, and what they desire from us. Which I think not fit to insert in this book for making the volume too spacious and great, but will proceed to a design of the East Indies, which was presented by me, and promised by the Queen to have it undertaken as I projected it.

Then comes the question of cost in men and money; he thinks 'the keeping it not chargeable,' a very optimistic view which events would probably have contradicted if Elizabeth had been persuaded.

The first English Guinea Company was founded in 1618, Castle de la Mina, or Elmina, was first taken by the Dutch in 1637 and ceded to them permanently by the peace with Portugal of 1641.

A Project of a Voyage to the East Indies,  
with an Intent to have had Footing in  
the hithermost Parts thereof.

I WILL prosecute my voyage from Guinea to the East Indies with my ensuing projects, as Bartholomew Diaz proceeded in his discovery. And the first port I will arrive at shall be Mozambique, a place of great importance and relief to the Portuguese, both going and coming from the Indies.\*

If her Majesty will please really of herself, or by joining with her merchants, to undertake a voyage to the East Indies it will prove a great annoyance to the King of Spain and his subjects, if the project following be well undertaken and prosecuted.

The only good we are to expect of this East India attempt must be the provident proceeding in our first voyage, as well to settle a certain and secure trade as to have habitation in the country. And therefore to go abruptly, and to offer them a trade, considering we are, or shall be, disgraced by the Portuguese and Hollanders, were a thing uncertain and full of hazard. For though those two nations love not one another, yet to bar us of our trade thither they would not stick to cast many false imputations on us.

For prevention whereof it were necessary her Majesty made choice of an able and well experienced gentleman who, besides the charge of the

\* This sentence, about Mozambique, is not found in MS.



voyage, should have the employment of an ambassador. His message and letters should import the greatness of her Majesty's State, her power by land and sea, her protection of the Low Countries, and the several disgraces and overthrows she has given the King of Spain, whereby it is to be supposed, that some of the Portuguese his subjects, in their secret hate to our nation, not being able otherwise to revenge themselves, have most unjustly scandalized our proceedings. Therefore wishing them that they would receive what she writes for a truth, coming from so mighty a prince, and to give no further credit to the Portuguese than as the carriage of her subjects shall deserve. What presents or other obligations in that kind her Majesty should send in sign of her love I will omit, only there must be care to win such persons as have most credit with the princes with whom you shall traffic by whom good offices may be wrought, and by whom a traffic under certain articles may be agreed upon. And the conditions and articles settled, we desire that an ambassador may be sent to her Majesty with offer of hostages for his safe return.

The exceptions against this voyage, are, the great distance from England; the treachery of the people, having no religion to engage themselves by; the force of the Portuguese by their long continuance there; and the commodities we must send, which are wine, silver and oil, the one we may ill spare and the others our country doth not naturally yield.

The method to provide against these inconveniences, is, whilst there is no suspicion of us, to possess and keep some town nigh to us that the Portuguese enjoyeth; it will prove a great refreshing to us, and make the journey both

delightsome and pleasant. Secondly, we shall be the more respected by the people when they see we have footing so near them. Thirdly, we shall weaken the Portuguese, and prevent their carracks wintering at Mozambique if they be not able to double the Cape of Good Hope as many times they are not. The reason I prefer Mozambique before the rest of the Indies is the nearness to us, and where the carracks certainly water in their way to the Indies ; and the time of their arrival is so certainly known to us that we shall undoubtedly intercept them. The wealth of the town is great both of gold and merchandize, for to the governor of Mozambique only is allowed the trade of Sofala lying under his jurisdiction. The keeping of the town will be easy, the dwelling in it safe, for it is seated in a strong and defensible island ; it hath plenty of victuals, corn excepted. The town is fairly built, with many commodities to it, and in every point like the Castle de la Mina I have formerly described. When we are masters of the town, and have fortified it, and possessed ourselves of the carracks, the enemy will be weakened, and unprovided of entertainment in their way to the Indies ; for that it is the only place where they have refreshment.

The Portuguese use this place for their refuge and succour, not for trade, but only by what the governor drives with Sofala, as I have shewed. But we will make it our chiefest town of mart, and thereby our voyage shall be made short and easy ; for our ships shall be appointed to go thither to fetch away the goods that our other ships shall bring from Java and other parts of the Indies. By means whereof, every twelve or thirteen months, we shall have a certain return of our adventures.

The way of proceeding upon this expedition must be to send an extraordinary number of sailors, besides the soldiers ; the sailors to man the carracks, the soldiers to defend the town. They must depart from hence in February, and cast to be at Mozambique by the last of June, which will be twenty days before the carracks' arrival. The money and goods taken in the aforesaid carracks may amount well nigh to six thousand tons in bulk, which may be there unladen and kept in storehouses, and vended into the Indies by our ships yearly. For they are such commodities as will keep, and will return five times more gain than bringing them for England. Our hope is no less in meeting their carracks in their return for Portugal at the island of Santa Helena, where, out of necessity, they never fail to water. And if we have the happiness to enjoy them both going and coming we shall possess ourselves of an inestimable wealth, and bring the Portuguese dwellers in the East Indies to such an extremity by it that they must be forced either to revolt or accept of our trade.\*

\* It may be worth noticing that in the sixteenth century, the East Indies were sometimes called the Great Indies, or Old Indies ; the West Indies, the New Indies or Little Indies. Monson, however, never uses these variants.

A Project and Reasons against an East India Voyage, and an answer to those reasons. 1601.

THE Hollanders, who are a people both apprehensive and laborious in what they conceive or undertake, having light given them by the two voyages of Sir Francis Drake and Mr. Cavendish what the East Indies and South Sea afforded in wealth, and being likewise seconded and encouraged by the solicitation of some of their own nation who put themselves into the service of the Portuguese trading into the East Indies, and who whilst they were there understood the depth and secrecy of it, revealing it at their return, were so far prevailed upon as to spare no cost to make trial where there was likelihood of profit. And accordingly began a trade into the furthestmost part of the Indies, and have yearly since continued it with various success. Not long after, we, who are rather imitators than first enterprisers of things, where there is not a present return of profit, finding by the success of the Hollanders that the voyage was worth our embracing, by the rumour of gain spread abroad (though in this, as many other reports, fame proves as often false as true), thought fit to venture something upon it. And accordingly our English merchants gathered a joint stock together, and from thenceforward to this very day they have settled a trade in the East Indies; and what it has produced you shall understand at the end of this argument.

But forasmuch as every innovation commonly finds opposition ; from some out of partiality and from others as enemies to novelty, so this voyage, though at the first it carried a great name and hope of profit by the word India, and example of Holland, yet was it writ against, and answered, as in the ensuing discourse shall appear :—

1. Objection.—*This voyage will be an occasion of the extreme exhausting our silver, which is already too much diminished by the Irish wars, and by the Hollanders drawing of it and our gold over into the Low Countries.*

Answer.—I confess this is the strongest reason of the seven that are alleged. Yet I think not but there may be means to draw out of other countries such a quantity of silver as would furnish this voyage yearly if there could be means to keep our own silver from transportation into the Low Countries ; for it is to be feared that the better part of the silver the Hollanders send into the East Indies is drawn out of England. But this objection is fully answered by the project of Mozambique.

2. Objection.—*It will be the death of many a good mariner in the climate there ; and, by the way being so intemperate, either the one half, or a third part, of our people cannot but perish.*

Answer.—This trade, in my opinion, will be so far from diminishing our seamen that no voyage will or can breed better mariners ; for long voyages make the skilfullest and best navigators. But whereas the unnatural heat is alleged for the cause of the death of men, we find by experience that the greatest infection and death of men is not whilst they abide in the hot countries, but in the entering into the cold out of the hot,

which comes principally for want of clothes in poor mariners. If you will please to peruse the voyages of the English nation made to the southern regions you will find that to be the means of people's deaths.

3. Objection.—*It will be the decay of shipping ; because, unless they be sheathed with lead, they prove so worm-eaten that they are never after serviceable, except it be for one voyage only.*

*Answer.*—I cannot see how this can any way prove the decay of shipping, but rather the maintainance of greater ships than have been used among our merchants. For if they mean to maintain a certain yearly trade they cannot have less than eight or nine ships of one thousand or twelve hundred tons each, which, upon the occasion of service, are of greater strength than the whole shipping of London. And where there are so many good ships always set to work it will be a maintenance both of ships and men ; for as men die who are not accustomed to hot climates, so these ships will nourish, breed, and harden as many mariners, by all likelihood, as have died. All this while we speak by conjecture, not by experience ; for what greater trial can there be than of the Portuguese ships, who make their voyages at least a year and a half long, and yet most of them make twelve or thirteen voyages before they be old. After this proportion they continue much longer than our ships ; yea, I have known one carrack make twenty-four voyages.\*

But if you will allow that sheathing them with lead will avoid the worm which is the greatest inconvenience you allege, we may better cheap

\* B has the plural, 'I have known carracks that have made.'

sheathe them than the Portuguese, because our country affords lead which the other doth not.

4. Objection.—*It will hinder the vent of cloth ; for whereas now our merchants may put over their six months' bills of debts, as well for spices as other merchandize, thereby to make the more speedy return, our East India merchants will be able to afford them so cheap at our own doors that our merchant adventurers shall be forced to abstain from bringing in of spices, and so want, oftentimes, present commodities to make return of.*

*Answer.*—Here we speak generally, that it will hinder the vent of cloth because the merchants may put over their six months' bills for spices ; but the spices being afforded better cheap at home the merchant must be forced to leave off his trade, as though our chief vent of cloth were in exchange of spices. But I conceive that in most countries, where they utter our cloth, merchants do not return spices ; as into Barbary, Italy, France, &c. From Stade and some parts of the East Country we have some spices, but very little, which was wont to have come from Turkey to Venice, and so dispersed into the East Countries. But since our trade to Turkey it has not been much.

What inconveniences can then grow of this trade but to our Turkey Company ? Which, if they cannot have other commodities than spices to exchange for our cloth, it were better for the commonwealth to dissolve that trade than that to the East Indies which is the well-spring from whence all those commodities doth flow. As we are now served with spices it is at the third hand, and at an unreasonable rate, which enriches some private men only. But, surely, if this trade to the East Indies were encouraged, and carried

with equality, the commonwealth would be the better for it insomuch that all manner of spices would be far cheaper than now they are. If any find prejudice by this trade, it will be the Turks themselves ; when they shall see all Europe served with spices by sea out of the East Indies at the best hand their trade will be quite over-thrown.

5. Objection.—*They will bring in such quantities of spices as will lie too long upon their hands and not to be vended in due time. As was seen by the pepper of the carrack, which, notwithstanding a general restraint against the bringing in of all other pepper, to the hindrance of many a merchant, yet it was a year before it could be made away.*

*Answer.*—Allow that our trade will decay in Turkey, especially for spices ; and that we be served with no other spices than shall be brought out of the East Indies, all casualties excepted. For you must understand they will sometime stay long for their lading ; some of their ships, it is likely, may miscarry, others not return justly at the time appointed, others not wholly freighted, so that I make no doubt but England, Scotland, and Ireland, will be able to take off a great part : if not, the East Country and Russia will receive more than we can spare.

Whereas you refer yourself to the example of the carrack, it is thus to be answered : They that bought the spices of the Queen in the carrack conditioned that till they were vended none should be brought into England. By which restraint, and they having engrossed the whole quantity of the spices, before they made sale of them they provided that the old store should be spent within the realm ; and then they forced every man to pay what they listed, knowing we could not otherwise be supplied. This, you must



confess, was a great abuse; for when the greatest quantity of the carrack's spices was unsold then were they at the greatest rate. But suppose contrarywise that there had been no spices in England when the carrack came in, that all the land was to supply their wants out of her and that they had not been engrossed by some few, no doubt but in a year they had been wholly vended. And allow, proportionally, such a quantity to serve the realm a year, it is no more than we shall return out of the East Indies in that space though we have certain established trade, for if our return be more it will be prejudicial to the commonwealth.

6. Objection.—*The original of this voyage was secret malice of some against the Turkey Company and a greedy desire of private gain. The effect whereof will be such a molestation to our neighbours the Hollanders, and such hatred we shall reap at their hands, as all our gain shall not be able to countervail this one inconvenience.*

*Answer.*—We are not to enter into the hatred or private grudges of men, but into the commodity or discommodity that will arise to our nation by this trade. If it be more profit to maintain traffic into the East Indies than into Turkey I see no reason that, for the benefit of some private men of the Turkey Company, we should nourish the one and neglect the other. But methinks if there were no more reason of gain than out of spleen to some merchants of the Turkey Company they would not adventure so great a stock without a hope of profit. We see by experience what commodity the Portuguese have made this hundred and odd years by that trade, and we conceive the Hollanders find a great commodity by it, which may give us satisfaction in it and all those

former reasons might as well have satisfied them as us. Neither do I see that the Hollanders have more advantage to persevere in that voyage than we.

For offence to be given the Hollanders in that trade I see not how in right and justice they can except against us. For they can challenge nothing of discovery, since neither the country nor the places of trade were discovered by them, but we rather gave them light thereof by the voyage of Sir Francis Drake and Mr. Cavendish,\* who had been there before there was ever mention of Holland or Hollanders sailing thither. Secondly, those with whom we shall traffic are not subjects of theirs, but free princes of themselves, that may make election and choice with whom they will entertain leagues. Thirdly, we may with better reason, and we have better means to bar the Hollanders of traffic with Turkey, Barbary and Russia, than they to restrain us of this; for we were the first light-givers of those trades.

And therefore, if all her Majesty's gracious respects to them should in the end be recompensed with ingratitude, the world would confess their unworthiness and evil requital of so many favours, for who knows not that with loss of her subjects and expense of her treasure she hath defended them from their enemies and maintained a principality among themselves. But suppose they should do their worst against us, and burst out into open hostility, we know how to be even with them by many advantages we have over them, as before has been declared.†

\* 'Chandegé' in MSS.

† If this reference relates to *The Project how to War against Holland* it shows that this section must have been, at least, re-edited far later than 1601.

7. Objection.—*Lastly, the money thus transported pays no custom at all to her Majesty. Nor are the merchants bound to return home so much treasure in value or quantity, but only upon their bare words.*

*Answer.*—Though the money, upon the transportation of it, pay no custom, yet the merchandize which is bought with that money pays a great and extraordinary custom, and all things considered the loss to her Majesty will be little or nothing at all. Nay, it will become a great commodity if the merchants perform what they make offer of, *viz.* to become bound to bring into the land so much silver as shall be transported in this voyage.

And seeing therefore the particular objections are answered, of exhausting our treasure, consuming our mariners, destroying our ships, hindering the vent of our cloth, bringing in commodities not utterable in due time, that malice was not the cause of it, that in justice it cannot be prejudicial to the Hollanders, that it will be no decreasing of customs, and the silver we send not to be our own; all these things being rightly weighed and considered, I refer myself to the censure of any indifferent man, whether the objections be fully answered or not.

What was written in the former discourse, as well by the objector as the answerer, was but conjectural till time and experience, which are the discoverers of truth, resolve the question doubted of. But now having twenty and odd years trial of what this voyage to the East Indies has produced, a time sufficient to judge of the convenience or inconvenience to the State, or the commodity or discommodity to the commonwealth,

and the profit or disprofit to the adventurer, I will thereupon collect out of the reasons aforesaid, betwixt the objector and answerer, what I can gather of how near their opinions sorted to the truth, as also by what errors, and by whose means, the voyage hath proved prejudicial to the subject.

The first objection of exhausting our coin was answered, and confessed to be the strongest argument of all the rest. But a third person, whom I term the moderator, says that if the company had provided, as they promised, and as they might easily have done, to have brought the quantity of silver out of foreign parts in truck of our staple commodities and have put it ashore at Dover, for all people to behold, till their ships of the Indies had passed by, and then had embarked it, this would have taken away all occasion of repining by the subject that their coin was transported out of the kingdom to uphold the East India trade. If this had been really done, without evasion or cunning, the objection had been salved and our moneys found to have been no impediments to the voyage.

The second, was the death of our men : and though this was answered fully, yet to confirm the opinion of the answerer there cannot be a better proof than experience, that peoples bodies do as well agree with, and return from the Indies in health, as from shorter voyages, and that who-soever has been there once desires to go thither again. Some there are that have made six or seven voyages and found no distemper or difference in their bodies ; and, if there were no greater objections than this of health, it were tolerable and worthy to be nourished.

To the third, that it will decay shipping, the

answerer disproves it very sufficiently; but, indeed, the greatest abuse of the voyage shall now appear in the covetousness and desire of gain in our merchants, according to the nature of Englishmen, who strive to be suddenly rich and have not patience to stay a time for it.

The bane of our East India voyage was that they exceeded the proportion of eight or nine ships, treble to the number of those that were projected: this was the cause of decaying of timber which this kingdom will hereafter smart for. For the loss of men and money, it will be regained in an age, when timber must be growing many ages.

This proportion of eight or nine ships would not have overcloyed the trade, either there or here, nor have brought the commodities of the East Indies to so great a price as now they are in that country. Neither would it have drawn so mighty stocks of money by the company to maintain it, whereby all the kingdom find themselves aggrieved, imputing the want of money to this cause. Thus it is apparent that the voyage is not the cause of the inconvenience, but the ill ordering and managing of it by the merchants.

The fifth objection is imputed to malice against the Turkey Company, and the molestation we shall offer the Hollanders. The moderator alleges that there are very few of the Turkey merchants that are not admitted with their stocks into the East India Company and all questions accommodated, whereby their malice ceased. And to the point of the Hollanders—we see that it is not that trade alone, but all others in general they seek to deprave and deprive us of. The chief cause that sets their hearts against us is not so much our commercing ourselves, but that of late we

have debarred them of their trades, which before, out of cunning, they only engrossed and possessed ; as namely, that of Spain, and the King of Spain's dominions, whilst they had subtilly engaged us in a war. But now that our peace debars them of it, and that we enjoy it ourselves, these are the motives of their hates to us ; and as for their love, it is to be valued according to the profit or use they can make of us, as in the next and last book I have at large declared.\*

This shall suffice for our East India trade ; but I will still have relation to the East Indies.

\* The last sentence does not occur in the MSS., nor have they the expressions 'out of cunning' and 'subtilly.' Instead of 'But now that,' &c., B and R run, 'Free States are no longer thankful than they receive courtesies ; there is nothing of shorter life among them memories of pleasures and courtesies past. One ounce of discourtesy overweighs all former friendship, and not to continue to do them good is to begin to do them affront.' This passage has occurred previously in Book IV.

A Project how to intercept the Ships of  
Cambay that trade yearly into the Red  
Sea.

\*THOUGH the trade of the East Indies was first found out and prosecuted by the Portuguese, and in these latter times frequented by us and the Hollanders, yet can we not say but that the natives of these remote parts had use of navigation, commerce and traffic with one another long before the resort of the Europeans amongst them. As is apparent by the continual intercourse and trade, to this day, betwixt those of Surat, subjects to the Great Mogul, and Ziden,† a port within the Red Sea, which is commonly called the fleet of Mecca. The vessels which pass these seas we cannot properly call ships, because their build is much differing from ships. They are neither able to brook the waves of a grown sea, or of force to withstand the power of an enemy: these vessels are carried with a certain, settled, and constant wind, both outward and homeward, as I have declared, when I had occasion to speak of the nature of the winds called the monsoons. Yet, as ugly and as unshapely as these vessels are to our eyes, they transport inestimable riches and wealth betwixt the places aforesaid.

\* In the MSS. this section commences with the next paragraph, 'Whensoever his Majesty,' &c.

† Jiddah. The name, Ziden, was in common use in the eighteenth century.

And whensoever his Majesty shall please to prohibit the trade of his subjects to the East Indies, and that the merchants shall be weary of it, which will be according to their loss or gain ; for the nature of a covetous merchant is like an usurer that values and esteems his own profit more than the convenience or benefit of the State. They are not satisfied with abundance for the more they have the more they desire. They are not profitable to men living nor good to none until they be dead.

But leaving the passion and humour of such men who are only for themselves, let us enter into the true condition of this kingdom, and the way to benefit his Majesty, as well as his subjects have been benefited by the East India trade. And here, besides the former project humbly recommended to the late Queen, I present another design to his Majesty if he shall prohibit the trade of the East Indies, as I have said before.

It is not like other sea actions, that enemies are authorized to take from one another in a broad and ocean sea, where ships are hard to be met, or shall contest with force and strength, or in such weather as shall forbid ships boarding, or such winds as shall make it difficult in fetching up a chase, or such vessels as shall make a doubt of the riches of their lading. My project is to encounter the Cambay fleet in their return out of the Red Sea, in their course from thence to Surat. These vessels are not freighted with merchandize of mean and base condition but with the richest that Egypt and Turkey can afford. Their strength not able to resist their sailing in a sea that never endured storm ; their winds and seasons so certain that the meeting with them will be certain, as some of our East India ships can put us out of



doubt of who have heretofore friendly visited them. The wealth in them, and the ease in taking them, being thus known, we are to think of the hurt and mischief that may ensue upon it, and to balance indifferently whether it is to be embraced or rejected for convenience sake.

There are two sort of people, and both infidels, that will find themselves aggrieved if this design be set on foot. The one is the Grand Seignior, into whose country they resort to barter their East India commodities, and make a return of merchandize there exchanged, to the great increase of customs that accrue to the Great Turk by it. The other is the Great Mogul, King of Cambay, but of late years known to us by the traffic of our merchants. They are the subjects of this King that trade into the Red Sea, who besides his customs and other adventures in the voyage, will receive great loss by the loss of his ships which no doubt will exasperate him.

These are the considerations on which depends the convenience or inconvenience to ground this voyage upon, Whether the forbearance of that trade by us, or the profit that will redound to his Majesty be estimated and valued at a greater rate. Two ships of his Majesty's, for countenance and strength, with a number of men above their ordinary proportion, will be sufficient with choice of victuals and other provisions for health. The rest of the ships to be rated in tonnage according to the proportion that may be judged will contain the goods taken in the ships aforesaid, which will prove but a small expense in comparison with the gain that will be returned.

A Project of the Genoese to have brought the East India Commodities into Muscovia by Land in 1520.

As commerce and trade draws a concourse of people where commodity appears, and by consequence acquaintance and civility, knowledge of one another's customs and countries, and the ways and means to direct them thither, so did this trade of the East Indies most especially, being so lately discovered and yielding such great wealth and riches, a thing not dreamed of till time gave light thereof by the Portuguese new discovery. The way, and the nearest way that could be thought of, to attain to the East Indies was after attempted by several nations, sometimes by the Cape of Good Hope, others sometimes by the Straits of Magellan, and then again from New Spain, and, lastly, by the north-west passage. Which shews a great willingness and desire people had to search out the secrets of those countries which they found so plentifully stored with all manner of riches.

And because the Genoese were a people not much accustomed to voyages in the ocean, wanting both ships, sailors, and harbours for such navigations, yet because they would not be accounted slothful or idle, and seeing it was an age of wit in which every nation sought to exceed one another, they in the year 1520 propounded a journey by land from the East Indies to Muscovia

and Russia ; and one Paul Centeraneo, a merchant of Genoa, was employed in it and went with authority from that state to Basilius, then King of Russia, with offer to bring that trade thither. He shewed the rivers and countries they should travel through, and acquainted him that the Portuguese, who served all Europe with spices and drugs, brought them by sea whereby they became mouldy and lost their true operation and virtue. Though indeed it was otherwise, for after the Portuguese loaded their goods in their carracks they never moved or unshipped them till they arrived at their port of Lisbon. As, on the contrary, if they should come to Muscovia, they were to pass many rivers where they should unlade, and lade again, to the spoil and loss of their merchandize, besides many dangers they should suffer by the Arabian thieves. Which the King of Russia did wisely foresee and consider, and therefore refused and rejected that offer made by Paul Centeraneo, and it was never after attempted or proposed.

A Project how to attain to Timbuctoo and Gogo, the richest Parts of the World for Gold, seated in Africa and never yet discovered by Christians.

MANY and several attempts have been made by the English trading into Guinea to arrive at the two places aforesaid, being incited to it by the fame of the abundance of gold they yield and the fineness of it, by the daily proof that is made of it in Barbary whither it is brought in truck of mean commodities. The King of Morocco or Barbary yearly sends certain camels, which pass with much hunger, pains, and peril, in going and coming thither. And many times they are taken with violent storms, and southerly winds, which swallow them up and devour them like the sea, but yet this danger does not hinder the trade because the profit is so great that a camel laden with salt will return his load in gold. And this is the encouragement our Englishmen have to attempt it by rivers; but have still failed, either by death of the undertakers, by want of victuals, by the encounter of the wild negroes, or shallowness of the water to hinder their passage.

I will set down the errors I conceive of the former undertakings, and deliver my opinion how it is fitting to enterprise it with little charge or hazard to the actors or adventurers, by example of the Portuguese happy and honourable attempt made upon the discovery of the East Indies,

which gave the first light to all succeeding discoveries, as I have touched on in my Fourth Book.

King João II. of Portugal, wisely imagining with himself that the riches of the East Indies, brought to us of Europe by the way of the Red Sea, might have a passage from thence by an open sea, if it could be discovered, and the trade conveyed from thence directly to Portugal without being beholding to infidels, as then we were, he caused timber to be felled to build two small ships for that discovery of the East Indies. In the mean time, whilst he was employed in furnishing the pinnaces for this voyage, he employed these persons following to discover by land the state of the Indians, and to get what light he could to encourage his sea intention.

The first man he employed was a Franciscan friar, who for want of language returned from Jerusalem, without effecting anything. The next he sent were two servants of his own, both of them skilful in the Arabic language, the one called Pedro de Covilhão, the other Affonso de Paiva. They left Portugal the 7th of May, 1487, and coming to the Red Sea parted company. Affonso went to Prester John's country where he died: Covilhão travelled to Calicut and other places of the East Indies where he fully informed himself of those countries. In his return from thence he met with two Jews the King of Portugal had sent to meet and advise him to inform himself thoroughly of the state of the East Indies. One of these two Jews he sent back to the King with a relation of the state of those countries; the other he carried with him to Ormuz, from whence he sent him likewise to the King with a further relation, and himself travelled to Prester John's country, where the King, whose name was

Alexander, treated him courteously. Who dying, the succeeding King detained him prisoner, where he died, and never sent more to the King of Portugal.

The King being truly informed by the relation of the two Jews, he hastened the preparation of his two ships; which voyage proved successful by the discovery of the East Indies. By the example of this land undertaking we are to prosecute our intention for Timbuctoo and Gogo, and to labour how to arrive at those two places by land, that we may with more ease, after we are there arrived, find out a passage by a river when the country is made known to us.

The men by whom we are to work our design must be the black people of that country, whose complexions are suitable to those of Africa, for white men would seem monsters to them and soon be destroyed by them. The climate of the country, the diet, the travels, the avoiding other dangers and inconveniences, the negroes can better suffer than white men can undergo. Therefore I advise, seeing what we do must be by the travel and endeavours of the negroes of the country, that every English ship that goes yearly to Guinea may be enjoined to bring from thence three negroes, with care to treat them civilly and kindly, that at their return they may have just cause to commend our usage of them. These negroes, being arrived in England, may be sent into several cities and corporations, two or three of them in company together, where they may be put into free schools to be taught the English tongue, to write and read, and the true worship of God, with necessary provision for their apparel and diet. And when they are thus made capable to perform so much as they shall be employed

about in their own country, then to send them back again, there to follow such instructions as shall be given them for finding out the way and passage to the two places aforesaid; and after they return from thence to assign them a place where they shall find a ship and men to entertain them. For the only thing that is to be required in this voyage is to discover a way to Timbuctoo and Gogo, and to know the true state of that country and a means how to settle a trade with the people thereof.

The rivers by which we must make this attempt are Senegal and Gambia; and though there be two entrances into them yet they make but one river and betwixt them compass an island.

I confess there have been many undertakings by the English to find a passage by rivers to Timbuctoo and Gogo, but to little purpose as it has been carried; therefore my design and desire is that what follows may be put in execution.

Besides the ordinary ships that trade to Guinea and make their return for England, I wish that two pinnaces, each of twenty tons, and two substantial shallops, be appointed to follow the discovery in the rivers, to be well manned, and sufficiently victualled and armed to stay out a whole year, with several commodities the negroes desire to have, to allure and entice them to us. These two barks are to sail so high into the rivers till they be stopped by shoals, and then to cause the two shallops to proceed further with their oars, for the greater way they go by water the less journey the negroes shall have to travel by land. These ships and shallops are to make their abode thereabouts the space of nine or ten months, and to employ themselves in traffic to know the state

of the country, to learn the condition of the people, to win them to civility ; and by consent of them to obtain a place ashore to inhabit and fortify, and make it a rendezvous for a yearly course and trade ever after as the Castle de la Mina is to the Portuguese.



## A Project for a private Voyage to Guinea.

THERE is much more use to be made of the country of Africa than either we, or any other nation, have laboured to find out. Which I do impute to the unhealthiness of the climate, and the neglect of people in not labouring to bring the blacks to civility by courteous handling and treating them, as I have touched in my precedent project. And, because I would have nothing attempted that may not bring a possibility of profit, I here present a private voyage with one ship of two hundred tons, and four or five shallops, to be quartered and carried in her.

It is not unknown to so many as trade to the East Indies what succour they find in the Bay of Saldanha, near the Cape of Good Hope, especially of oxen, where there are the greatest abundance, and the biggest of body, in the world ; and the seas thereabouts afford abundance of whales, out of which may be made train oil.

My directions in this voyage are to buy or freight a Holland ship of two hundred tons burthen, with the number of shallops aforesaid, to carry in her to the value of two hundred or three hundred pounds in cargo, two hundred tuns of cask, with all things necessary to kill and boil the whales, and three or four butchers to slay their beefs. The place whither they must first resort is the Bay of Saldanha aforesaid, but in their way to touch at the isle of Mayo, at Cape Verde, there to take salt to save their hides they

shall truck for. At their coming to this bay, some of their men must be employed in traffic with the negroes ; some in killing their cattle for their hides ; and others in fishing the whales, and making oil of them. And as they shall find a decay of either oxen or whales, then to remove to the northward, where I doubt not but they shall find a sufficient store of both, as also gold and other rich commodities to settle a trade ever after.

A Project how to Trade to the West Indies  
for Tobacco, with the Consent of the  
King of Spain, or some one Merchant,  
his Subject.

THE colour of our English ships resorting to the West Indies in time of peace is to seek a trade for tobacco, and under that pretence they have committed divers piracies, though the King of Spain has used all the strict means and courses possible to avoid that mischief. He has made it death by law if any of his subjects, either directly or indirectly, traffic or have commerce with any foreign nation, and has often used the rigour of that law, as well upon his own subjects that have offended in that kind as upon strangers with whom they have traded. And yet gain is such a temptation that in some places the Spaniards will not forbear traffic though they run into imminent danger.

But to take away the occasion of this abuse, and that England may be served with better tobacco than any other growing elsewhere, and that the King of Spain, for his part, receive no prejudice in his customs for tobacco, this is the way that I devise.

That a merchant of Spain, and another of England, do make a contract that the English shall take off such a quantity of tobacco, and at a certain rate agreed on, and receive it at one of the Terceira Islands; which will be an ease to

the navigation, having the less way to sail, and, by consequence, the less danger of the sea and pirates. And this to be done with a ship of the Spaniards, and manned with Spaniards. And for such commodities as shall be brought out of England, to deliver either at the islands aforesaid or in any port of Spain, at the election of the Spaniards; whereby the King of Spain shall not be deceived of his custom either going or coming.

When the Spaniards have a certain vent for their tobacco, which is the thing they desire, they will not hazard to trade with any strange nation by stealth. And when the English perceive they are out of hope to truck for tobacco in the Indies they will be disappointed of trade, and in a little time make them become strangers in those parts. And this is the reason that must be used for the King of Spain to grant his consent to it. And when we shall be served with tobacco, and shall have proof of the goodness of it in comparison of the beastly stinking tobacco that comes from other places, people will desire it for wholesomeness and detest the other. Which when our planters at Virginia, and other colonies, shall find their tobacco undervalued it will be a cause that the people will apply themselves to more beneficial labours than they now do in planting tobacco only. And because tobacco shall be better used and made up, to make it the more vendible in England, (for the goodness and badness of tobacco consists in the ordering of it) we desire that two or three Englishmen, practised in that art of making up tobacco, may be hired by the Spaniards and carried to the Indies to make it merchantable there where it grows. So shall we be sure to serve England with none but choice

tobacco, where it will give a better price to the seller and more content to the buyer.

Both the kingdoms and subjects of England and Spain will receive benefit by this project if they be governed by the directions aforesaid. And if there be a question of the King of Spain's consenting to it, it is no more than merchants within themselves may contrive without making request or suit to either of the two Kings.\*

\* It may be surmised that the Churchill editor expanded this section to suit the political and commercial conditions of the moment. In any case B and R read very differently, thus . . . 'divers piracies. To take away the occasion of this abuse that is offered the subjects of Spain, and that the King, himself, may receive no prejudice in his customs or the sale of tobacco, to make offer to take yearly . . . weight of tobacco at a certain rate in truck of such commodities as may be agreed upon betwixt the Spanish merchant and the English one. For the more ease of navigation, the danger of the sea, the less way to sail, and to avoid the hazard of pirates, we are contented to receive the tobacco they shall bring in their own vessels to one of the islands of Terceira, and to deliver our goods, in lieu thereof, either in Spain or at the said Islands as they shall think good. Whereby, the King of Spain shall have customs from us for our commodities as well as from his subjects for tobacco. But because tobacco shall be the better used and made up, for that the goodness and badness consists in the ordering it, we do desire that two or three Englishmen may be hired by the Spaniards, to be carried to the place where it is made, to see it packed and used as they shall direct. Thus shall the customs of both the Kings be increased, and none but choice tobacco, such as is good for the body, be vented. Neither can it tend to a liberty of trade to the Indies if it be granted to an Englishman, for it is not more than two merchants, the one a Spaniard and the other an Englishman, may contract betwixt themselves for the benefit of them both without having relation to the King or his prohibition for our trading into the Indies.'

An Answer to a Project of the Hollanders in their surprising the Island of Canary, and that of St. Thomé, under the Equinoctial, Anno 1599, in Reproof of some of my Countrymen who seek to prefer their Actions before ours.

It is wonderful to behold and see the mutability and uncertainty of this envious spiteful age of ours. And amongst many intolerable vices that reign emulation is most rife; for let a man be advanced by virtue in his vocation, as, namely, a scholar to promotion and dignity by his learning; it breeds a secret hate in all scholars against him: the soldier, for his service, makes all soldiers envy him inwardly: the courtier, preferred by favour of the prince, makes all courtiers repine at his fortune and enter into examination of his merit above theirs, as though they should be judges of their own worth. This shews the corruption of men's minds in our time; for virtue was never envied but by men of vice; nor honour despised but by them that could not judge of it. Envy stops not at private grudges, for very often it inflames the hearts of princes against the greatness of other potentates; it reigns in one kingdom against the prosperity and welfare of another. But this kind of emulation, if it proceeded no further, is somewhat tolerable; for the example of one good prince may make another virtuous, and the example of one kingdom make another strive and endeavour to equal it.

But there is a worse kind of emulation than this as you shall find in my ensuing discourse where, in this expedition of the Hollanders, my countrymen are apter to give them honour and to

attribute good success to them, it being an action of their own, than if they had joined with us.

\* I know not what to impute it to ; whether

\* Instead of this paragraph B and R have :—‘ I will speak more particularly. I remember that at the setting forth of the fleet of 1599 by the Hollanders we were readier to prognosticate their good fortune and commend their enterprises than any of our own, assuring ourselves what victories they would achieve having the chief command and rule in their own hands as if condemning us; in respect of them, in the actions we have jointly undertaken together. Some of their own nation stick not to write that if the English had been ruled by them the town of Cadiz had been kept for that they offered to leave so many men and so much victuals for the maintaining it. Whosoever shall chance to read that treatise I do assure them it is most untrue, for they carried not in all their ships such a proportion of men nor such a quantity of victuals as is set down by that author.<sup>1</sup> Then is it but a bare opinion men carry of their sufficiency at sea, for it hath not been seen in all the wars with Spain that ever they did anything in warlike sort against the Spaniards at sea.<sup>2</sup> But it may be answered that, till of late they were prohibited the traffic of Spain, they never had occasion to use their ships but in merchandize, and therefore undertook nothing by force, which is true and cannot be denied. But then it is strange we should so much extol them above ourselves, that never did anything by proof but by imagination what they would do. The principallest drift of my treatise is to answer some of my countrymen's extraordinary opinions that they have of the Hollanders' actions above ours ; and to condemn their carriage of this last journey wherein they showed themselves neither wise, honourable, discreet, nor valiant, the particulars as writ by them and my answer to it.’

<sup>1</sup> They offered to leave a month's supply of victuals. Cf. *ante*, i. 356, ii. 4.

<sup>2</sup> On April 25, 1607, Jacob van Heemskirk, in command of a Dutch fleet, met twenty-two Spaniards, under Don Juan D'Avilés, in the Straits of Gibraltar. Only ten or twelve Dutch came into action but the Spaniards lost eight ships burnt and three sunk. The Churchill version of this paragraph must be the later one and, in it, Monson does not repeat his taunt which many incidents had shewn to be unfounded (Cf. p. 119), but he has, probably by an oversight, allowed it to stand (*ante*, iii. 249) in a section written late in life. The *animus* with which he writes is visible all through this section, but even before 1599 the Dutch had shewn, on a small scale, their superiority at sea to the Spaniards.

envy to others, because they could not be actors themselves or a natural love to the Holland nation, not perfectly knowing them ; or to their popular government, because they have cast off all subjection to monarchy. But sure I am that their partiality has discovered a great deal of envy, as they shall know by what follows ; for I will so unmask them that they shall not deny it. After their engaging us in a war with Spain, it is known to as many as know anything that notwithstanding our prohibition of trade with Spain, which continued eighteen years, they never committed any hostile act by sea against Spain, nor had encounter with fleet or ships of Spain. But, on the contrary, supplied them with all manner of provisions and ammunition against us. Then seeing there appeared no act of theirs to commend either their sufficiency or valour, it is strange to me that my countrymen should extol them above ourselves only out of an imagination of what they would do, but not by proof of what they have done.

This trade of theirs into Spain continued all the reign of King Philip II. But he dying, and his son succeeding, he caused a general embargo and arrest of all ships within his dominions which belonged to any parts of the Netherlands that were not obedient to his father's government, and published an edict that it should be lawful, from that time forward, to use the same law upon any such ships as should be found in his country. This was effected accordingly ; and the Hollanders, being certified thereof, knew it was not their advantage to suffer their ships to lie and rot without employment, neither had they means to maintain so many mariners as were in the country without they had the use of navigation.



For these two reasons, and a desire they had to annoy the King of Spain, they sent this present year, 1599, seventy-three ships to sea, the General whereof was Peter van der Does.

Whilst this preparation of theirs held, there was an overture of peace made to her Majesty by the King of Spain, and the Archduke Albert, which the Queen was somewhat inclined to hearken to. But upon the earnest intercession and request of the Hollanders, with promise to secure her at home, with their fleet abroad, from any hurt Spain should intend against her that present year, she, out of a gracious respect to them, was willing to surcease speech of that treaty for a time.

And now in answer to a book they published at their return from the Canaries, which they entitled thus, 'The Conquest of the Grand Canaries made this last Summer by seventy-three sail of Ships, sent out by the command and direction of the States General of the United Provinces to the Coast of Spain and the Canary Islands; With the taking of a town in the island of Gomera, and the Success of part of this Fleet in their return homeward, which set sail from Holland the 25th of March, and returned home the 10th of September, 1599.' When you read the two first words, 'The Conquest,' you will not think there followeth less than a kingdom; for commonly it is not a phrase used to any State but to a kingdom.

The Grand Canary, which they think to blind the ignorant people with to be a place of so great fame and renown, because of the length of the word in pronunciation, is an island of twelve leagues in length and breadth; many villages in it, and one town bigger than the rest, called a city, where the bishop's seat is for all the other

islands. There are in number seven islands; Grand Canary, Teneriffe, which is the biggest, wealthiest and strongest, Palma, Gomera, Fuerteventura, Lanzarote, and Ferro.

Upon the first discovery of these islands they were called the Fortunate, and now the Canary Islands. And, by setting down the Canaries, he would have the world think that they had conquered all the islands, whereas, if he would have spoken truth and according to sense, he should have entituled his book, 'The surprise, and taking, of the city of Las Palmas in the island of Grand Canary.' The title of this book is as ridiculous as if we should write the story of the sack of Cadiz, and entitle it, 'The Conquest of Spain,' because Cadiz is a city in Spain. Thus you see they are people that will set a great gloss upon a small shew.

Their promise made to her Majesty at their setting from home was, to view and search all the harbours upon the coast of Spain, and to destroy the King's ships, whereby she should be secured at home.

The first port they fell in withal was Coruña, being guided with a favourable and large wind, for from Holland thither they were sailing but eleven days.\* But when they came before the harbour they behaved themselves so unadvisedly that the town took the alarm and was provided to withstand them. Here lay divers of the King's ships which they durst not attempt, but dishonourably departed. Though I must confess they performed half their promise made to the

\* The fleet consisted of 72 sail divided into three squadrons, that of the orange flag under van der Does himself, white under Jan Gerbrandtsen, and blue under Cornelis Gelyn. It arrived off Coruña June 11, 1599 (N.S.).

Queen, in viewing the harbours, but not the other half in destroying their ships.

If her Majesty had rested upon their assurance of safety, and not otherwise provided to stand upon her own guard, I am of opinion the Spaniards had sooner visited us, than they them. And yet they stick not to boast in their glory what they did in despite of Coruña for, saith the author, we cast anchor in twelve or thirteen fathoms water where the town and castle shot above two hundred cannon shot, but killed never a man. In another place he saith that they towed out their ships with boats, in despite of all their shot. By this it appears, either they lay so far off, that they were in no danger of their shot, or that they were in fee with the gunners not to hurt them, as any man may conjecture.

But it seems they were so much discouraged with looking into this harbour that they resolved, thenceforward, not to undertake any such service of danger and, forgetting their promise to the Queen, the General made known his purpose to his captains that he meant to attempt the Islands of Canary. If this project was designed him from home, or that it was left to the discretion of the General to undertake what he thought fit—in the one, the States shewed themselves very ignorant in martial sea causes, or the General had no disposition to enterprise a service that might bring danger. For the Canaries are known to be of such small importance that we never held it worth our labour to possess them, especially intending to do service after, though it were many times in our power to surprise them. For we well knew the wines the islands afford would be the cause of a most contagious sickness which I think by this time the Hollanders have found out.



Says the author, 'The place of landing was 'discommodious and difficult, but that most of 'the enemies were slain, to the number of thirty 'or thirty-six. The Lord General leaping first 'on land, was thrust into the leg with a pike, and 'had in his body four wounds more, being in 'great danger to lose his life but that one of the 'soldiers slew the Spaniard that did it ; but his 'wounds were of small moment.'

Gentle reader, first you are to observe that, by their own confession, they had very great difficulty to land and that before they landed they slew most of the enemies, which were to the number of thirty or thirty-six, so that by their own computation they were not withstood by many more than thirty-six. Then let us think whether it was greater valour in the thirty-six, to withstand the twenty-four companies, as they report of themselves after, or for the twenty-four companies to overcome the thirty-six men. After this proportion it was three Spaniards to two companies of Hollanders.

Then follows a report of their Lord General's valour : a Lord we will allow him, because the author gives him the title, though, I think, if it were examined, he was no more Lord than they have authority to make a Lord. He was the first man, the author says, that leaped ashore, and received a wound in his leg with a pike and four in his body, which put him in great danger of his life but that a soldier slew the Spaniard that did it ; and that his wounds were of small moment. Mark the improbability of the one, and the variety of the report of the other. For how is it likely that one Spaniard should come to the push of pike, upon the General's leaping ashore, and give him so many wounds, having his whole companies

ready instantly to land and their shot in their boats so prepared that they would not suffer the head of a man to appear, much less one man to present himself to push of pike in face of them all? This man's valour far exceeded the thirty-six; for he undertook their whole force, being twenty-four companies. The author says the General was in great danger to lose his life, and in the line following that his wounds were of small moment. These two are contraries, and for my part I know not which to believe; but if you will have my opinion, considering the improbability of the manner of his hurts and the contrariety of the state of his wounds, I do verily believe the thirty-six men could not make the resistance they speak of; secondly, the General came not to the push of pike at his first landing; and, thirdly, he received not so many wounds as for his glory they report of him.

After they had thus landed they followed the victory with great loss to themselves, and little to the enemy, by their own report. For they say that they neither found wealth nor prisoners in the town, their goods being all carried into the mountains, and the people having quitted it and escaped, wherein the Hollanders shewed themselves inconsiderate to suffer their escapes.

The memorablest thing they did in the town was the delivery of thirty-six prisoners in the jail, who reported that two others, one an Englishman, the other a Hollander, were carried into the mountains, being censured to be burnt by the Inquisition, whom they had not the means to redeem for want of two Spaniards as they had not had the fortune to take prisoners. The author reports that after the taking of the town some of the mariners went into the country, and the

passages being known to the Spaniards and not to them, that at one time twenty of them were killed. Another time they returned with the loss of seventy men by reason, as before, that the passages were known to the Spaniards and not to them. Moreover, he saith that at the taking of Gomera because the enemy, observing their disorder, obscurely hid themselves till they had them upon such advantage as they thought fit and then assaulted them, they slew four score and made the rest retire; besides, at divers other places they received loss.

This, in my opinion, proceeded rather out of disorder amongst themselves than any unlawful act of the Spaniards. For those thus slain, were no better than freebooters that went to rifle and spoil, without leave of their officers. And yet the Hollanders rail and exclaim against their cruelty, alluding to their names, that the Canaries were so called, because of Canes, the abundance of dogs then found in the island: they say that the people would run as swift as dogs, and were as tyrannical and blood-thirsty as ravening wolves, which they sufficiently manifested. For as soon as they could lay hold on any of their people, like to mad curs, agreeing with their names, they would presently worry them. I confess they have some reason to revile at the Spaniards' cruelty and yet in all men's opinions it is not near their own where they conquer; in this they could not for they took never a Spaniard to execute their tyranny upon.\* But though they did not sufficiently revenge themselves upon the people of those islands who annoyed them by reason of

\* The Spaniards cut up one Dutch prisoner into quarters; the author confesses that the Dutch thereupon retaliated similarly on a Spanish prisoner.

their own disorder, yet they ceased not most cruelly and against all Christianity to rifle their cloisters, monasteries, and churches; and not being content with the spoil of them, they destroyed and burnt them down to the ground. This example they never learnt of us in the actions they have been with us, for we ever had a respect to the churches, though we differed in religion, and held it was a house of our God as well as theirs, though we served Him not both in one kind.

The Hollanders are people that will omit nothing for their glory; and amongst many famous acts they have achieved in this expedition they set down the taking of seven fishermen by one of their pinnaces, fishing under Fuertaventura, and the General's committing them to prison. These seven Spaniards stood them in great stead for their reputation, for had it not been for the taking of these seven men they had returned without manifesting their landing in any part of the King of Spain's dominions; not having taken a man before to have testified to the world they had met with an enemy.

After the sack and spoil of the city of Las Palmas, the General embarked his army, and was willing to perform some other service that was not of danger. He called a council of his captains and pilots, enquiring of them which was the weakest island, for there he meant to land. You see he was not desirous to know the wealthiest, but the weakest island; making account where there was wealth there was strength that would resist them. But he wisely considering that the taking an island, though it was of no importance, yet it would carry a great shew and gloss to the world, (for men would not enter into the value

and worth but into the name of an island) did hereupon courageously resolve upon the attempt of Gomera, a place of so small account, that they might have been ashamed to undertake it, but especially to publish it in print.

If all our deeds, according to that computation, were published to the world, we have had many ships, not above three or four in company, that have performed greater service. Yet the Hollanders stick not to boast that they left the island of Gomera burning, which was never done before by any nation. Some men that know not the state of this poor island would think it were to be compared with Vienna, which the Turks have often assaulted with huge armies, and never had power to prevail against it. And in the same case men may imagine, seeing they did that which was never done by any nation, that it was a place of that invincible strength as though many armies had attempted it yet had never power to prevail against it. Whereas, in very truth, this island is very poor in wealth and weak in power, readier to yield to a weak enemy than to withstand a mean army. This island was subdued upon the first discovery without fight; all the rest withstood the Spaniards, which it is like the General well knew by his demand which was the weakest island, which emboldened him upon the enterprise. Here he found no resistance; for all the people abandoned the town and fled to the mountains, only one they took who by negligence escaped. And they experienced the disgrace the people did them who derided and exclaimed against their cowardice, urging them with despiteful speeches to fetch the arms of the eighty men before slain which they durst not do but with dishonour and shame quitted the island.



Once again the General embarked, and dispatched thirty-four of his ships back for Holland while himself with the rest meant to proceed to the West Indies. Those ships that returned took two prizes of small value, that had but forty men in both, which takes up a long discourse in this book how to dispose of them, so ignorant were they in such actions and so great a wonder they made of taking two poor ships. If all our prizes were estimated, and the number set down, since the beginning of our wars with Spain, there have been at least six hundred greater and richer vessels brought to England, which we think not worthy to boast of. But indeed they are to be excused; for the taking of these two barks, and the forty men, are the only deeds they did in their famous enterprise to the Canaries.

You have heard that upon the division of the fleet the General resolved for the West Indies; which resolution was suddenly altered, and he directed his course to St. Thomé, an island under the equinoctial line. What became of them I yet understand not, neither will I covet to know till I see it published in print as this was. Neither, in my opinion, can they expect any thing but death, the country and climate exceeding all parts of the world for sickness. And I verily believe this latter project to St. Thomé, was designed by some traitors amongst themselves; for the Portuguese that live in that island confess that no man born in Europe ever lived there so long as to have a white beard, or attain to fifty years of age.\*

Gentle reader, I pray you observe what

\* Van der Does, fifteen captains, and about 1200 seamen and soldiers died of disease.

irresolution in this voyage and their weak courage since the beginning of it by which we shall perceive that it was a mean project they set out to do and that they had no intent to annoy the enemy by endangering themselves; wherein they abused her Majesty in promising to secure her and doing it not, and discovered their own want of resolution and courage.\*

And to conclude, seeing how indiscreetly the Hollanders have carried themselves in this last action, wherein they have deceived the expectation of all their well-willers that are not too much transported with partiality, I would not have my countrymen hereafter to magnify them above their worth. But that in reason, without affectation, they will compare the managing their actions with ours, which in discretion they are bound to do before they give their censure; and they shall undoubtedly find great difference betwixt us. What I have here writ I protest is neither in malice to the Hollanders, nor in partiality to ourselves, but out of a sincere love of truth. For I am so far from any detracting humour that, if I can see amendment in them and their actions, I will be as ready to do them honour therein as I am now willing to defend my countrymen from the scandal of spiteful tongues.

\* All through this section Monson repeats that the Dutch broke their promise and left Elizabeth, relying upon them, defenceless in 1599. Compare, *ante*, ii. p. 234, iii. p. 248, and p. 55 of this volume where, to support the argument he maintains in those places, he takes the exactly opposite view. Nor, here, does he appear to see that, assuming that the objective of the Dutch was of sufficient importance to attract Spanish armament to themselves, it did not matter whether they were at the Canaries or at the South Pole.

A Project how to ruin Spain, with the Assistance of Holland, if his Majesty enter into a new War with that Crown.\*

IF the King of Great Britain declare himself enemy to Spain no man need doubt but that he shall have assistance of Holland to join with him in any action against that Crown. And then it may be supposed what hurt in time may redound to Spain in the Indies, if both the nations do really join together and their designs be well grounded, by example of what hurt the Hollanders alone have done the Spaniards in Brazil and the Indies without the help of any other nation.

And to descend to particulars, there is lately an occasion and an unavoidable opportunity offered, never thought on by England or Holland when they both had wars and studied how to vex the kingdom of Spain by their hostile actions. Now, I say, there is a new discovery wherein the Indies may be hazarded, the Spanish nation subverted, and all their rule, government, and riches, settled upon us and Holland if we join mutually together, as we have done in sundry other actions heretofore. The ground of this design stands upon the peopling and planting of an uninhabited island, eighty odd leagues from Cartagena, in Tierra-firme, and not above ten or twelve miles in length. and, as I formerly said,

\* I have no MS. authority for this section.

six in breadth, five hundred leagues west from the other islands the English now possess, and where there are already seated six thousand able and sufficient soldiers with their arms and other habiliments for war, and are like daily to increase by the forwardness of people that willingly put themselves into such actions.\*

Such islands as the English are seated in are in the hithermost part of America, and by which all ships that go to the other islands aforesaid, or to *Tierra-firme*, are to pass by with a certain and settled wind which never fails. And the men that there inhabit, their bodies are made able and fit to live in such unnatural climates by their former breeding; their hard and evil diet, with drinking water, is made familiar to them and they are become excellent soldiers. These people, thus planted, will much forward any enterprise that shall be made upon the Indies by the convenience and little charge to transport them considered. As likewise the ability of them, which we may account treble to as many as we shall carry out of England.†

But now I will proceed to the design and to the way how to put it in execution, which may prove the most dangerous plot that was ever intended against Spain since the first discovery of the Indies, though at the first apprehension it

\* St. Christopher's and Barbadoes were settled in 1624 and 1626, but would not justify this magniloquent description of the number and strength of the British islands, which seems rather to belong to the period when the Churchill editor was at work than to Monson's lifetime (Cf. *ante*, iv. 404). It will be remembered that Monson died in 1643, twelve years before the conquest of Jamaica.

† *I.e.* that they were acclimatised and accustomed to local conditions.

may seem ridiculous, and rather to be contemned than feared by the Spaniards. But if they will call to mind the precedent of other times, they shall find that their King Don Rodrigo and his country was conquered in two years by a few barbarous Moors not worth naming, and could not be recovered in seven hundred and seventy odd years of wars after. The like may be said of England when it was subdued and subverted by less than four hundred Saxons at the beginning; things not to be believed but that times and stories make them manifest. And in reason this island may prove as dangerous to the Indies as the others have been to Spain and England, for it is like a spark of fire out of which greater fires may be kindled and made unquenchable. This island, which I have spoken of in my Fourth Book, is near Cartagena, and not far from Puerto Bello and Nombre de Dios, whither the treasure of the Indies is brought first from Peru by sea to Panama, and after to the places aforesaid by land before it be embarked for Spain.

This island has of late changed her name from Catalina to Providence, out of a foreseeing providence and care that some well-minded Englishmen do owe to their country that have so named it, thinking to work the effect for which they possess and so call it, as may be gathered out of a discourse, it being of that importance, by reason of that impregnableness and the commodity of a harbour to receive some shipping of a reasonable bigness, and being naturally encompassed about with rocks and shoals that it is impossible for any bark or boat to make an enterprise upon it but only in the harbour, which is so fortified that no force is able to assail it. Insomuch that it may be said of this island

that God has placed it with his finger to impede and forbid the trade of the Indies upon that coast as aforesaid. And though this island affords nothing but water for the sustenance of the people that shall inhabit it, yet in a short space it may be supplied from the Tortugas, which we enjoy near Española,\* with hogs and beefs sufficient to relieve as many men as the circuit of the ground can contain.

But now to the use that can be made of the island. It is to be considered, as aforesaid, how dangerous a thing it will be to the Spaniards' navigations thereabouts. Secondly, that whereas in all our voyages and expeditions in the Queen's time to the Indies we have still quailed because our fleets made their abode out of England above six or seven months, going, coming, and staying there, for want of provisions to abide there any longer, but were still forced to return when their greatest service was to be executed. The use we must put this island to is to make it a magazine to relieve our greatest enterprises upon the main land, without either sending or turning back into England. For every thing that England can supply us with this island may receive from thence without charge; and the ships thus freighted may return laden with salt, that shall cost them nothing, to countervail the expense of their transportation. Here shall we be fully furnished, and all difficulties taken away to further our enterprise upon the main land. Which upon our first landing we must divide our armies into two parts, the one to go to Panama, and possess the port of the South Sea, whilst the other enjoys Cartagena and the North Coast so

\* Tortuga was a buccaneer centre from about 1632, but it was cosmopolitan rather than English.

that betwixt them they shall give the greatest blow to all the Indies as ever was projected by man, as well Peru as New Spain.

These places being taken, as it will prove no great difficulty by example of fewer forces that have done far greater exploits in the same places, seas, and towns, this is the way for England and Holland to become masters of that land and sea. For the strength of the Indies consists in the people and inhabitants of Peru and New Spain ; the one north, the other south, thousands of miles from thence, which distance will debar them of succours and all that coast will be left to their own defence ; whose weakness the English have found in sundry actions heretofore. Or if it be alleged that their ports and towns are better fortified than they have been ; it may be answered that if it were so, yet our army and strength will be twenty times double to that in former times, and that, moreover, a country invaded (that relies upon the force of towns and fortifications) by an enemy that commands both land and sea, though it be never so impregnable, in the end must yield.

Leaving some attempts formerly made by our English before they were warranted by the war with Spain, who then joined with the Cimaroons, which are negroes revolted from their masters betwixt Nombre de Dios and Panama, a place where they seized upon the King's treasure ashore in those times, I will recite some particular exploits done upon the towns of the Indies during the war of Queen Elizabeth :—

Drake, with fewer than a thousand men, took Santiago in Cape Verde, San Domingo in Española, Cartagena in Tierra-firme, and San Antonio and St. Helena in Florida. Drake and Hawkyns, with

seven hundred and fifty men, took Rio de la Hacha, Rancheria, Tapia, Santa Marta, Nombre de Dios, and Puerto Bello; and were forced, for want of supplies, to return for England. If the island of Providence had been theirs, the advantage of it foreseen, and they supplied from it as is now intended, they had taken Panama, and by consequence had an entrance into the South Sea, which would have proved the most dangerous design against Spain that was ever projected. If we call to mind private men's undertakings, Captain Preston, with one hundred and fifty men, took Puerto Santo, Coche, the town and fort of Coro, the city of Santiago de Leon, and the town of Cumana. Captain Parker, with two small ships and one hundred and eighty men, took St. Vincent in Cape Verde, Puerto Bello, and a fort called Santiago, with the King's treasure in *Tierra-firme*. The same Captain Parker, in a voyage before, and with fewer men, took one town of importance, called *Campeachy*. I could repeat many more but these shall suffice.\*

The Earl of Cumberland, with fewer than one thousand men, took Puerto Rico, a place of great strength and defence, with the loss of twenty-eight men. These precedents shew what these places are, or may be made in strength. And if so few ships and men could surprise and take so many cities and towns without the countenance or help of the Queen, or the assistance of other princes or countries, and in time of war that gave continual alarms to them to provide for enemies, what may England and Holland now do, joining their forces together, that have the command of more bodies of men, more number of ships, and

\* See *ante*, i. pp. 226 *et seq.*



to be furnished with greater celerity to second their actions, than all the world besides? But, especially, having this island that will serve for a key to open the lock of the Indies?

But to end with the design of the North Sea, which is so distinguished by the Spaniards, I will now sail into the South Sea, and Peru, the fountain out of which the treasures of the Indies flow, and will set down the last resolution taken by the projectors, counsellors, and adventurers of this action, which in my opinion seems to be a thing of great reason. They conclude, as upon a matter of great consequence, to take away all occasion of help or succour from Spain is to forbid the ordinary trades of their neighbour countries into Spain; which being done the Indies is hopeless of help. And the way to put it in practice, as they conceive, is to put out a general proclamation throughout Europe, for all nations, towns, and cities, to take notice of, that if such countries, towns, and princes, will from thence forward desist from their traffic with Spain, with ammunition, victuals, or other habiliments for the war, that then from that day they shall enjoy the immunities and privileges of trade into the Indies as freely as now they do, or have at any time done, in their commerce of England or Holland. As to the contrary, if they relieve Spain with the commodities aforesaid they are to stand upon their perils and not to expect favour. This will debar Spain of foreign helps, and be a means to unfurnish them of all materials to fit out fleets; so that the Indies will be left to themselves and the dwellers there to defend them.

The conference and resolution of the treaty aforesaid provided for all things to be presently put in execution, and to forecast all doubts that

might be impediments to them. And they considered how easy a thing it was to go through the work they had projected: so, on the other side, they weighed that the substance of the wealth of the Indies was thousands of miles from Panama, whither it was brought by sea, not having means or passage to transport it by land, and therefore conclude that the ruin of Spain in the Indies was to have an entrance and command of the South Sea. They know the condition of that sea, and all the harbours and towns inhabited and possessed by the Spaniards from Chile and Peru till they arrive at the ports of Navidad and Acapulco in New Spain, which are the harbours whither Mexico and all that coast send their commodities, as well into the ports of America as into the Philippine islands. And that by the taking those ports the whole country of New Spain must necessarily submit and yield.

They are not ignorant that though that sea affords ships for trade from port to port yet they and their ships are shut up from any other traffic out of that sea by reason of the Straits of Magellan. And that the ships there built are made only for merchandize, not for defence and strength, not one of them carrying one piece of ordnance. They likewise know that the Spaniards thereabouts are rich and unaccustomed to war; that if they may have good conditions for life and goods they may be easily drawn to live under our subjection and government. They moreover know the evil disposition the people of those countries bear to the Spaniards, and how willingly they will be drawn to join with us against them. And to join the one and the other more heartily to the invaders' party they resolve to make a public act and decree, 'That all Indians, as well

the one as the other, shall be freed from their labours, their slaveries, and forced tyrannies.' And, because the Spaniards shall have no dependence or necessity of the help of Spain, it shall be lawful for all men to plant wine, oil, and other commodities they desire. It shall be also as lawful for them to enjoy their religion as in former times. These will be motives and reasons sufficient, as well to draw the one as the other to the government of England and Holland, when all the possibility of relief shall be taken from them.

For the effecting of this they determine to send forty or fifty warlike ships into the South Sea by the Straits of Magellan, which shall carry a sufficient number of men to perform their design, with all manner of ordnance, with ammunition to strengthen the shores and ships. No part but shall be possessed, strengthened, and inhabited by us, till we come to Panama, where they shall find it planted and enjoyed by their countrymen in as good a manner as though they should arrive in England or Holland. And from thence they may easily pass to the ports aforesaid of Navidad and Acapulco in New Spain, and conclude an absolute conquest of the Indies. They may say as Julius Cesar said, 'I came, I saw, and I overcame.'

And because this counsel and resolution shall not seem vain, by example of the North Sea aforesaid, where I have made a repetition of such towns and ports as have been taken by the English, so I will do the like in the South Sea by one ship alone that departed England in 1586 and upon all occasions and services could land but eighty men. The first exploit he did, was by taking away certain ordnance from a port, built by Pedro Sarmiento in the Straits of Magellan, where

he found all the people dead, except three only. Sailing from thence to Chile, he took Santa Maria; he took and spoiled Morro Moreno, Arica, Pisco, Paraca, Chinche, Payta, the islands of Puna, a place of great importance for the building and trimming of ships, and arriving at New Spain, he took and spoiled Acapulco, the port of Navidad, the port of Santiago, the bay of Compostella, the island of St. Andrew, and the bay of Mazatlan. And therefore let no man doubt that any part of that coast or seas can resist forty or fifty sail of ships sent from hence.\*

\* Compare what Monson says *ante*, iv. pp. 440-2 and see vol. i. p. 87 for notice of this project. It is hardly worth while commenting on the flighty hopes of the originators that they could bribe the other European countries to cease supplying Spain, that they could placate the Spanish settlers by religious and commercial concessions, or that they could send 40 or 50 ships into the Pacific, ideas, however, which obtained Monson's approval. In effect, Providence became but a commonplace trading station for the benefit of the Dutch; the Spaniards made an unsuccessful attempt to re-occupy it in 1635, but succeeded in 1641.

The statement (p. 123) on 'a country invaded' must be read with limitations; even if such a country has no fleet and few fortified places the prospect of eventual conquest depends on the effective strength the invader can bring to bear on a resistance which may be expected to be stubborn, especially if based on climatic and natural difficulties. Certainly England and Holland could not have placed sufficient troops in the field to conquer Peru and New Spain even if nothing happened in Europe to divert their attention.

## Projects for the Spaniards to annoy the Hollanders in several Trades.\*

### *The first Project.*

THE Hollanders have compassed a great and beneficial trade into several places of Guinea, which anciently belonged to the Portuguese as the first discoverers of them. The Hollanders now resort thither daily and are well accepted of by the negroes of that country, who bring them gold, and divers other rich commodities in truck for their slight merchandize. The project to hinder the trade of the Hollanders and quite to banish them from that coast is to furnish as men of war six or seven of those ships they ordinarily send to Brazil, well manned, and these in their way to range along the coast of Guinea where they shall undoubtedly meet and take the Holland ships that trade there in several parts and ports, as is apparent, having neither port nor other strength to resist them.† Or if it shall happen that they have made any defence on shore by the assistance of the negroes, they may easily supplant them with the soldiers they carry with them. Whereas by giving them a longer time to inhabit that coast it would become a more difficult enterprise to subdue them, by the example of the Hollanders possessing divers places in the East Indies, which at the first might have been prevented.

\* I have no MS. authority for this section.

† The first Dutch conquest was Gorée island in 1617.

If the Hollanders be but once thus served it will be a means to make them quit that coast, and clearly thrust them out of Guinea. For Guinea is not like the East Indies where the Hollanders maintain a hundred ships by their several trades in sundry parts, as well those places they enjoy as the others that accept of their commerce, whereas in Guinea the traffic is but in particular places whither the merchandize is brought them by negroes from afar off within the land, which cannot be of any great bulk for want of carriage of ships or boats. Neither are they designed any particular harbour, as the Portuguese are at Castle de la Mina. The Hollanders have little hope of robbing and spoiling the Portuguese because their trade is but small and their ships few, whereby they are not able to maintain footing in that country without greater expense than the profit will countervail. Six or seven ships of Portugal will be a sufficient strength to drive them out of Guinea, those ships to range along the coast and cut them off where they shall find them trading in their several places. My project is, after they are thus destroyed, that the six or seven ships of Portugal stand over to Brazil, and there take their freights of sugar and other rich commodities, which, considering the safety and waftage by those ships of war, will be a means to ease the expense in furnishing the ships of war.

*The Second Project to Russia.*

The north part of Russia was but a thing imagined, till Sebastian Cabot, by his persuasions in the reign of Queen Mary, drew England to the discovery of it, Anno 1553, which enjoyed the

absolute trade thereof for many years till the Hollanders encroached upon us, as they have done in all other trades, as I have said in my Sixth Book. In continuance of time the Hollanders have increased from two ships to one hundred, as is apparent by so many as they yearly send, and have made a greater use of the country than to merchandize alone. For they have set up a trade of making cables, ropes, and other cordage in such abundance that they outdo all other places in the Baltic Sea ; and from hence they directly serve Spain with those commodities. And, because the passage being through our Channel in time of war they feared to be intercepted by us, they directed their course to the north part of Scotland and Ireland purposely to avoid us.

The advantage Spain is to take of them in this project is to carry their designs discreetly and secretly ; to be provided of pilots without suspicion or noise, which must be done out of England, for no other Christian country trades into Russia but we and the Hollanders ; and though their harbours are dangerous at their going in, by reason of their bar, yet it is familiar with the pilots that use it. The force the Hollanders have to guard their hundred sail of ships is commonly three or four men of war, who suspect no annoyance from Spain at any time ; and by these three or four ships you may judge of the strength you are to employ against them. Though I advise you carry no less than thirty sail of ships, well manned, to man the Hollanders after you have taken them. Besides the command you shall have over the ships aforesaid, you shall possess their storehouses, cellars, yards, and what else belongs to them, and spoil them, that they be never able to erect more without an infinite charge.

The third consideration is the season of the year; for they must cast to be at St. Nicholas by the 10th or 12th of July; for no longer than the 17th of August they can well abide there by reason of the winter so suddenly coming upon them. Or if they shall arrive earlier than the 12th or 14th of that month perhaps they may come with the soonest, and find their goods not shipped; but though they should, it will not be very material for they may row up with their boats to Polmogro,\* eighty miles distance, where the greatest part of their commodities are made, and shall either meet them in their transportation to the ships, or possess them on shore where they shall undoubtedly find them. Or if upon any other accident the Spanish ships shall not arrive at the port of St. Nicholas before the others put out to sea, then they may stand to the North Cape of Norway, and there lie off and on the headland, which the Hollanders must of necessity see and double before they can direct their course for Holland.

If Russia were a country in league with Spain, or otherwise had correspondence or friendship with them in commerce and traffic, then I confess it were against the laws of nations and honour to offer violence to an enemy within the port of another prince when they are under his protection. But I could never understand that ever leagues were treated of or trade maintained betwixt Russia and Spain, or ambassadors employed, or other obligations of friendship since King Philip was King of England. And therefore the King of Spain can be no more taxed or blamed if he used this opportunity upon his enemy that

\* Kholmogory.



is offered him by this proposition, especially when none of his subjects can receive prejudice or fear of hurt or embargo to be made upon their persons or goods.

Let the Spanish commander, at his arrival in the road of St. Nicholas, have a care to summon such English ships as he shall there find in harbour, and to admonish them to forbear offering violence or making other resistance in defence of the Hollanders' ships, and let them understand in a friendly way, how they are to carry themselves by the articles of peace which they may carry and shew them. And withal to tell them roundly, if they exceed their commission therein, that justice will be required at their hands by their ambassador residing in England, who will be sure to prosecute it with all rigour and severity: and in the Spanish fleet's behalf let the General give assurance no way to impeach the English, or by any direct or indirect means to trouble or molest their peaceable traffic.

This project prevailing, the Spaniards will be enriched with one hundred sail of Holland ships and their lading, great part whereof is cordage and other things of considerable value which Spain has most need to be furnished with, and need not hereafter be beholding to friends for them.

*A Rutter of Russia.*

He that will direct his course from Spain to the north cape of Norway, must steer a northerly course, till he arrive to Iceland, where upon occasion he may refresh himself with butter, flesh, and fish, and from thence steer away E. N. E. for the North Cape.

From the North Cape to the North Kave,\*  
E. and by S. thirteen leagues.

Thence to Marcroft,† E. S. E. twelve leagues.

Thence to Wardhouse,‡ E. S. E. fifteen leagues.

Here you may have yourself from Wardhouse,  
to the point of Kegro,§ E. S. E. eleven leagues ;  
no good road for great ships.

From Kegro to Zouse,|| E. S. E. nine leagues.

From the seven islands to Swetnoss,¶ twenty-  
one leagues : there are islands where you may  
anchor.

From Swetnoss to Lombasco,\*\* S. S. E. thirteen  
leagues.

From thence to Orgolouse,†† S. S. E. seven  
leagues.

From Orgolouse, to cape Caudenos ‡‡ N. E.  
forty-seven leagues. But you must sail from the  
Three Islands to Cross Island,§§ S. S. W. thirteen  
leagues.

From thence to Calmouse |||| Archangel, and by  
W. seventeen leagues on this side of Archangel is  
St. Nicholas.

\* Nordkyn.

† Malkorf, on Tana Fiord, in Herman Moll's map of 1719.

‡ Vardöehuis.

§ Cape Kekour.

|| Qy. Arzina river and haven where Sir Hugh Willoughby  
and his men perished. Of course we have here not only Monson's  
original corruptions but those added by the Churchill editor  
and the printers, with no possibility of collation.

¶ Cape Sweetnose (Sviatoinos).

\*\* Lumboievsky Island.

†† Orlogenose, or Orlofka, Point.

‡‡ Cape Karan Nos.

§§ Sosnovits.

|||| Koskanos in Anthony Jenkinson's map of 1562 and  
in Wm. Borough's map c. 1600 ; now Cape Katness.

*The Third Project.*

That the Spaniards may practice against the Hollanders, and to be as easily effected as the rest and of greater consequence than all the others, is a design against their fishing, which all men know is a means to uphold their State, to increase their ships, and to multiply their wealth. In which, if at any time they be prevented or intercepted, they become more miserable than all other people, in that they shall be made a prey to their enemies.

This fishing I formerly treated of, with the condition of the Hollanders that only enjoy it by our permission. Now will I proceed to the design upon them for the Spaniards to execute, so it be with the approbation and sufferance of the King of England. I have already declared the place of rendezvous where the Hollanders meet; as also the time of the year, the month, and day, when they begun to fish, with the profit they make of it. The place of rendezvous is Bressa in Shetland, an island in his Majesty's jurisdiction of Scotland; thither commonly resort one thousand or more fishing vessels, called busses, which, by a law made amongst themselves in Holland, cannot put forth line or net to fish till the 24th of June.

And therefore the Spaniards must so cast as to be at Bressa Sound before that time, or at least two days, to take an opportunity before the others going out of harbour; which, if they have a care effectually to accomplish, they shall bring both the persons of the Hollanders and their ships to their mercy. And after this is effected I need not teach the Spaniards how to carry their business,

or what conditions to make with the Hollanders, for they shall have time sufficient to compass their ends after they have them in their power.

*The Fourth Project,*

Is for the King of Spain to keep a constant squadron of ten or twelve ships, choice sailers, upon his own coast. They will be able to keep the French, the Hollanders, and the Turks pirates, from the incursions they usually make upon that coast, and put them to look for their prey in a vast and open sea, which is as uncertain of meeting ships as the finding a needle in a bottle of hay. For I have often shewed that if capes and headlands be well defended the others will not be worth the cost and charges they shall be put to.

Besides the service done against ships of war, in this manner aforesaid, they will secure their own trades and impeach all such Hollanders that shall go in or come out of the Straits if they keep a squadron twelve or fourteen leagues south from Cape St. Vincent, and spread themselves north and south a league and more in distance from one another. One ship of Holland that shall be taken in their course out of the Straits will countervail the charge of a whole squadron for many months; and the example of it, seeing their good success, will encourage the Spaniards to keep ships continually thus employed.

Here I end my projects, till I have occasion to speak of them again. And now shall follow my stratagems.

### Stratagems to be used at Sea.

1. A FLEET that is bound to a port, and fears to meet an enemy, may avoid him by this stratagem following. Besides such pinnaces as must be sent to look out the ships expected, to give them warning of an enemy, they ought to have other pinnaces, choice sailers, that should attend the enemy's fleet; and finding they lie in a height the others have order to sail in, to draw near them and to entice them to chase them. And in pursuit of them they will be drawn to leeward and give passage for their fleet's entrance

2. But if this prevail not they may cause one of their pinnaces to be purposely taken to deceive them with false instructions. As for example, if their fleet have order to come home in thirty-seven degrees; the enemy finding those directions will not suspect a deceit, but will stand into thirty-seven degrees, when the others will come home in thirty-six, the height former assigned them and so avoid them.

3. Or if a fleet be sent out for guard of those ships expected, and not so good of sail as their enemy, to force them to quit their coast it were better such a fleet should lie in a contrary height to that their ships have directions to sail in than otherwise. For the enemy finding in what height they lie in, will verily believe they have orders to come home in the same height and will strive to meet them in that height, before they shall

join together, when the others have directions not to come within forty or fifty leagues of them.

4. If fleets shall meet in the night, or after an encounter they forbear fighting when it is dark, and one of them have a desire to quit the other, they may cause so many lights as usually their Admiral, or other ships, carry in the night, to be carried by pinnaces in such a height as may equal the poop of their ships. And the enemy, accompanying those lights, will not suspect the flight of the fleet, who in the mean time may convey themselves away and leave only the pinnaces behind them.

5. If a fleet will deceive an enemy of a less force than their own, that is so far to windward that they cannot fetch them, they may do it with counterfeit flags and working like merchant ships. And, for a bait, may appoint part of a fleet to chase another astern, and the chaser to wear the enemy's colours.

The ships must shoot, but miss one another. Which they to windward, spying, will come room in hope to have a part of the booty, and so be brought into the wake of the fleet and entrapped.

6. This stratagem will serve as well for a road, to cause in the like manner one ship to chase another, as though she that is chased laboured to recover the road. And this being seen by the ships in the road, the flag seeming to be a friend, may embolden them to go forth to the rescue of her and so fall into the laps of the enemy.

7. People are not so easily cozened with counterfeit flags as they have been, for the often practice of such stratagems makes men more cautious. We were wont to make it a common custom, after we had taken a Spanish caravel, to clothe our men with the others' garments and

to send them into the harbours of Spain to be informed of the state of their shipping.

8. In 1587, and the first time I went to sea as captain, I had two pinnaces and one Spanish frigate under my command. The frigate took a Portuguese, and after was robbed herself by a French ship of war: out of necessity this frigate was forced into the harbour of Setubal in Portugal, and the people seeing her Portuguese build, and the men attired in the habits of the Portuguese they had formerly taken, and having a Portuguese aboard with them that came out of England, and whom they trusted, they were supplied with what they wanted from the shore and departed without suspicion.

9. One night I came into the road of Cezimbra, pretending to be a Fleming bound to Setubal to lade salt, and desired a pilot. Under which colour I deceived the pilot, and divers other boats and barks that came aboard me, by whom I understood the state of the fleet at Lisbon ready to set to sea in pursuit of me. I could recite many stratagems of this kind.

10. If a fleet intend an attempt upon a harbour, where a strong fort may impeach their entrance, by example of Lisbon and the castle of St. Julian, the stratagem is to set two or three old vessels on fire, fitted with all manner of provisions to make a smoke, and to run them ashore under the castle, where the wind will carry the smoke with that wonder and terror to them of the castle that the gunners may not see a ship, much less have an aim at them, and so they may pass without danger.

11. What stratagems may be used against such ships as are entered a harbour, and how to prevent it, I have expressed in the Second Book,

where I treated of the last expedition at Cadiz, in 1625. And because I have named Lisbon I will set down a stratagem I had in mind after my imprisonment there.

12. Both many years before and after I was prisoner in Lisbon the Hollanders had a free trade into all parts of Spain, which I took advantage of in this stratagem following: I devised that twenty Holland ships freighted with merchandize, under the colour of merchants, should repair to Lisbon, and that every ship should have a number of men secretly hid in them. And when they came to anchor at Belem, which they ordinarily do, and are viewed by the King's officers, these men should not appear; and after their discharge from Belem, I had ordered that every ship should ride as near the King's\* at Lisbon, as conveniently they could, and that in the night, when there was no suspicion of them, and the galleons had no more men on board than the ship-keepers, the Hollanders should sheer aboard, possess, and burn them, for they were sure to find no resistance. After this was done there was no danger in their coming out, for it is an ordinary thing for ships to pass Belem in despite of the castle.

13. If a ship fall into company of a fleet at night it is necessary to give a sudden and a ready answer; as also two or three of the nation to speak as they shall be directed. As for example, and as you shall read in my last voyage in the Queen's time, how in the night I lighted amongst twenty-four galleons of Spain, and being so nigh the Admiral I could not avoid her had I been

\* 'Ships' understood; the Churchill editor inserted 'palace,' which is absurd.



known to be an enemy. I commanded a Spaniard that served me to call the Admiral and tell him there was a strange ship entered amongst our fleet, which of all others he could not suspect to be mine because of the warning I gave him. And in mean time I tacked from him, and so escaped in a secret manner, making no noise.

14. In the Islands Journey I met the Indies fleet, and it blowing little wind I went off in my boat to descry them. When I perceived what they were I made my self and ship known to them, urging them to pursue me. Which, if they had done, I had brought them into the wake of my Lord of Essex and his fleet from whom I departed but three hours before, where they had been taken and the State of Spain utterly destroyed.

15. It is a common use when ships are scattered, and chance to meet in the night not knowing one another, to hail one another in a strange language, which I disapprove as a thing dangerous. For the other being satisfied by his tongue, not to be his consort, or of his country, prepares to fight. And thus had it been like to fall out with me, for the Mary Rose and I meeting one night, after we had lost company, one of my company hailed her in Spanish without my privy, whereat I was angry and caused her to be called to in English even as she was giving fire to her broadside. It is folly in this case to counterfeit ; for no good can come of it seeing the one cannot part from the other without knowing what they are.

16. The signs that direct a fleet in the day-time are striking or hoisting the topsails, shewing their flag, or shooting their ordnance ; by night in shewing of lights. Many times I have known when a ship hath lighted in company of an enemy,

that by chance she has made the very same sign given by the General, by which means she has escaped, and in the like manner ships have been taken by the same chance. Therefore there cannot be a better stratagem than when a ship shall make a sign that it be answered by the same, and the contrary ship to begin a new sign before the other make any. For it is not to be doubted but the other ship will answer every sign that shall be made by her that makes the first.

17. I once knew an unlikely stratagem take good effect in this manner; after three days chase of a ship, that afforded great wealth when she was taken, my Lord of Cumberland was out of hopes of fetching her up, she was so far to windward; only a pinnace kept her company, and in the night carried a light for us to follow. I advised my Lord to shoot a culverin at her, though we could not fetch her at twice, saying that perhaps she would yield to the countenance of the ship that would not for shame do it to a pinnace. This seemed ridiculous, and I had much a-do to persuade my Lord; yet upon my importunity he yielded to it, and the ship, as I foretold, submitted herself.

18. A ship that is chased and desires to shew fear, thinking to draw her that chases into her clutches, must counterfeit and work as though she were distressed, or lie like a wreck into the sea. She must cast drags, hogsheads, and other things overboard, to hinder her way; she must shew no more men than an ordinary gang, and haul in her ordnance and shut her ports, that her force be not discerned till the other ship come within command of her.

19. As ships ought to observe their Admiral's

working in the night by his light, so ought they to be more careful when they are nigh a shore, lest they mistake a light on land for that of their Admiral, by example of 1597, when the Adelantado drew down his fleet from Lisbon to Coruña, and coming nigh the North Cape the greatest part of the fleet steered with a light on the shore, mistaking it for Admiral, and cast away thirty-six ships and five thousand men.

20. As lights direct one another at sea, so are they directors of ships from the shore; as I can instance in many cases, some of which I have already declared, to which I refer you.

21. Lights kept in the night off of a headland, as the Lizard or such capes, are a great safeguard to ships in their passage that are in view of them. Lights likewise give warning of an enemy that is upon a coast, and for that use beacons were invented.

22. Ships that are appointed for more readiness of a service to ride in the Sound of Plymouth, in the Range of Dartmouth, or other roads upon our coast, and in the night are suddenly taken with a storm at south, which is a deadly wind in those roads, if lights be placed on either of the sides of the points of Catwater or Dartmouth they will be guided into the harbour, be it never so dark.

23. In a barred harbour, such as Dunkirk, that is continually beleaguered by an enemy, by keeping lights from half-tide to half-tide, he that enters is directed how the tide increases or decreases, and thereby how to avoid the enemy.

24. Ships riding at the Downs, and fearing a surprise from an enemy in the night, by placing two boats with lights on either side of the Brake

will direct one how to pass the channel and avoid the sands. Which being done, and the lights taken away, the ships that pursue them will run upon their death if they follow.

25. The cutting down mills, trees, taking away buoys,\* or other marks that direct the pilot, is a great safety to any port, or place, such as the Thames, where many sands must be passed.

26. The placing of ships for the advantage of wind is a matter of great consequence. As for example, if an invasion against England be intended from the southward, that wind that brings an enemy for England will keep in our ships in harbour that they cannot stir out; only one place is advantageous to us, which is Hamoaze near Plymouth. For that wind that brings an enemy on our coast, will serve our ships that lie in Hamoaze to follow them, if they pass to the eastward of Ramehead.

27. Prospective glasses, if they were not so common, were an excellent stratagem to be used in many cases at sea, and yet it is no hard thing to deceive those that use them. For a merchant ship, that carries not above ten or twelve men, may have the shapes of men made that those twelve may seem to be one hundred afar off. They likewise may have counterfeit pieces made of wood, which the glass cannot discern from iron, to the terror of the assailant. It may as well serve for a man of war to stow his men, save so many as may sail the ship, in hold and embolden the other to come near him.

28. The best and the greatest ship in the world may be sunk by a bark of twenty tons by this

\* 'Boise,' in MSS.

stratagem, *viz.* to place a cannon in the hold of a bark with her mouth to the side of the ship the bark shall board, and then, when she is on board her, to give fire to the cannon which is stowed under water and they shall both instantly sink. The man that shall execute this stratagem may escape in a small boat hauled on the other side of the bark.

29. Two galleons may be manned and furnished in the manner following, and will be as great a guard and safety to a fleet of galleys as the wings of an eagle to little birds, or a castle to a ship.

The two galleons shall carry each of them one thousand men, with all kind of arms for offence and defence: there shall be placed aloft such kind of fowlers as I will invent that shall shoot as I list. Their hatches shall be made with trap-doors, and pikes placed under them, that as fast as men enter they shall fall upon the pikes so placed. All the deck shall be strewn with round pease tallowed, that treading upon them no man shall be able to stand upon his feet. The ships on the outside to be stuck with tenter-hooks, that they shall take no hold to enter with their hands, and their clothes will stick upon the tenter-hooks if they should enter. There shall be barricadoes, and close fights made with all advantage, and all parts of the ship be made musket proof for the safeguard of men.

Allow by the water and without board they shall be fortified with packs of wool that no shot shall pierce them, or galleys be able to board them. Every ship shall have upon its yardarm a barrel or two of gunpowder mixed with bullets, that as the galleys shall approach the distance of the yard the barrel of powder shall be let fall with a pulley, and matches stuck about the

barrel that shall give fire upon the fall and breaking of the barrel. In this manner will the galley be burnt, and the men slain all at one instant.

30. If galleys attend a fleet of ships, thinking to cut off some stragglers, as they did to Sir Francis Drake, and after to us at Cadiz, where they took some small vessels, in such a case if the fleet chance to anchor to place the least and weakest vessels outermost of the fleet in the day-time, which will embolden the galleys in the night to assail them. But when the darkness of the night shall approach, then to remove them and in their place to cause the best and the greatest ships of the fleet to anchor where the others did, that if the galleys attempt them they shall be entertained to their cost.

31. If a ship will board an enemy under a castle, let him that boards bring the ship boarded betwixt him and the castle; for then dares not the castle shoot for hazarding their own ship boarded.

32. Sinking of ships full of stones is an old invention, and used as well to defend one's self in a barred harbour as by an enemy to keep in ships from going out. It is no great hazard or prejudice to him that possesses the harbour; for when the water is decreased such ships sunk may be waded to, the stones taken out, and the ships burnt without hurt to themselves or harbour.

33. Booming harbours for the safeguard of ships is an old invention. But at each end of the boom sconces must be built to defend the boom and impeach ships' entrance. But I would wish in this case that there were two booms made, the one five or six yards within the other, that, if the first were forced by ships bearing upon it, by the time they came to the second boom they would have

lost their strength and be driven on shore, or sideways upon the boom, where the sconces would destroy them. I would also advise that the river or harbour were buoyed and every piece on shore to be levelled on the buoys so that whensoever a ship shall come near any such buoys they shall not need to traverse their pieces or to take aim at the ship but only to give fire and sink her.

34. One of the known dangers in a ship of great burthen, and in a wrought sea, that carries weighty ordnance, is the breaking loose of one of her pieces in the lower tier. For before she can be muzzed, or overcome by force of men, what with the rolling of the ship from one side to the other, the piece will carry the ship's side with her and founder her in the sea.

35. For avoiding these perils there is no way but one, if it take effect, which is suddenly to heave up the hatches of the deck, that in her recoil she may find the deck open and fall into the hold, where she shall be easily overmastered; besides a ship doth not labour so much aloft as she does aloft.

I am of opinion, if the shipwrecks of the King of Spain's galleons were certainly known, which is impossible, they would confess, if a man had escaped to make report of them, the breaking loose of their ordnance was the occasion of their destruction. And no marvel, seeing they carry their great ordnance upon field-carriages, which makes them the more dangerous and unserviceable, for their piece, so lying, cannot be traversed from side to side but must be shot off directly forward as they lie.

36. If there could be made a ball of wildfire, as I have heard some take upon them to do it, which ball should burn without quenching, then

were it an easy thing to convey one of those balls secretly into a ship, and privately to hide it in some place till the party be gone out of the ship, which then being set on fire will not only burn the said ship but all others near her.

37. In passing a fort in the night it is good to make both the ship and sails black, with a care that no light be seen in her. But the way for an enemy to prevent an entrance is this, to make a fire opposite to the fort and to lay the ordnance point blank with the fire so that when they shall see the shadow of the fire taken from them by the ship and sails then to discharge their ordnance, and be sure to sink the ship.

38. A ship that will keep another from boarding her, she being to windward and wanting to board her, the remedy is, to put forth two masts out of two ports, that the ship coveting to board shall light upon the masts and be kept from coming near the ship.

39. It is a good stratagem to board a ship though she presently fall off again; and during the time she is on board to appoint the carpenters with their axes to cut the port-ropes of the ship boarded, that at her coming off again, when she shall begin a new fight, her pieces may serve for no purpose because her ports will be clogged and not able to put forth a piece of ordnance, but lie at the mercy of the enemy.

40. A number of ships lying in a harbour, dry from half-tide to half-tide, may be thus destroyed. As I will make a comparison betwixt England, Flanders, and France, where two of them have wars with one another, and the third peace with both. I will suppose that a ship of France, and a man in her that I will trust, ladened for Dunkirk, where English barks are forbid to go.



The bark is to be laden with deals and other dry substance apt to burn, and under her boards there must be stowed pitch, tar, rosin, and other ingredients not to be quenched: the Frenchman that shall execute this stratagem must forecast at his entrance into the harbour to seek to lie aboard the best ships, and where he may do the most hurt and spoil to the rest when his ship is on fire.

All things being thus provided and the train sufficiently made, the Frenchman must watch his opportunity that his match come to the train by that time it is low water, which he may compute by hours and the length of his match. And in that time he may have his horse in readiness to carry him over the river of Gravelines but nine miles from thence, where he will be in France and free from danger. The fire thus taking, and all things ordered by these directions, as well this ship as all others in the harbour will be destroyed. For the water going from the ships, and they lying dry, they are not able to remove, or stir, or have water to quench the fire till the flood rise; so that in the mean time they will be utterly destroyed.

41. If ships desire to surprise a fort or sconce that would give them landing if it were taken, it is thus to be done:—to embark the men secretly in their boats in the night, and without noise of their oars, and then to row as near the fort as they can without being discovered. And in the mean time to cause a small boat, not near the place where the others are, to shew a light or two with a match as though it were accidentally done and not willingly, and to leave the boat adrift, which the fort perceiving will presently let fly her ordnance against her; which the other boats

seeing, they may suddenly land and enter the sconce by their scaling-ladders before their ordnance can be laden again.

42. If an enemy should land in boats upon a shore where the siege of the sea should be very inconvenient for the landing of themselves and arms, there is a kind of bridge to be made with boards by mooring their boats ahead and astern, and out of the waists of their boats they may lay a bridge over the siege, and, instead of wading, their men may go in ranks ashore without wetting.

43. If an army shall land where the shore is all beachy, and full of little stones, like Deal and the castles thereabouts, where they may bring ordnance to impeach the enemy's landing, I would advise that the artillery shoot not so much at their boats but suffer part of them to come on shore, and then to let fly at the stones or hills piled up on purpose in heaps, that will scatter and disperse as not a man will be left alive.\*

44. A ship that desires to be boarded and to be entered by his enemy may use this stratagem ; to haul in all his ordnance, to shut his ports, to hide his men, to strike his sails, and make all the signs of yielding ; which the enemy perceiving will perhaps be emboldened to board him. And, whilst they are suffered to enter and pillage, the defendants may suddenly rise upon them and enter and possess the enemy. Or, suppose their boat only should come on board, they may take it and the men which will be a great weakening to the enemy.

\* The Dutch attempt to storm Landguard in 1667 failed largely because two small English vessels were able to fire into the shingle, scattering it among the stormers with the effect of shrapnel.

45. If ships lying in harbour shall be attempted by a fleet whose power they are not able to resist, if all other helps fail they may sink their ships as they ride so that the enemy shall have no benefit by them for they may be suddenly weighed, if the assailant quit the harbour, without any great detriment or loss. But if an enemy sink ships to keep in others from going out they are to make choice of the shallowest place to sink their ships, and nearest to deep water, where their own ships may ride and float that with their ordnance they may keep the ships sunk that no boat or other help can weigh them. There are some places which I forbear to name, because I may live to put this stratagem into execution, where there is shoal water and at low water dry but with a spring tide of fifteen or sixteen feet. At the entrance of the shoal water it is so deep that ships of great burthen may ride, therefore he that will prevent the weighing must keep his ships still at an anchor in deep water so that he may hinder the others that shall attempt to weigh those that are sunk, and then the town to which the trade belongs will be brought to any conditions of yielding.

46. There is a stratagem as old as the invention of ships though the common people attribute it to the wit of Sir Francis Drake, at Calais, in 1588, against the Spaniards, to fill old ships and vessels with pitch, tar, train-oil, brimstone, reeds, dry wood, and to join three or four of these ships together in the night, and then turn them adrift with the tide where the enemy's fleet rides, and either burn or disperse them after they are thus put from their anchorage.

47. At my being at sea in my youth, 1585, two small ships of us in company together, we

met a strong and obstinate ship of Holland, who refused upon courtesy to strike his flag, or to suffer our boats to come and board him to view his cocket. This ship had in her an English pilot, by whom we expostulated with the Hollander, without any semblance of boarding her; but being very nigh her our master cried to the man at helm, with great anger, to port the helm, lest we should come foul of her, but privately he gave him charge to put his helm a-starboard when he should call to him to put it on port, and cried with great vehemency and so did most of the company to the English pilot to bear up, for our ship came against her helm, and willed them to get fenders to fend off lest we should come foul of her. The Hollanders thought all we said was true, and every one of them put their helping hand to keep off our ship with fenders and oars, not apprehending our intention. And when we saw their people thus employed, and not to have time to take arms, we suddenly boarded, entered, and took her by this stratagem.

\*48. As the greatest advantage of a fleet of ships of war is to have intelligence of their enemy when they come upon their coast, so the way to obtain it, arriving upon the coast of Spain, is to let a ship's boat lie under the islands of Burlings, where they shall not fail, by break of day in the morning, to take fishermen that will be able to inform them of the state of things ashore: it may as well serve for any other place if they see fair weather in hand.

49. My Lord of Cumberland, arriving upon the coast of Spain, was sore distressed for intelligence; and, a sudden calm arising, two or three leagues

\* Stratagem No. 48 is not found in MS.

from us we spied two caravels. Whereupon I put myself into the ship's boat and rowed to them; one of them I took, the other might have escaped but by this stratagem I prevented her: I took out two or three of her men and manned her with my own company, and immediately without delay sent her to meet with her consort who made signs that they might think her discharged, and rowed my boat on board the ship that there should be no suspicion, so that the caravel was thus taken by deceit which otherwise might have escaped. But when I had so much as I desired for intelligence at their hands I dismissed them, and after found, I being taken myself, that they reported well of my good usage of them.

50. I had a stratagem upon Cardinal Archduke Albert, when he was Viceroy of Portugal, but was prevented by his sudden going into the Low Countries, and thus it was:—When I was prisoner in the galleys of Lisbon, about the 10th of September the Cardinal passed down to a pleasant place called Cintra, with a small train, where he spent his time in devotion. Usually he repaired thither at the same time of the year, and to the same purpose, which I well observed, and meant, if ever God gave me liberty, to have surprised him in this manner: I projected in my head to have brought two or three ships of war, which would no way have hindered the hope of their voyage, and to have anchored before Cintra, that is seated upon a hill and not above two miles from the sea. I meant in the middle of the night, when there was no noise or suspicion, to have landed a hundred men with firelocks, who might without any difficulty have surprised him and his house, and have brought him to the place where the boats were

commanded to attend. This would have proved a business of greater importance than to have taken the best carrack of the Indies.

51. When I was removed from the galleys to the castle of Lisbon I had another stratagem on foot; but was prevented by a traitorous Englishman, whom I was forced to use as an interpreter before I had the language.

There was in prison with me a Portuguese gentleman, called Manoel Fernandez, who had been in England servant to Don Antonio, their pretended King: this man was much devoted to the service of the Queen. This gentleman had a pilot of the King's often resort to him, a man usually employed to meet the Indies fleet with letters of advice to direct them the course they were to come home in. I so dealt with this gentleman that in consideration of a good sum of money to be given him by the Queen of England, the which I engaged myself in my reputation should be really paid him, he wrought the pilot to undertake to carry three letters of advice to the Queen's ships instead of their own fleet. For I had contrived, if I had not been prevented by the traitor aforesaid, that the Queen should have had a fleet at sea to have executed this design. But when I had brought it to this pass that my letters to my Lord Treasurer Burghley and my Lord Admiral were writ, and conveyed in the soles of my boy's shoes, by the false dealing of the Englishman aforesaid my plot was discovered, and my boy carried into Belem castle, three miles from thence. So that when I thought my servant had been embarked for England, two months after I had intelligence by an Englishman, gunner of the said castle, that he was still there prisoner, and had famished if he had not taken

pity of him. The first thing the Spaniards did, after the imprisoning my boy, was, to rip and search his shoes according to the intelligence given them. But though it was unfortunate to me yet in another kind it fell out luckily, for a great rain falling that morning he was carried away, it so moistened his shoes and letters that they were mouldered and could not be read, as the boy afterwards told me at my arrival in England ; so that they could have no witness but the Englishman who was my accuser.

And seeing I am upon this project, though it may seem tedious to the reader, yet will I set down the danger that befell the gentleman and me upon the occasion aforesaid. This Senhor Fernandez had been prisoner in the castle of Lisbon almost seven years ; and his offence the coming out of England with letters and messages to Don Antonio's friends in Portugal ; yet such was the power of money that by means thereof he was to receive liberty had it not been for this treason discovered by this vile Englishman. A day was appointed for his sentence of death, which with weeping eyes he acquainted me with, like a friend in a desperate case. I advised him, if all other hopes failed, to seek some stratagem to escape prison, with promise of my endeavour to help him. And, to be short, he provided himself of a rope and a cudgel to put betwixt the battlements of the castle wall, thinking when we went to our necessary business, which was once a day, with a guard of two soldiers, to have taken an opportunity to have slipped down the wall, and to have run into a church, thereby seated, to take sanctuary.

But after four days trial made at our coming to the wall, as I have said, we found it impossible

to put this stratagem in execution in the day time ; and I considered, withal, the danger that might have befallen me if he had escaped. Therefore we thought upon another course, though it was more improbable, and which was as followeth : over the little room he lay in was a chamber where soldiers had been lodged, that a week before were embarked in a fleet to sea ; the chamber was not so high but that by the help of a high stool, which he had in his room, the top of it could be reached to : here we put our helping hands, one of us still working till we cut with our knives a trap door out of the boards above-head that a man might creep through it ; and finding by the almanac when the nights would grow dark, we contrived all things, against that time, to perform our devised plot. And by means of his son, who had access to him, he was provided with a sword scabbard, and a stick to serve instead of a rapier, that he might seem to be a soldier as he passed the sentinels ; he carried his rope and cudgel, aforesaid, and a bag with a little bread and wine for his sustenance under his cloak. And thus he went armed out of the chamber above, as a soldier, with a wooden sword by his side.

He passed the Corps de Garde and five sentinels before he came to the wall, pretending he went for his necessary occasions, which they never mistrusted, seeing he carried the sign of a soldier, which was a stick in his scabbard. At his arrival at the wall, without fear, or any sense of age, he slipped down by the rope and happily escaped.

Not long after, the round passing about the castle espied his rope, cloak, cudgel, and wooden sword, which assured them of the escape of some prisoner ; whereupon the drum beat, the alarm was



taken, and the soldiers furiously came running into my chamber, as they did to others where prisoners lay, with their swords drawn and threatening death. I confess I looked here to have ended my life; but that passed, and two soldiers were left to guard me till morning.

They finding it was my neighbour Senhor Manoel Fernandez that was escaped, the hue-and-cry went through the city and country, and command for his apprehension; but such was his fortune that he escaped the fury of the tumult, and I was left at stake to be baited for the offence. In the morning, early, I appeared before the judge as the only delinquent, the rest of the prisoners casting it upon me; all agreeing, I was the likeliest to know of his escape because of our continual conversation, but little knowing the true cause of our often meeting.

But neither threats, ill usage, nor promise of liberty, could make me confess any thing to the prejudice of either of us. I was so urged and threatened that I was forced to use for my defence this argument, (*viz.*) that I was no subject to the King of Spain, but to a prince his enemy; that I was taken in war and therefore required the benefit of that law for my redemption; I came not willingly to their country to learn their laws nor to bring in others to breed innovation: I was subject at that time to the universal law of honour and arms, by which I challenged the privilege of a gentleman for my freedom; and for the accident now in question, I denied that I had any knowledge thereof, or that I was any way privy to it; and that the unlikeliness of it should plead for me and be a sufficient testimony of my innocence. I told them, they knew I was so unskilful in their language that I could not devise a practice or plot

with a man I understood not, and that my imprisonment had kept me from acquaintance, either in city or country, to contrive any evil against their State; and if it argued guilt to be accused no man could prove innocent, and therefore I desired them that they would rather pity my misery than accuse me unjustly. I entreated them to consider that I was a prisoner among my enemies, destitute of all relief, both of back and belly, and in a place where no friend could resort to me or I bemoan myself to them of my wants, there being a restraint of intercourse and trade betwixt the two nations.

But what I could say did little prevail for they aggravated my supposed offence with cruelty of threats; insomuch that I was forced to plead in another style, and let them know that by the law of arms they could prove nothing against me that deserved punishment, the privilege of which law I challenged as being taken in war and continued prisoner for my redemption. During which time it was lawful for me to seek my own liberty, and to neglect no occasion wherein I might do service to my prince and country, and therefore what they accused me of could not be deemed an offence. I told them, moreover, though I used this but as an argument, that they knew their barbarous usage of me deserved a greater revenge from my hand than I had ability to perform; whereas, if they had treated me with humanity and civil courtesy I had been more bound to have been just to them than if they had reposed trust in me. I ended with this defiance, that they should beware what violence they offered me for I had friends in England, and was descended of a nation that both could and would sufficiently revenge what cruelty soever they should use towards me.

These reasons begot a more calm respect from

them; and another while they used persuasive arguments, with promise of liberty and reward, making me believe the gentleman was taken and had confessed so much as they accused me of. But I well knew their words were but airy sounds, for that they would never have warned me if they could have justified their allegations by a personal testimony: yet I confess the thoughts of one thing much terrified me, which was a letter I gave to Senhor Fernandez at his departure, which might have been produced against me if he had chanced to be apprehended. The letter was in his behalf to all English captains at sea for his friendly entertainment, his design being to put himself into a fisherboat to look out at sea for a man of war to transport him for England.

After a tedious examination of four hours, when they saw their subtleties could work nothing out of me, presumption being but a doubtful thing, they returned me to prison with charge to be more strictly looked to. And after that neglected no cunning means to entrap me, as I have more largely expressed in another discourse at the request of some of my friends.

I will again return to the gentleman Senhor Fernandez, who no doubt was as much perplexed out of prison as I who could not fly from the danger of my enemies, in whose custody I remained. All hue-and-cries, searches, promises of reward, and other devised policies, not prevailing for the apprehending of the poor gentleman, he lived in a disguised obscure manner till time furnished him an opportunity to embark in a fisherboat, to make use of my letters aforesaid, where he spent fourteen days at sea, and failing of meeting any English ship at sea, and wearied with sea-sickness, he was forced to return to

shore where he lived a good space among poor shepherds and herdsmen, till he thought his disguise and disfiguring himself had so altered him that he could not be known.

Now thinking his new-formed shape would secure him from being discovered ; and hoping that the long time since his escape might make his fact to be worn out of memory, he was emboldened, in a beggar's habit, to try the charity of good people ; and chancing to repair to a gentleman's house for alms it happened that the said gentleman and he had been fellow-prisoners in the castle of Lisbon, who by his tongue and watching of him narrowly, discovered who he was. The gentleman, after talking with him for a little while, hastily called a servant, which gave a suspicion to *Senhor Fernandez*, that it was to give warning to the officers to apprehend him ; but to prevent what his heart misgave him he suddenly ran into the church thereby and took sanctuary for his defence.

This accident being so strange, and falling upon a man the whole kingdom took knowledge of because of his former escape, the Cardinal Prince was immediately with speed advertised of it at Lisbon, being above one hundred miles from the place where this happened. It was my fortune before this chanced to be released out of my imprisonment, which I account a happiness that thereby I was brought into no danger.

The Cardinal being advertised, as you have heard, of *Senhor Fernandez's* taking sanctuary, with all speed caused him to be taken out of the church and brought to his old accustomed lodging in the castle of Lisbon, where not long after the law proceeded against him and he received the doom of death due to such an offence. But not

without grief and sorrow to many of the beholders, as well Spaniards as Portuguese; for indeed he was a man of much goodness and great charity, and to his ability obliged many a soldier in the garrison.

The day appointed for his execution being come, and having received all the rites and ceremonies of a Christian, he was brought out of prison, with a winding-sheet lapped bandolier-fashion about him, having many soldiers and others to behold him to give him their last adieu. And for a farewell from himself he took occasion to speak to the soldiers there present in this manner; he told them how much he had loved them; and that to some of them he had given testimony of it in his better fortunes, which he knew they would thankfully acknowledge; and in lieu of all his former courtesies and kindnesses he desired them to requite him with one now at parting, as the last request he should ever make, which was, for one of them with speed to repair to the house of the Misericordia, an office of great reputation and trust concerning religion and charity, and to inform them of the injury done to God, themselves, and the Holy Church, by taking perforce a penitent sinner out of sanctuary: a thing so unjust and unsufferable that it behoved them to take notice of it.

This little hope of his life gave great content to the soldiers, and happy was he that could make greatest haste to the house of the Misericordia to make relation of the strange accident that had happened. The gentlemen of the Misericordia, who are of the principallest account and reckoning of the whole city, posted on horseback to the place of execution, where they found poor Senhor Fernandez ready to recommend his spirit to

God, and the hangman as ready to perform his office. But such was his fortune, by the speed and courage of the gentlemen, that they redeemed him from present death and returned him to the place from whence he came; for as they were loth to lose their privileges, so they were as unwilling to offend their King.

The strangeness of this accident may put a man in mind of an old English proverb, that 'Marriage and hanging goes by destiny.' \*

52. In the forty-eighth stratagem I have shewed how necessary it is to get intelligence of an enemy, and how to obtain it, as you shall there find, for that part of Spain and Portugal I spoke of. So likewise you shall read in my First Book how to compass intelligence of the south part of Spain, as namely San Lucar and Cadiz, by example of a precedent of my own. As also in the same book, I refer you to the way how to procure intelligence at the Terceira Islands; to which book I refer you for brevity sake.

53. When the Queen lived she was inclined to hearken to a project of mine for the taking and inhabiting the Castle de la Mina in Guinea, many years possessed by the Portuguese, for the defence whereof they relied most upon the number of negroes in whose country Mina is seated. And to endear the negroes the more to them, and to exasperate them against their enemies, they make them believe that what war soever they have with others is in their defence against those who seek to slay them and to possess their country. But to meet with this project I devised to carry a number of negroes out of England that could speak their language, and were able to report

\* I have no MS. authority for the remainder of Book V. except for Stratagem No. 59.

the difference betwixt the Portuguese usage of them and ours; for in Portugal they sell their negroes in open market for slaves, as we do horses, which they know we do not. By which means we shall be able to disappoint their designs.

54. The Marquis of Santa Cruz, when he took the Terceira Islands, made offer of landing at the city of Angra, and finding the island had drawn all their forces together to withstand him in that place he instantly winded his galleys about and rowed five leagues to the eastward of it, and landed where he found no resistance. The same did my Lord of Essex at the island of St. Michael, who pointed to land at Ponta da Galera, but left that resolution and went with his boats to Villa Franca, which he took easily, all their forces being drawn to Ponta da Galera.

55. Naming Villa Franca, I will say something that happened to me eighteen years before this I have spoken of,\* rather to make you laugh than for seriousness sake, and yet I place it amongst the stratagems; and thus it was:—you must know that notwithstanding the wars with England and Spain some of those islands connived at the trade betwixt them and the English ships, which went under the name and colour of Scots. It chanced that one evening I came into the road of Villa Franca, but without the command of the castle, attending the darkness of the night to go aboard an English ship there riding, to avoid suspicion of being seen from the shore. Upon my boarding of the same ship I was carried by the master to banquet in his cabin; his company that were on board espied a boat rowing from the shore and brought us news of it, being in the cabin, which put the master to a deadly fear, for my

\* *Sic* in the Churchill text, but eighteen years before 1597 would be 1579 when Monson was about eleven years old.

being discovered would have proved his undoing. I comforted him, and willed him to follow my directions and he should escape any such danger. I desired him to go out of the cabin, and leave me there, and to say what I should bid him. The boat came to the ship's side, and told the master that the strange ship that rid not far from him was an English rover, and willed him to be careful, for that night it was thought he would surprise her. I willed the master to tell them that he suspected as much, and stood upon his guard, but feared that the ship had descried their boat coming off from the shore, and it was likely they would intercept their boat in their return to land, and advised them, as they loved their liberty, to hasten away. This put the Portuguese in such a fear, that suddenly, without speaking one word more, they put off their boat without entering into the ship; which made us laugh heartily and was a good addition to our supper.

56. In the year 1600 there was a complaint made by the inhabitants of the Cinque Ports that the French encroached upon their fishing at sea,\* a rocky ground five leagues south from Rye, which place serves all London with choice fish. Whereupon I was sent down to redress this disorder and made use of the stratagem following, because, if I had discovered myself with my ship, the French would have fled. I manned the English fisherboats with my own company, and gave them order, as I should pass by with my own ship and shoot a piece of ordnance, to board the French and possess them. Which they did, and by means thereof the Cinque Ports enjoyed their ancient privilege.

57. The stratagem of taking the pirates in

\* Probably the MS. read 'at the Sowe,' a fishing ground the Rye men tried to reserve for themselves.



Ireland, Anno 1614, is amply set down in my Second Book, to which I refer you, wishing you to peruse it. For it will give you pleasure and content in reading it, and a light withal how to use the same stratagem if there be occasion.

58. A ship, and by consequence he that is employed in her, may be deceived by touching the needle in the manner following:—a ship going her course to the port she is bound may be deceived in touching the north point south with a loadstone, which is contrary to the place she is going to, and may, perhaps, carry her upon some shoals and rocks that in a right course there is no cause to fear.

59. In the voyage with my Lord of Lindsey, in 1635, by my advice we sent over a fisherboat to the coast of France to spy and view the state of the French and Holland fleet, which we knew was thither retired for not giving distaste to the King's Navy. But with such instructions as the French could not suspect it; and that they might see we had great confidence in them, and to receive advertisement from them, we pretended the cause of our employing the boat was to look out certain Turkish pirates who we supposed hovered upon their coast. By this stratagem we understood not only the state and condition of their fleet but of other things they had it in charge to inquire after, which gave his Majesty great content.

60. Not long after my being taken by the galleys in Spain, if I had not been by accident prevented, I had escaped the imprisonment I endured for many months in the said galleys at Cascaes and Lisbon, which was most grievous to me, by this stratagem following. Whilst we rid in the harbour of Lisbon, there came aboard the galley where I was a master of a ship of

Holland who spake good English ; this man came from Brazil, for at that time the Portuguese freighted Holland ships in most of their long voyages though they pretended to be in war one with another. This Hollander, pitying my case, wished me privately aboard his ship, promising to conceal and hide me that I should not be found ; besides his word I took his protestation and vow to perform his promise if I could devise to escape out of the galley. I verily believe the man meant truly and honestly, for he confirmed it by many protestations at other times and days. Whereupon I was not idle to devise an escape, and writ a letter with my own hand directed to the rest of my company, then prisoners with me, declaring that my captivity was so hard that I could no longer endure it but chose rather to end my life by drowning myself, and wished them to signify so much to my friends in England. And one night, when all things were wist and silent in the galley, I intended secretly to escape by stealing secretly into the ladder of the galley at the tide of ebb, and to convey myself into the water without noise, or moving either hand or foot, till I was brought clear off the galley's view, and then to swim on board the Holland ship, who lay just in the wake of the galley and in view of me. This I might easily have done without suspicion or notice taken of me ; but unluckily it fell out that the day before I meant to put this stratagem in execution the galleys were commanded upon some service to sea. So that before our return to Lisbon the Holland ship was gone a new voyage and I frustrated of my hopes.

As commonly one discourse begets another

so this accident puts me in mind of some others that befel me, or that I was witness to, in the time of my imprisonment, which I have been desired by my friends to put in writing that there may remain a remembrance of them after my death. And what I insert is neither as project or stratagem but only a plain narration of what I have heard and seen.

Riding in the port of Lisbon (for there is no other place for the galleys to reside upon all that coast) there was discovered to the General a practice by an Italian to draw the forçados, or galley-slaves, to take arms and rise against the soldiers and possess themselves of the galley and men where he was, in order to recover their liberties and dispose of the galley as they pleased. This treason being examined the Italian confessed it; and for his reward his two arms were made fast to the stern of two galleys, and his two legs to two others, and he quartered by the rowing of the galleys. If this Italian had had the wit of an Italian he would not thus have played the fool; for he might well know where so many men were to be trusted as are in a galley it could not choose but be revealed. The slaves consisting of so many nations, and the trespasses being so different, some condemned for life, others for years more or less, and any one revealing it was able to purchase his own liberty and reward. Or suppose they had prevailed in their design, the rest of the galleys had been able to have mastered them; or if not, they had been destitute of victuals to sustain them, not having so much as water, for every second day they used to fetch their water from the shore. Or though all those I have spoken of had been no impediment to them, yet there had been no place to have fled to but some

port of France, no nearer than seven or eight hundred miles.

The next accident I take notice of was in the same port of Lisbon and in the same galleys, that happened to the captain of the Vice-Admiral, a churlish and ill-natured man, as myself had some occasion to say. For after my being taken prisoner I found him discourteous and uncivil towards me ; for, without leave, knowledge, or warning to my page that served me, nor permission to see me, he sent him to the farthest part of all Spain, intending he should never return more into his country. Though, after, he failed of his purpose by means of an Englishman that lived thereabouts, whither he was sent, and understanding this accident of his coming thither and that he had been my servant, whose name and friends he well knew though he was unacquainted with me, yet at my request by letter, when I heard of the condition of the man, most courteously he procured means and obtained liberty and licence for my servant to return to me, and of his own accord furnished him with money sufficient for his journey, who arrived safely and continued to do me service during the time of my imprisonment. Whom after I preferred to be a captain in the service against the Spaniards.

This ill-conditioned Spanish captain after tasted a just reward for his ill disposition ; for as it is the use of captains of galleys to make choice of some Moor or Turk to attend them in their cabins, as people more neat and officious than Christians, and more obsequious and desirous to please than their own natural countrymen : out of those supposed reasons the captain made choice of one of them, a Turk in religion, and most

consonant to his humour, as he conceived. It happened that as this Moor exceeded in diligence so it increased his credit and trust with his captain, who sending him one day ashore to wash his linen, (for some of the Moors exceed women in that employ) he carried with him one hundred crowns of his captain's, which he had in charge among other moneys and plate; this Moor was enticed by company to play, where he made a short end of his hundred crowns.

After some time his theft was discovered to his captain who was so enraged, having no means to recover his loss, that he returned him to his oar and painful bank in the galley, where he remained in his former slavery. But this was not revenge sufficient to please the captain, but he ordered him a cruel punishment usually inflicted upon offenders, laying them flat over the Cruzea,\* where he was unmercifully beaten with a bull's pizzle till he was made unable either to stand or sit, or to do the King's work. Nor was the captain willing he should do him service till time had overcome his passion; but then finding a great want of his attendance he once more delivered him out of his chains and accepted of his service as he was wont, and so he passed some time as he was formerly wont to do.

But the Moor carried a cankered revengeful heart against his captain, which he craftily dissembled, not giving any kind of suspicion till he had found a way and opportunity to compass it, which was in this manner:—

At his usual hour in the morning he repaired to get up his captain but provided all things for his purpose; as first, a crossbar to keep

\* Or *coursier*.

down the scuttle ; and being below he provided himself with powder, fire, match, and other necessaries, which he placed in the outward room, and suddenly rushed into his captain's cabin with a naked dagger in his hand to whom he gave eight stabs, making account he had slain him. But hearing a noise without he left the captain and betook himself to a gentleman who cried out for help ; which being done, he put the match to the train he had prepared and set the galley on fire, which he leaped into and burnt himself to ashes. But by the help of the other galleys that rid near her they suddenly boarded her, saved all her slaves, and the captain, who was not quite dead ; but what else was in her was all consumed. A rare example of revenge in a Heathen to a Christian ! and though the captain and he differed in religion yet not much in condition and perverse natures.

This captain was after questioned as the author of the destruction of the King's galley by the ill usage of this slave. And had it not been for the General's sake, Don Francisco de Coloma, brother to Don Carlos de Coloma, who was after ambassador into England in King James's and King Charles's time, he had deeply smarted for it.

Misfortunes thus left not the captain but still attended him, as a thing fatal to his ill nature. For after the recovery of his hurts, and restitution of his command, he was once more rifled and robbed by another Moor he entertained in the place of his other servant. This Moor was enticed by two Spanish soldiers to commit the theft ; and after it was done he and the soldiers passed over the river without interruption, and kept company together till they arrived upon a spacious

great hill, where the soldiers, finding a good opportunity for their purpose, slew the Moor, possessed the money, and escaped themselves. So that they were never heard more of whilst I was in Spain.

I will leave speaking of the galleys whilst I was in them. And now I was removed to the castle of Lisbon, where I remained prisoner a good space. But I will end with the hap of two of the said galleys, which my eyes beheld, and myself was made an actor of revenge upon them.

In my First Book, and in the year 1591, you will find how I became prisoner to the Spaniards, and what passed in the fight betwixt six galleys and the ship I was taken in. It happened that about eleven years after, and as you shall likewise find in the same book, that Sir Richard Leveson and myself had the surprising a carrack and two galleys, which we burnt in the road of Cezimbra, which two galleys were of the number aforesaid that took me, and one of them the very same wherein I was kept prisoner. This act of revenge to some men would have been very pleasing.

In September, which is commonly the month for the galleys to make their retreat into harbour for winter, I and eight of my company were strongly guarded to the castle of Lisbon, there to lie imprisoned till a course was taken for our redemption out of England, with an allowance of  $7\frac{1}{2}d.$  *per diem* for each man for his maintenance, a proportion that did not equal  $3d.$  *per diem* according to the rate of things in England. All the time of our imprisonment we were close confined, only in the morning we resorted to the castle wall, with a guard of soldiers, to perform our necessary occasions.

It happened on St. Andrew's day following,

being upon the walls at our usual hour, we beheld a great galleon of the King's turning up the river in her fighting sails, being sumptuously decked with ancients, streamers and pendants, with all other ornaments, to shew her bravery. She let fly all her ordnance in a triumphant manner for the taking Sir Richard Greynville in the Revenge at the island of Flores, she being one of that fleet and the first voyage she ever made.

I confess it was one of the greatest and sorrowfullest sights that ever my eyes beheld to see the cause the Spaniards had to boast, and no remedy in me to revenge it but in my tongue, but hoped for future comfort, and took such Englishmen as were in my company to witness what I should say to them : I offered to give them one for ten, if I did live to be at the taking and possessing of that triumphant galleon, that carried the name of that day, *viz.* St. Andrew. This passed but as an idle desire I had to see my word come to effect.

In the year 1596, which was five years after, ensued our Cadiz expedition, under the command of the Earl of Essex and the Lord Admiral, where, amongst fifty-eight ships there destroyed and burnt, the said St. Andrew was, and she and another only, saved from the fire. This was nothing to my prognosticating wager, for I could assume no more to myself than any other man of that fleet. But it happened, as I was captain of the Repulse under my Lord of Essex, I was appointed in the Repulse's boat and some others to save the galleons that were run ashore, whose names were these, St. Matthew, St. Andrew, St. Philip, and St. Thomas. The St. Matthew and St. Andrew we preserved, though it was with some peril to us ; the St. Philip and



St. Thomas set themselves on fire even as I was ready to enter the St. Philip. And I may boldly say, what I spake in the castle of Lisbon was now punctually performed; and for the truth hereof, it is not long since one of the Englishmen lived and till his death vouched my words to be true.

These four strange accidents I have inserted in this Fifth Book at the entreaty of friends that have heard me often relate them; but what shall follow was upon the importunity of some of my children, who considered how young I was when I put myself into the wars at sea, how long I have since lived and been acquainted with the affairs of the world, which amounts to fifty-six years, and the often dangers and perils I have gone through by the sword, by famine, by danger of the sea, and other casualties, as all men are subject to that run such desperate adventures. These reasons prevailed with me that I yielded to their request: and though in my First Book I have had occasion to speak of most of them, when I treated of the voyages that then happened, and wherein there was occasion to mention them, yet, for brevity sake, I have added them to the latter part of the Fifth Book, that they may suddenly be turned to and found, referring to the year and book where you shall find them.\* And I will make my beginning in the year 1585, when the wars with Spain began, and wherein I was an actor at the taking of the first Spanish prize.

In that voyage of 1585, and in the month of September, I was a youth of sixteen years of age, and so inclined to see the world abroad that

\* This portion of the Fifth Book appears to have been written in 1641. See *post*, p. 182.

without the knowledge of father or mother I put myself into an action by sea, where there was in company of us two small ships, fitted for men of war, that authorized us by commission to seize upon the subjects of the King of Spain. We departed from the Isle of Wight, to which place we returned with our dear bought prize : she was a Biscainer of three hundred tons, well manned, sufficiently furnished, and bravely defended. She came from Grand Bay, in Newfoundland, which at our first arrival upon the coast of Spain we met with, and refusing to yield to us we suddenly boarded and by consent of all our men entered her ; but the waves of the sea growing high we were forced to ungrapple, and to leave our men fighting on board her from eight of the clock in the evening till eight in the morning. The manner how, and all other circumstances, you will find in my Second Book.\*

My next escape was in the year 1587, and the first voyage I went captain to sea ; where, abiding longer than I expected, I was put to great extremity of victuals, and coming from the Canary Islands towards England I fell in with Ireland and put into Dingle bay, where the same morning I was taken with a most dangerous and tempestuous storm, being upon a lee-shore and the weather as dark and foggy as though it were night. The master found himself so nigh the land that within an hour we could not escape shipwreck upon the devouring cliffs if God did not send us the sight of a little rock called the Crow, half a mile from the entrance of the port of Dingle. Every man was as careful to look for this rock as for life, for our safety consisted in

\* *Ante*, iii. p. 43.

the sight of it; and by great fortune it was spied by a Brazilian Indian that served me, which rock was a perfect director to our master and in half an hour he harboured us in the port of Dingle. This put me in remembrance of what I had formerly read, that there was nothing more pleasant to a man than to see himself at the point of death by shipwreck at sea and suddenly to escape the danger by arriving in a safe harbour. Here I received two lives from God, the one was the escape of shipwreck, as you have heard, the other of famine. For when we were safely arrived we took view of our bread, for other victuals we had none, and we had divided to every man his proportion of bread a fortnight before, and found but six biscuit cakes amongst our whole fifty men and more.

Reckoning according to years, which course I mean to follow, my next shall be in 1589, when I served as Vice-Admiral to the Earl of Cumberland to the Islands Azores. And coming to Flores, the most westernmost island of the seven, my Lord had notice of certain Spanish ships riding in the road of Fayal, ready to take the first wind for Spain, to the southward of which island my Lord had passed eight days before. Upon this news my Lord hastened thither, both to be resolved of the truth thereof as also to make an attempt upon those ships if he should see a possibility to prevail: but arriving two days after, towards the evening a calm took him and he was not able to reach within two leagues of the road where the ships lay. Whereupon there was a council called, as in all cases of difficulty there is, wherein myself and Captain Lister very earnestly proposed, and by entreaty prevailed, that we might have leave in that calm to row to the road to take a view of

the ships, that against morning we might see where to take advantage by surprising them.

As we drew near the Spaniards the dashing of our oars was heard, which gave the alarm to the Admiral, who only wore the flag, and instantly let fly her ordnance, without any certain aim more than the dashing of the oars directed. Captain Lister and I seeing ourselves missed by the shot were so much encouraged, that, rather like mad than discreet men, we ran aboard the Admiral with an intent suddenly to surprise her ; but finding so great an inequality in our forces, for the ship carried sixteen pieces of ordnance and was well manned and provided, we were glad to put off our boat and retire, repenting of our bargain.

As we were rowing towards our fleet again, which all this while beheld the fight and heard the report of the ships' ordnance, we met another boat of greater burthen sent to succour us ; and, after joyful salutation, we resolved and concluded with both our boats to return again and give a second assault upon the Admiral, telling them the state and condition of the ship, which did so encourage both the one and the other that by consent it was agreed they should board her in the quarter and we in the hawse, and we to cut her cable and let her drive off to sea. All this was successfully acted and the ship miraculously enjoyed, notwithstanding the continual shot from the castle to which the ship was moored ; and which castle a month after we took and afforded us forty-five pieces of ordnance, mounted and dismounted. I must not forget that, as we entered the Admiral on the one side, the Spaniards leaped overboard on the other, except the Captain, John de Palma, and one more.

Now having got an unexpected victory, rather by valour than reason, we towed out the ship with our two boats, the castle not sparing to fire at us, till we brought her without reach of the shot, and then we agreed to take out all our men, except one at helm to govern her, and struck down her sails. And we ourselves returned in our boats once more into the road where we possessed ourselves of the other seven ships left behind, three of which were of reasonable good value. For the other particulars of this voyage I refer to my First Book where you shall find this relation following :—

Coming into the island of St. Mary we found an unelcome entertainment, though indeed we meant the people no farther hurt than to be supplied with water from the island. But it seems they were better prepared to forbid us than we expected, for at our offering to land with two hundred and odd men, two parts of them were suddenly hurt and slain ; in which encounter my sword, which I placed naked and the point upward, was shot asunder and the bullet passed through the belly of my doublet, which if it had not been for my sword had done the like through my belly.

My Lord being thus frustrated of all hope of water and other refreshment was to seek the help of another island to give him relief, for now drink began to be scarce and it was likely it would put us to desperate want. And standing from hence to the island of St. George, by labour and pains, and by the help of my swimming, my ship drawing little water to come near the shore, I procured so much water as kept us after from perishing.

Passing by the other side of the island of St. George we might see a goodly spout issuing

out of the great cliff, which gave my Lord a great comfort to be supplied with drink by that spout. Now began our people to be in despair of any help of drink, either by sea or island, and by one consent, in a tumultuous manner, cried out to return to England, which much troubled my Lord who hoped for a better fortunate voyage before his return. And finding no man so heartily true to him as myself, he bewailed himself and his case to me, how much it imported him to try what water that spout would yield him, conjuring me, by the love I bore him, that I would put myself into a small boat that rowed with three oars, one man to steer, and myself to sit, and to venture ashore to shew the possibility that spout would yield him for water, promising that he and his ship should stand within a mile of the land to take me up at my return. I performed it as honestly as he reposed trust in me, though by an accident it had almost cost me my life.

In my way, rowing towards the shore, a great whale was spied from my Lord's ship, lying with her back upon the water asleep as is the nature of whales before storms. This whale was supposed to be a rock, and dangerous for the ship to bear further into land, and thereupon tacked about to sea leaving me to the mercy of the waves. I had no sooner set my foot ashore but it began to be dark with night and fog, to blow, rain, thunder, and lighten in the cruellest manner that I have seen. There was no way for me to escape death but to put myself to the mercy of the sea ; neither could I have any great hope of help or life, for the ship was out of sight, and only appeared a light upon the shrouds to direct me. This sudden alteration of weather gave me lost in the opinion of my Lord and all his company.

All this while the ship lay upon the lee ; and seeing it was in vain to expect my return the master called with the whistle to fill the sails. But the master gunner being a countryman of mine, and one that loved me well, (an approved man of skill and art, by the place he held as master gunner in the Pope's Admiral galley in the victorious battle of Lepanto, in which battle he was sore wounded) he humbly besought my Lord to forbear filling the sails one hour longer, which my Lord willingly granted ; and in that interim of time one of the company in the ship spied a flash of fire and heard the report of a musket. For all our powder was spent to that very last shot, by means whereof we were preserved rather by miracle than any human art. And, to make it the more strange, we were no sooner risen from our seats and ropes in our hands to enter the ship, but the boat immediately sunk. And though I have passed many dangers, as will appear by this treatise, yet I account this the greatest of all, and none of the rest to be paralleled with it.

What miseries we endured in the latter end of the voyage you shall find in the First Book, where I have occasion to speak of our return, and the extremity we endured, which was more terrible than befell any ship in the eighteen years' war. For laying aside the continual expectation of death by shipwreck, and the daily mortality of our men, I will speak of our famine, that exceeded all men and ships I have known in the course of my life. For sixteen days together we never tasted drop of drink, either beer, wine, or water ; and though we had plenty of beef and pork of a year's salting, yet did we forbear eating it for making us the drier. Many drunk salt

water, and those that did died suddenly, and the last word they usually spake was 'drink,' 'drink,' 'drink': and I dare boldly say that of five hundred men that were in that ship seven years before, at this day there is not a man alive but myself and one more.

The first port we arrived at was the Ventry in Ireland, five miles by land from Dingle church, that gave me succour in my former voyage as I have said. Here we made shift to furnish my Lord with a horse, and myself and some other gentleman followed a-foot. At our coming to the town we found my Lord in the house of the sovereign, which is the title of the mayor, telling his strange adventures and his dangerous escape of famishing with want of drink. The sovereign told his Lordship that about two years before, a gentleman came into their port in as great a want of meat as his Lordship was of drink; and even as he was repeating my name I entered the door, who my Lord took by the hand in their presence, and said, *Lupus est in fabula*. They beheld me with admiration,\* and told my Lord, that it was my fortune that brought him thither; and held themselves happy that it was in their power to give him relief as they had done the like to me before.

In the year 1590 my former sickness, you have heard I took in Ireland, kept me from employment or thought of the sea; but now, finding my body as willing as my mind to follow my begun courses, this year of 1591 I attended my Lord of Cumberland once more, and had the command of the Garland under him, wherein he went Admiral. I can say little of any consequence of this voyage

\* *I.e.* Wonder.



that concerned myself, but my imprisonment by six Spanish galleys, near the islands of Burlings, which I have had cause to remember by some accidents you shall read in my succeeding voyage.

My constancy has been such, though to my cost, where I have made profession of love, that no small unkindness could suddenly divert me when my affection has been grounded upon true friendship, as may appear by my faithfulness to the Lord I now speak of, for whom I have often ventured my life with little fruit of his favour. And I must confess it was some blemish to my judgment; for notwithstanding many admonitions I was incredulous, still relying upon him, and followed him in this voyage of 1593 in the place I had formerly held, captain of the *Golden Lion*, a ship of the *Queen's*, wherein he served as Admiral. What I shall say here relates to some principal accidents that concern myself in this voyage; and for the rest, I refer you to my First Book, where I have shewed that my Lord, being severed from his fleet about the *Burlings*, met with twelve hulks of the east country that after some fight yielded, and delivered him a large quantity of powder which they carried for the King of Spain's service; my Lord took the one half of those ships and stood off to sea; the other half he left with me to examine and rummage. Towards night my Lord cast off those in his company, whom I spied making towards me and their consorts, which seemed strange to me that was left guarded but by a small ship and his long boat with fifty men. I feared, as after I found true, that those ships had a resolution to board and take me; but to prevent their design I leaped into my Lord's boat on one side of the ship as they boarded her on the other, in which

leap I received a hurt in my leg, which to this day, in 1641, I have found a great decay to my whole body.

In the said First Book you will find that from hence my Lord stood to the island of Corvo where he was taken with a most melancholy sickness, and in despair of health or life unless he might be relieved with the milk of a cow. And I seeing in what condition he was, and valuing his life as much as my own, I ventured my person to get him a cow from the hands of the enemy, either by fair or foul means, and put myself into the hands of the Portuguese of the island of Corvo. First shewing a flag of truce, I told them the cause of my coming to them was out of love, and that we had a great fleet at sea thereabouts; and lest any of them should do them injury I brought them a protection from our General, the Earl of Cumberland, to defend them if any violence should be offered them; and so insinuated to them as they afforded me courteous entertainment. And because night drew on they desired me to stay all night: I willingly embraced their offer, and by my liberal carriage obtained what I required, and the day following carried a cow and other refreshments aboard, which gave plenty of milk till my Lord's arrival in England. This cow, in all likelihood, was the saving of my Lord's life for the present, which he acknowledged.

In the ensuing year, 1595, I was married; but before my marriage I engaged myself by promise to attend my Lord of Cumberland, as his Vice-Admiral, to sea. Himself went in the *Malice-Scourge*, a brave ship built by himself; his Vice-Admiral, the *Alcedo*, a goodly ship of the merchants.

Now I began to have a proof of what before

I had just cause to suspect, *viz.* the inconstant friendship of my Lord of Cumberland. For though I was drawn by his sweet words and promises to this voyage, and that we had proceeded upon it so far as Plymouth, and from thence eight or nine leagues to sea towards the coast of Spain, without imparting, or making shew of anything to me he suddenly quitted the voyage and appointed another captain for his own ship, which did so much discontent me for the present that I abandoned the company of his ship at sea and betook myself to my own adventure. This bred an after-quarrel betwixt my Lord and me, and it was a long time before we were reconciled.

My voyage produced no danger of famine or sword as other voyages had done. The worst enemy I found were storms, which were such as forced me to cut my mainmast by the board and compelled me to bear for England. After I had weathered the coast of Spain the storm held on so outrageous and of such long continuance, that I was driven to Spain before the sea, betwixt Coruña in Galicia, and Blavet in Brittany, which port the Spaniards at that time possessed. The sea was so grown, and the waves so mighty, that they raked me fore and aft for want of a mainmast to keep up the ship, so that I expected for many days together nothing but foundering in the sea. But at last it pleased God to send me to Plymouth, where I found the people much distracted upon the news brought them of the arrival of four Spanish galleys from Blavet to Penzance in Cornwall, which village they took and sacked. These four galleys could not choose but pass me that night in a calm unseen. Sir Francis Drake was now at Plymouth ready bound

with his fleet to the West Indies, in which voyage he died. Upon the news of these galleys he instantly put to sea, and myself with him, and arriving at Penzance, we found the Spaniards were gone and the poor spoil not worth their labour they found in the town.

The next offensive voyage by us, was to Cadiz, in 1596, under the command of the Earl of Essex and my Lord Admiral, whereof I had formerly occasion to say something when I made mention of burning of fifty-eight sail of ships and the taking the St. Andrew. The principal and dangerous thing that happened to me in that voyage was the accident following :—My Lord of Essex having made his way through the town, at length came to the spacious market place where he found the greatest and sharpest resistance from the houses thereabouts, that sorely flanked him which way soever he passed or looked, and one house more than the rest seemed most dangerous. Whereupon I desired my Lord to spare me fifty old soldiers of the Low Countries to give an assault upon that house, which his Lordship granted, and I performed and took it. In that conflict I was shot with a musket bullet through my scarf and breeches, and the handle and pommel of my sword shot from my side, without any further hurt. As I stooped for my handle and pommel of my sword, Sir John Wingfield was next to me on horseback, who had received a hurt in his thigh a little before ; and as he was asking me how I did, (for it seems he feared I was sorely wounded by my stooping) he was shot with a bullet in the head and suddenly fell down dead ; and these were the last words that ever he spoke. What more concerns this voyage, in general, you will find in the First Book ; but, by the way, this I

note, that as the sword is the death of many a man so it hath been twice the preserver of my life, the one at the island of St. Mary, in 1589, the other now at Cadiz, in 1596.

The Islands expedition succeeded this to Cadiz, in 1597, equal with it both in greatness, goodness, and the person of the man that commanded it. In this expedition I was captain of the Rainbow of the Queen's, which ship had a special cause to be remembered by meeting the Indies fleet in the manner following. My Lord of Essex had intelligence from the island of Graciosa, where he had some men ashore, of certain ships descried off to sea. The night drawing on, his Lordship divided his fleet into three squadrons, and myself being the next ship to him he commanded me to stand away south that night ; and if I spied any ships to make signs, with shooting my ordnance and making false fires, promising to send twelve ships after me. I instantly departed as I was directed, not doubting but the twelve ships would follow me. It blew little wind, and within less than four hours, about twelve o'clock in the night, I fell in company of a fleet consisting of twenty-five sail ; whereupon I put myself into my boat, the calm continuing, resolving, though it were with my apparent peril, to discover what ships they were before I would presume to make signs as I was directed. Approaching near the fleet I hailed them in Spanish, who answered me in the same language ; and by their course I knew them to be the Indies fleet. And having as much as I desired for the present I returned on board the Rainbow, and afterwards performed so much as I was commanded in shooting of my ordnance and making false fires: I accompanied the fleet that night and the next day, till I brought them

into the road of Angra, in the island of Terceira, and what after befell me and them I refer to my First Book. All the hurt that happened to me in this desperate attempt of mine, besides the hazard of shot from the castles and fleet, my ship being shot through fifteen times, was foul words and railing language, with some shot from the Spaniards when I first hailed them in my boat.

In our return this voyage I was in more peril, hazard, and danger, than any other ship of our fleet, for the Rainbow is known to be the most rolling and laboursome ship in England, especially in the condition I was in, having spent my foremast in a mighty storm and mountainous seas, where we hourly expected death.

My next voyage, of all others, was most fortunate to me wherein the carrack was taken, and the best service performed by so few ships that happened in all the Queen's time. And yet it gives the least occasion to speak of out of many others wherein I was an actor, save only that I must assume to myself to be the chief persuader of the attempt upon her. The resolution taken by consent of council, how to assail her, was in this manner, that Sir Richard Leveson and I should anchor in the road of Cezimbra, near the carrack and their other forces, the rest of our ships to ply up and down and not to anchor. Sir Richard, according to his directions, made his first entrance into the road, but by the negligence of his master, much to his dislike, he failed in anchoring and the current taking him on the bow carried him out of the road, so that it was the next day before he could recover in again. Myself, having the rear, followed my Admiral according to former order till I had brought one broadside against the galleys and my other against the

carrack and castle, which done I let fall my anchor; and for what followed upon it I refer you to my First Book.

This voyage ending, the next was the last undertaken by the Queen, for not long after she died. And this was the last voyage against Spain, for by her death the war ceased, and as I was a soldier and a youth at the beginning thereof, so I was General of this last fleet. And for the particulars of this voyage, more than these few following, I will refer you to the First Book aforesaid.

I departed England the last of August, 1602, and arrived at the Rock the 26th of September, where a light was espied by my ship in the night, which after we found to be a fleet of twenty-four galleons which I had intelligence of the day before by the caravel I sent into the shore to discover. I drew so nigh those ships that I could not escape them if they had taken me to be an enemy; and finding myself thus entangled I commanded a Spaniard, who served me, and held a dagger at his heart, upon his life to speak as I directed him, which was as follows:—to call to them with a loud voice that there was a strange ship fallen amongst their fleet and that he knew not what she was. I conceived that, having warning from me of it, of all others she could not suspect I was she, and in the mean time, in a secret manner, I tacked about and quitted myself of them without further suspicion; but the Adventure (for only she and the Whelp was left with me) could not carry herself so dissemblingly, but she was in danger of being taken and escaped with the loss of some men. The next morning they chased the Adventure and Whelp, for I was gotten a little way to head of them. Three of the best

sailing ships of the Spaniards drew near the Whelp; and, perceiving that unless I acted some desperate thing she would be taken, I struck my topsail, though it was much against the will of my master and company, crying out that I would lose myself and ship. I stood with the Whelp and Adventure, and caused them to stand their course to sea whilst I stayed for the three Spanish ships with whom I would make trial of their force, and hoped to make them have little list to pursue them. The Spanish Admiral was astern with his whole fleet, who perceiving my working, and the little respect I had to his three ships aforesaid, tacked in with the shore and shot off a warning piece for his fleet and the three ships to follow him.

Being thus luckily acquitted from the Spanish fleet, wherein Don Diego de Brochero was General, I returned to the South Cape, with the Whelp only, for I had lost company of the Adventure two nights before: and arriving there the one and twentieth of October, I gave chase to a galleon of the fleet of Zubiaur, who recovered under the castle of Cape Sagres before I could fetch her up. But though I knew the force of the castle, by sundry shot I had formerly received from it, and was acquainted with the excellence of the gunner, who was an Englishman of my acquaintance, in the sight of their General Zubiaur and his squadron I attempted, and had taken her, had it not been for the cowardliness of the helmsman, that sheered off as I was ready to board her. The fight was not long but dangerous, with the loss of twelve men on my side and in no less danger of sinking; who was so beaten from the castle that it was a spectacle to behold my ship, for she might be crept through from side to side. For all other circumstances I refer



to my First Book. And so I take my leave of the Queen's reign.

This voyage ended and I returned for England. At Christmas, after, there was a consultation by the Lords of her Majesty's Council, to prepare two fleets, the one for the spring, the other to second the first in June following, Sir Richard Leveson to command the former, and myself the latter, in some action against Spain. But though this was a pretence to satisfy the world yet the Lords had another intent in it. For at that time they knew, the Queen being sick, there was much danger of her death because of her years, which made them the more willing to hasten this fleet to sea, to have it in a readiness to defend the kingdom if the Queen's death should happen.

And though Sir Richard Leveson, nominated General of this fleet, was not beloved by the Lords, fearing his ambition, yet they continued him in his place and command. And whereas I was appointed to second him in a later fleet, yet the Lords by importunity persuaded me to accompany him as Vice-Admiral in this voyage, they having a greater trust and confidence in me than in him. And therefore I was ordered to command the *Merhonour*, a better ship than that Sir Richard served in. All this was done out of policy; and few of the Lords, but such as were intimate friends to the King knew of it. For their intention was, if the Queen died and King James had found any opposition, that my Lord Thomas Howard, afterwards Earl of Suffolk, should take charge of this fleet and come aboard me, and I to go into Sir Richard's ship, and Sir Richard's authority to cease. But, God be thanked, there was no cause for this wise forecast of the Lords. For his Majesty repaired peaceably


to London, and we returned safely to Chatham, after we had seen the King's entertainment by his well affected subjects.

Two years after, and in the year 1604, I was nominated Admiral of the Narrow Seas, without suit or seeking of mine. And the first service I was appointed to was the transportation of the Constable of Castile, who was to repair hither to conclude a peace betwixt the two Crowns, that had been eighteen years at variance. What happened in that employment, as also in the twelve years after that I served as Admiral, I refer you to my Second Book throughout. Only I must say that, as in former employments I went not without danger of life by enemies, by the peril of sea, and famine, as I have formerly repeated, in this employment I was to fear neither foe nor famine, the King having a general peace with all princes and nations, and my employment being not so far from home but that in few days I might be supplied with victuals. Though I account another danger greater than the rest, which consisted in accidents of the sea and extremity of storms and foul weather, in the south and straitest part of England, where commonly I was to lie at anchor; and upon any occasion being put from my anchors, the narrowness of the seas betwixt land and land would put me into imminent danger of shipwreck and life. The shoals and sands were no less dangerous, considering that very often we were to be attended with fogs and mists; besides that we were sometimes put to double a lee-shore, which if we failed of we presently perished.

But God so provided for me that I escaped all these hazards, and at last found malice had a greater power and force against me than by sea

I found, or otherwise I deserved. For when I thought to have left my painful labours at sea, and to have enjoyed tranquillity of peace on land, envy, unluckily and unlooked for, seized upon my innocence. For being thought a bosom friend to a nobleman I much honoured, who at that time began to be aimed at, and was afterwards borne down by a court faction, though I was one of the meanest in number and unworthy to have knowledge taken of me, as a man of no eminence, yet considering how my estate then stood by my engagements, and otherwise, I found fortune more aversed to me than most of the others had felt by malicious practices.

*The End of the Fifth Book.*



## INTRODUCTION TO BOOK VI.

THE primitive savagery of Monson's commercial ethics was not peculiar to himself, although no doubt intensified by the malignant personal hatred he felt for the Dutch. But, like him, his contemporaries all seemed to think that because England, for its own sake, had assisted the Dutch in their fight for independence they were therefore bound in gratitude to remain subservient satellites, politically and commercially, and not to compete in trade with this country. Sir John Coke, who was exactly the sort of person who reflects popular opinion—the 'man in the street' in office—wrote in 1635 to the British Resident at the Hague a long letter which might have been indited by Monson, in which he talks of 'our unthankful neighbours' and repeats all the current commonplace abuse of the moment; and many more examples from the official and unofficial correspondence of the time might be given. No doubt the Dutch were keen business men, and often not very scrupulous in their methods, but it may be questioned whether their commercial expansion would have excited such bitter antagonism had not England been experiencing the reaction following the Spanish war when the English marine, military and commercial, was supreme and when, for long years, there was neither Dutch nor French competition to meet. Now, besides the commercial competition so acutely felt, there were Dutch and French military navies in existence to support their merchantmen, and Great Britain was not in a position to continue the imperative attitude England alone had maintained successfully under Elizabeth. Later, but not until the second half of the seventeenth century, regard was paid to the fact that the fisheries were the nursery of seamen and that, in the words of an eighteenth-century writer, they

produced the men that the royal and merchant services only expended without replacing. In Monson's time, however, and in the preceding period, the fisheries were regarded almost entirely from a commercial point of view as a matter of profit and loss in cash, of money gain to Holland and money loss to England, and their relation to the national wealth of manhood was, if not ignored, at least considered to be a secondary issue of far less importance.

That attention was so largely fixed upon the fisheries was in great measure due to the circumstance of proximity which brought home the conditions to many who hardly knew of Dutch commercial competition occurring in the Baltic, the Mediterranean, or the East Indies, or to whom, if they did, it was at least rendered more or less impersonal by distance. The North Sea fisheries of the Dutch were no new thing, although it was not until Elizabeth's reign that they underwent the expansion which aroused the jealous enmity of the Jacobeans, who seldom seemed to ask themselves why a foreign nation was able so successfully to engross a trade in which many natural advantages were their own. It cannot be said that the fisheries had been neglected in England; very early records<sup>1</sup> show that they were of ancient use, and early statutes indicate the attention given by the mediæval kings to this industry. Two statutes of Edward III., of the 31st and 35th years, known as the Statutes of Herrings, dealt with the prevailing conditions at Yarmouth and show the importance attached to the great fair held there, but even at that date we may find signs that the English fishermen were showing a tendency to buy their catches at sea instead of fishing for them. Those are, I think, the earliest Parliamentary notices of the herring fishery, but there is still earlier documentary evidence which has some bearing on the vexed question of licences and shows that the Flemish fishermen were accustomed

<sup>1</sup> *E.g.* payments of rents of herrings in Domesday. The Cinque Ports charters of Edward I, relating to the right of 'den and strond' at Yarmouth also shew that the North Sea herring fishery was a very old and important industry.

to resort to English waters in the thirteenth century or earlier. In the mediæval period the commercial and political interests of England and the Low Countries were closer than those existing between either of them and other nations, which may explain why the Flemings were permitted a freedom not apparently granted to the French. In 1204 the men of Calais were licensed to fish where they pleased until Christmas Day;<sup>2</sup> this is the earliest actual reference to any sort of licence, but if we had the documentary evidence belonging to the preceding reigns it would probably be found not to be the first. In 1224 a Calais fishing boat had been seized; the King ordered it to be set free and permission was given, to all men, for free fishing until a fixed date.<sup>3</sup> From both these examples it would appear that the English fisheries, whatever may have been their extent, were even then reserved and that the right of giving or withholding permission to fish within an area—unknown—was jealously guarded as appertaining to English sovereignty. On the other hand there was no such limitation in relation to the Flemings who seem to have been looked upon as ordinary visitors. In 1295 John de Botetourt, 'keeper' of the East Anglian Coast, was directed to make proclamation that no one was to injure the Flemish fishermen coming in those waters, and that the King was sending three hired ships to cruise in Flemish waters for the protection of vessels of both nations.<sup>4</sup> Here we have an acknowledgement of responsibility, and responsibility implies ownership. Again, two years later, in 1297, the Flemings are noticed as being in English waters 'as they have been accustomed to in times past.'<sup>5</sup> The exceptionally friendly relations between the English and Flemings at this period either followed, or were exemplified by, the marriage of Elizabeth, daughter of Edward I., to John, son of the Count of Holland, and the marriage treaty guaranteed free access to 'our seas' to the Count's subjects.

<sup>2</sup> *Pat.* 6 John, m. 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Cl.* 8 Hen. III., m. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Pat.* 23 Edw. I., m. 6.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* 25 Edw. I., pt. ii., m. 6.

The advent of the Holland and Zealand fishermen was no temporary occurrence and, so far as the records tell us, was so much a matter of course as to need little or no regulation. We find no stories of such murderous affrays between English and Dutch as occurred nearly year after year between the east coast fishermen and those of the Cinque Ports, almost amounting to civil war. It is clear, therefore, that their fishery was smaller and less profitable than the English and aroused no feelings of envy or jealousy. They seem even to have been welcome to import fish here, or at any rate to sell their catches in English harbours, for in 1316 the Count of Holland consented to a levy of twenty shillings on each of his ships bringing herrings or other fish until a certain amount due as damages to the English Crown was liquidated.<sup>6</sup> Importation was, if possibly uncommon, not unknown, for in 1329 a Newcastle ship is found to be bringing twenty-six lasts of herrings from Stralsund.<sup>7</sup> However, though the Flemings were allowed to come freely, the right of taxation, and of the ownership implied by taxation, appears to have been reserved from year to year. In 1320 Edward II. ordered that nothing was to be taken from the Holland and Zealand fishermen that season,<sup>8</sup> and in 1337 Edward III. proclaimed that all vessels, not exceeding 30 tons, were free to come into east coast waters.<sup>9</sup> Such limitations as to time and size, and the fact that in treaties the exercise of their vocation by the fishermen, subjects of the contracting powers, was usually matter for an especial article, all point to a consistent claim to rights which might be exercised at any moment. If in any year, or during any series of years, a levy was made upon foreign fisher-

<sup>6</sup> *Pat.* 10 Edw. II., pt. i., m. 24.

<sup>7</sup> *Cl.* 3 Edw. III., m. 26d. In 1293 nearly 100 Easterlings, from Stralsund, Lubeck, etc., were driven into Newcastle and other East Coast ports by bad weather. They were arrested by Edward I as carrying supplies to his enemies; amongst other things their cargoes included barrelled herrings and stock fish (*Exch. Misc. Bdle.* 2, f. 1).

<sup>8</sup> *Cl.* 14 Edw. II., m. 15.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* 11 Edw. III., pt. ii., m. 34.



men it was clearly not considered a grievance, for it has left no trace in the records.<sup>10</sup> We have even less evidence of the existence of any territorial limit, if one then existed, within which rights of ownership in the matter of fishing were claimed. Centuries later such limits were undefined. We have seen that in 1609 Cecyll claimed that the Channel belonged to England, and that in the ocean her rights of possession extended to 'about' 100 miles; <sup>11</sup> another writer of a little later date, perhaps Sir John Coke, called the distance 100 leagues, but, from the context, evidently used miles and leagues as similar measures.<sup>12</sup> In 1619 Sir Robert Naunton wrote to Sir Dudley Carleton that the Dutch could not be permitted to fish within fourteen miles of the coast, which was plainly his idea of the territorial limit, while James himself fixed the distance at 'a kennyng, as seamen do take a kennyng.'<sup>13</sup> A 'kennyng' was twenty or twenty-one miles; it is a Middle English word, and it may fairly be inferred that if, as James maintained, it was an ancient custom to make that distance the prohibited area the custom can certainly go back, on the strength of the antiquity of the word, to the fourteenth century at least. In 1594, however, in Scotch waters, the Dutch were forbidden simply to come within sight of the coast, which suggests that in 1618 James found his word to suit his argument unless he was basing it on some evidence or tradition of which we know nothing.<sup>14</sup> It is obvious that

<sup>10</sup> In 1379 there was a levy of sixpence a ton on herring boats for the defence of the North Sea, but this may not have applied to aliens (*Rot. Parl.*, iii. p. 63).

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, iii. p. 51.

<sup>12</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* ccv. 92.

<sup>13</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. II.* cccxxxix. This is a volume of collections, made by Sir Joseph Williamson, on the fisheries. It contains, of course, material of very unequal value.

<sup>14</sup> It is usually stated in text books that the principle of the territorial limit now in use is based on the suggestion of a Dutch jurist, Cornelius van Bynkershoek (1673-1743), who proposed that the sovereignty of a country should extend to the extreme cannon range from its coast, that representing its power of protection and defence. The principle was quickly accepted although the distances varied; Norway still claims

within sight of the coast might mean only two or three miles in the case of a low and flat shore; cliffs would have to be 500 or 600 feet in height to be seen twenty miles out at sea, and then only on a clear day.

The conditions during the middle third of the fifteenth century cannot have conduced to progress in any industry and, at the best, the fisheries could only have held their own, while the exercise of rights of ownership, if made at all, must have been intermittent and half-hearted. But the claims of others were respected, which goes to show that England still expected its own to be recognized. The King of Denmark insisted on the same observances in Norwegian and Danish waters that England and other powers required in their own, so that in 1444 Englishmen, in deference to Danish protests, were forbidden to go to such parts as were inhibited by the Danish King.<sup>15</sup> If, however, the state of Yarmouth in 1471 is indicative of the conditions prevailing elsewhere, the fisheries must have suffered considerably during the Wars of the Roses, for, from its former flourishing estate, when 220 vessels sailed from it, the Norfolk port had fallen into poverty, possessing, then, only twenty-four fishing boats.<sup>16</sup> When Edward IV. held the throne firmly he gave some attention to the industry by providing an armed guard in the North Sea for which the fishermen had to pay in the shape of a convoy tax, and this was taken from both

four, and Spain six, miles. England and the United States adopted the three mile limit towards the close of the eighteenth century; by the Territorial Jurisdiction Act of 1878 it is defined as a marine league from low-water mark.

However, the claim was anterior to van Bynkershoek, who may have done much to obtain its general recognition. In 1636 it was stated that it was lawful to make a capture out of gun-shot range from the land (*Adm. Ct. Exam.* 115); and in 1639 the States-General wrote that they could not recognise the claim of Charles to jurisdiction any further 'on the seas than within reach of cannon shot' (*Adm. Ct. Misc.* 1425 f. 40). Cf. Grotius, *De Jure Belli*. lib. ii. c. 3, § 10.

<sup>15</sup> *Fædera*, xi. 57. In 1490 the King of Denmark granted licences to English fishermen for Icelandic waters, renewable every seven years (*Ibid.* xii. 381, xiii. 798).

<sup>16</sup> *Pat.* 49 Hen. VI., m. 17d.

native and foreign vessels.<sup>17</sup> Henry VII. did the same ; but here we are left in ignorance as to the exact incidence of the taxation, although it probably applied to foreigners as well as English.<sup>18</sup> The Flemings must still have been coming in considerable numbers, for their needs were the subject of the 14th article of the treaty of 24th February 1495-6, the *Intercursus Magnus*, which provided that they might come and go freely without any licence or safe-conduct. It may be remarked that although the North Sea was the chief scene of the fishing industry, and the consequent quarrels, English rights were not neglected elsewhere. An Irish statute, the 5 Edward IV. c. 6, forbade fishing in Irish waters without a licence, and this may point to the presence of Scotch or Spanish fishermen there. The French are rarely mentioned because a state of war was the normal one between England and France, but in 1460 Henry VI. granted licences to the French to fish in English waters.<sup>19</sup> It was customary for Breton fishermen to come yearly to the coast of Cornwall without any special permission, but this was covered by the treaties between the English Kings and the Dukes of Brittany, which always provided for a free fishery. In any case the Bretons would have been treated with consideration, for the alliance or neutrality of Brittany was always valuable against France.

During the sixteenth century there was a marked decline in the North Sea English fishing industry of which the causes are not altogether clear. After the middle of the century the Dutch attendance also fell off for a time, but for that the reason is to be found plainly in the internecine war which tortured the Spanish and independent Netherlands for a generation. War, religion, and lack of capital and enterprise were at least contributing factors to the decline here. The state of war with France, and later with Spain, which were the chief military events of the century must have drawn many men and much money towards privateering which was becoming an

<sup>17</sup> *Pat.* 22 Edw. IV., pt. i., m. 2.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* 3 Hen. VII., pt. i., m. 18d.; m. 9d.

<sup>19</sup> *Rot. Franc.* m. 9; m. 14.

especial occupation in view of the larger field the growth of commerce and the appearance of a wealthier enemy opened up. The Reformation shook established usages and there seems to have been at least a partial cessation of the observance of fast days; so marked was the indifference of the people in this respect that Parliament sought to remedy it by enacting that Fridays, Saturdays, Ember days, and Lent were to be kept, strictly, as fish days in the hope of thus helping the failing industry.<sup>20</sup> Many proclamations in support of this statute were issued during the reigns of Elizabeth, James, and Charles but without much good effect; Elizabeth added Wednesday as an additional fish day. Want of capital, or the direction of such capital as was available into industries offering greater or more certain profits, was probably also a reason. The pamphleteers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries never seemed to realize the enormous amount of money the Dutch had sunk in the provision and equipment of their fishing vessels and the necessary and supplementary occupations required to keep them going, money that the Dutch themselves did not possess until they acquired it at the expense of Spain and by the profits of their carrying trade. These writers always assumed that a small English company, under royal and noble auspices and direction, with a capital of a few thousand pounds could compete successfully with an industry which had its root and support in every class of the Dutch people, which was maintained by the whole wealth of the United Provinces, and which had the supreme advantage of an established organization of production, preparation, and distribution among purchasers to whom its trade mark was a recognized proof of excellence. The only people who could have fought the Dutch monopoly with any chance of success, the wealthy London merchants, either refused entirely to engage themselves with the fishery companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries or gave them but a slight and half-hearted support; possibly they thought that they could use their money to better purpose but

<sup>20</sup> 2 & 3 Edw. VI., c. 19

in some cases it is certain that the aristocratic patronage of these enterprises rendered them suspect in the eyes of business men.

Perhaps the want of energy and enterprise noticed in the English fishermen, generally, during the sixteenth century was but a more marked condition of a tendency that had always existed in an occupation in which the profits were small and only gained at the cost of exposure, brutally hard work, and risk to life. Where there were larger profits, as in the Iceland fishery begun during the first decade of the fifteenth century<sup>21</sup> and in the Newfoundland fishery commenced systematically during the reign of Henry VIII., there was no lack of energy, and the development of both these fields must have had an effect in withdrawing men from the home fisheries.<sup>22</sup> Naturally, the worst seamen and the least industrious were left at home and, on the east coast, they took to buying fish from the foreign boats to such an extent that the custom was made the subject of an Act of Parliament and prohibited under a heavy penalty.<sup>23</sup> On the whole the supremacy of the English Crown seems to have been generally admitted. In 1512 Mary of Savoy, who was governing the Netherlands, asked Henry VIII. to afford armed protection to the herring fishers from Holland and Zealand,<sup>24</sup> and towards the end of the reign, in 1543, Francis I., during an interval of peace, asked for safe-conducts for French fishing boats.<sup>25</sup> It has been said that Mary, at the request of Philip, granted a twenty-one years' lease of the northern Irish waters to the Flemings in consideration of a fine and a payment of 1000*l.* a year, but an eighteenth century naval historian says that the story is 'grounded on no

<sup>21</sup> *Rot. Parl.*, iv. p. 79.

<sup>22</sup> But the English fishermen have always been lethargic in their methods and content to do only what their fathers did. The North Sea men did not go to the Dogger Bank until 1715 (J. Knox, *View of the British Empire*, 3rd ed. London, 1785. p. 301).

<sup>23</sup> 33 Hen. VIII., c. 2.

<sup>24</sup> *L. & P. Hen. VIII.*, i 3367.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* xviii. 259. It was refused.

better authority than a hearsay from Sir Edward Fitton, son of Sir Henry Fitton.' <sup>26</sup> Certainly there is no record evidence of it.

When Elizabeth came to the throne the progressive deterioration of the home fisheries was attracting the anxious attention of the Government, particularly of Cecyll, who was one of the few who looked at the question from the point of view of national profit in the possession of skilled seamen as well as of the national profit in cash. The number of Dutch fishing boats in the North Sea was relatively negligible compared with the huge fleets of half a century later, but it was sufficient to set him at work on some of the meticulous paper calculations to which we owe so much information. In one of these papers he notes that the Yarmouth fishery attracted 600 Flemish and French boats, that of the north coast 400 Flemish and some French, that the Channel was worked by the French, and the south coast of Ireland by the Spaniards.<sup>27</sup> What distinction Burghley drew between the Yarmouth and 'north coast' fisheries must be surmise. He was always an alarmist, and there is a further implication in the document that the herring fishery was engrossed by the Scots which is certainly incorrect. It was true that there were Spaniards in Irish waters, but they had no monopoly, for it was customary for boats from the ports of Somerset and other western counties to resort yearly to Ireland. The debates of Parliament took shape in the statute of 5 Elizabeth c. 5 by which various regulations were made intended to benefit the coast fisheries. Other statutes—13 Elizabeth c. 11, 23 Elizabeth c. 7, and 27 Elizabeth c. 15—made or altered regulations enacted with the same object. The 27 Elizabeth c. 7 had forbidden English subjects to go or send abroad

<sup>26</sup> Entick, *Naval History*, London, 1757, p. xv. There was no Sir Henry Fitton. Sir Edward Fitton, the elder, who was Treasurer at War in Ireland late in Elizabeth's reign, did not go to that country until 1569. The Spaniards, however, were coming into Irish waters in 1553 (*Camd. Misc.* ii. p. 12). The Fitton legend is also found in the Williamson Collection.

<sup>27</sup> *S. P. Dom. Eliz.* xli. 58.

for salt fish or salt herring; it was repealed by 39 Elizabeth c. 10 which recites, with a naïve simplicity, that the Act had entirely failed of its purpose and had only resulted in an influx of alien imports and raised prices. The remedy of free import and export was to be tried in its place. As a matter of fact the supply of dried fish did not keep pace with the demand although that, itself, was probably falling off in comparison with previous centuries, and in spite of the strict protective laws which were supposed to prevail it was frequently found necessary to grant licences permitting importation. Such English enterprise as was devoted to fishing was directed farther afield; the Newfoundland fishery was flourishing, that of Iceland was prosperous and the North Sea men were often on the coast of Norway. In 1600 the King of Denmark seized English fishing boats trespassing in Norwegian waters when Elizabeth protested shrilly that 'the sea is free and common by the law of nations and cannot be engrossed by any prince whatsoever,'<sup>28</sup> thus, for the need of the moment, denying, with her native inconsequence, all the claims made by herself and her predecessors. But probably the chief reason for the failure of the English fisheries, beyond the superior attraction of profitable war with Spain which attracted men to the high seas,<sup>29</sup> was the better business methods of the Dutch in the art of curing and packing the herrings with which the English were not skilful enough to compete.

During Elizabeth's reign, although it is said that she required all foreign fishermen to take out licences at Scarborough,<sup>30</sup> there were obvious reasons why the growing prosperity of the Dutch, both in commerce and in the fisheries, was not allowed to interfere with the close alliance between the two nations, although many English writers and politicians gave utterance, towards the end of the century, to the jealous fear with which that

<sup>28</sup> Camden, *Annals*, ed. 1688, p. 595.

<sup>29</sup> Monson, it will be remembered (*ante*, iv. p. 21), estimated that privateering trebled the number of deep sea sailors.

<sup>30</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. II.* cccxxxix.

prosperity was regarded. The North Sea fishery aroused that jealousy even more than did the success of the Dutch in general commerce, for it was nearer home, it was more easily comparable with the corresponding English failure, and it had grown astoundingly great within a short period. A writer of 1601<sup>31</sup> tells us that there were 2000 busses, of from 60 to 200 tons, employed in the herring fishery.<sup>32</sup> They followed the shoals from June until November—twenty-six weeks—while the English fished only for seven weeks and with small boats only capable of taking, at the most, three lasts when the bigger Dutch took from twelve to twenty. The Dutch got a start of nineteen weeks by commencing their fishery in Scotch waters, while the English waited until the shoals reached Norfolk. Add to all this their greater skill in preparing the herrings and an organization for distribution reaching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and then the hopelessness of competition under the lackadaisical conditions prevailing in England needs no further explanation. Numberless writers followed Keymor during the next century and a half, all dwelling on the greater industry and greater skill of the Dutch as though those qualities were injuries done to this country, and mostly copying their statistics and descriptions from each other; in fact a study of fishery literature goes far to impress one with the truth of the *mot* ascribed to Mr. Max Beerbohm—'History does not repeat itself; historians repeat each other.'

James came to the English throne with previous experience of the great herring question, for the Dutch had long visited Scotch waters. Regal rights had been maintained there as in England for, by an Act of 1424, a quota of the catch was payable by foreign as well as native fishermen and this claim had only been changed in character, not abandoned, by another Act of James V.; it is said to have been suspended at the request of the Dutch when the Princess Elizabeth was married in

<sup>31</sup> J. Keymor, *Observations on Dutch Fishing*, London, 1601.

<sup>32</sup> A buss seems to have been a vessel of usually two, but sometimes three, pole masts each carrying a square sail.



1613.<sup>33</sup> Of more importance was the appearance of the Dutch at Lewis, the island which figures so largely in Monson's account in this Book VI., in 1594, and that had hitherto been unknown as a fishing centre to foreigners. It is said that in that year the States, being godfathers to Prince Henry, obtained verbal permission from James to fish there and then requested him to sell them a small island of the group, which of course he refused to do. The Dutch, like their German cousins, have never possessed the instinctive capacity of adaptation to those strangers among whom they visit, settle, or conquer, and they soon made themselves very unpopular with the islanders, who complained loudly to the King and Council. It was not long before they elbowed the natives out of their own waters into those of Denmark, where they were soon forbidden to resort. This caused an acute situation in 1618, for of course the Scots, driven back into their own seas, clamoured for the ejection of the Dutch. Matters were brought to a head by the Dutch seizing and carrying off to Holland an officer of the Duke of Lennox, the High Admiral of Scotland, who had been sent to prevent their interference with the Scotch fishermen and to make them pay the tax of fish caught. There might easily have been war, but neither James nor the Dutch wanted to fight, and three years of embassies and negotiations followed which led to nothing. It may be noticed that a Scotch writer of this period placed the territorial limit at forty miles.

In England, during the first ten years of the century, discontent with existing conditions and envy of the Dutch increased without any clear perception of what should be the necessary remedial steps. There was perhaps a subconscious impression that if the Dutch trade could be stopped or hampered it would revert into English hands by some natural process without any great effort here. Possibly some little enterprise was directed towards the fisheries; a paper in the Williamson Collection

<sup>33</sup> *Williamson Collection*. It was very unlikely at that date. Many of the papers in this collection must be regarded as carrying very little authority.

asserts that in 1607 James granted to one Collins of Coventry a lease for twenty-one years of the Irish coast fisheries, but the statement seems more than doubtful for no record corroboration can be found. Better authenticated is the fact that in 1608 appeared the first tentative suggestion of a Fishing Company in the proposal by Richard Rainsford and some London merchants to farm a tax of the tenth fish to be levied on foreigners. That is to say that instead of working themselves they proposed to profit by the labour of the Dutch and others, but on consideration it may have appeared too speculative seeing that if the Dutch were obstinate they would have had to rely on James using force, and no one could expect James to use force. Rainsford and his associates withdrew their offer.<sup>34</sup> Lord Salisbury was one of the influential Englishmen who wished to see things altered and it may have been by his original verbal suggestion that the Rainsford proposal took such existence as it had. In 1609 he wrote to Cornwallis that fifty or sixty years earlier there had not been more than one or two hundred Dutch fishing vessels on the coast whereas there were now two or three thousand, and that there was the same relative increase on the western and Irish coasts.<sup>35</sup> He had not the advantage we possess of knowledge of his father's paper quoted above (*ante*, p. 202), which gives different figures. Of the same date is another paper which says that all the native fisheries, from Yarmouth round to Sussex, had fallen into abeyance, the field being occupied by many Dutch and a few French, while the Englishmen bought their fish at sea instead of catching it.<sup>36</sup>

A book on trade and the fisheries, *Observations on Trade and Commerce*, has been attributed to Raleigh and is included in his collected works, but is now considered

<sup>34</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* xxxvii. 79; xxxviii. 92.

<sup>35</sup> Winwood, *Memorials*, iii., 8th June, 1609.

<sup>36</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* xlv. 22. I am informed by Mr. R. G. Marsden that even to-day schooners sail from Fowey to Newfoundland to carry fish to the south of Europe but make no attempt to take fish themselves.

not to have been a production of his. It sounds the usual note of alarm with exaggerated emphasis; the value of the Dutch fishery exports is estimated at nearly 2,000,000*l.* Tobias Gentleman's pamphlet,<sup>37</sup> which Monson tells us (*post*, p. 236) he persuaded Gentleman to dedicate to Northampton in 1614, attracted more attention. He begins by assuming that the British seas were 'the treasury' which had enabled the Dutch to conquer Spain. That was only partly true; for though the great fishery was an important factor in enabling them to carry on the war with success against a bankrupt power, they had not been able to prosecute it on a large scale until their independence was practically assured. He says that they possessed a greater number of ships and seamen than Great Britain, France, and Spain together, and if the fishing vessels, on both sides, were to be included among the ships that was no doubt true. The bulk of his work contains only the same statements that Monson gives us, or perhaps it would be more correct to say that Monson gives us his facts and opinions; but Gentleman also analyses fully the advantages and disadvantages of the English harbours and the number of boats working from them. He is, rightly enough, enthusiastic about the quality of the East Coast men—'wet or cold cannot make them shrink or strain whom the North Sea have dyed in grain for such purposes.' He sees, clearly, the causes of the English failure: that the fishermen were too poor to equip large fishing busses or to export their catches, that they had not 'the right use' of making barrelled fish and consequently lost the foreign trade, and that the merchants would not put capital into the native fishery while they could buy from the Dutch. He estimates that the whole of the English exports were usually only four or five vessels to the Mediterranean, two or three to Bordeaux, and two or three to the Norman and Breton ports, but that in 1613 even that fell off, for the English exporters freighted in Dutch ships. Many of Monson's statements about general trade, *e.g.* the decrease of the Russian trade to two ships a year, &c., are taken

<sup>37</sup> *England's Way to Win Wealth.*

from a pamphlet which appeared the following year, 1615, but which had no particular relation to the fishery.<sup>38</sup>

James had no encouragement except in words to give to his subjects. To those they were welcome, but it was perhaps a sense of the growing popular feeling which impelled him to issue the proclamation of 6th May, 1609, ordering all foreign fishermen to take licences, either at London or Edinburgh, if they wished to use the British Seas, the extent of such seas being left undetermined. Nothing came of this proclamation, which the Dutch ignored, and it may be asked what would have followed if they had accepted it and hastened in crowds to take out the licences. The only logical sequence of the recognition of English ownership would have been a complete inhibition of the Dutch fishery so that the English might step into a vacant business without having to suffer the unpleasantness of struggle, preparation, and competition, for the mere receipt of a few hundred pounds for the licences would hardly have paid for the expense of collection and watching for evaders. That would have meant war, and is sufficient reason why James contented himself with the formal announcement of his requirements backed up by arguments instead of shot. Charles was much more ready than his father to fight; but less wise than his father, who made no pretence of an impolitic pugnacity, he receded, in 1637, after pushing things to the very verge of war, and thus weakened English claims and prestige since all the world knew that he had thrown down the glove—and then stooped to pick it up again.

The next attempt at the formation of a Fishery Company came from private enterprise possibly excited by the failure of the negotiations of 1618-21 for a settlement. There was talk, almost simultaneously, of the foundation of Fishery Companies both in England and Scotland, the Duke of Lennox being the sponsor in the northern country. In England George, Lord Carew, was the principal mover. He was in communication with Sir George Calvert, Secretary of State, therefore it

<sup>38</sup> *The Trade's Increase*, London, 1615. By J. R.

may be inferred that the project had the approval of James. On 8th March, 1622-3, Carew wrote to Calvert that he had consulted with Monson and others about building busses and that the merchants to whom he had spoken approved the scheme but despaired of raising the money; he thought that, at the best, they would only be able to build six busses, and four attendant doggers to take out supplies and fetch the fish from them.<sup>39</sup> The City capitalists may have approved in the abstract but they were not inclined to venture concrete money; there is no hint that Carew, Monson, and their friends were going to risk their own. On 27th March the Lord Mayor informed Carew and his associates that the Court of Aldermen—the scheme was evidently semi-official—were not inclined to undertake any fishery speculation and that the chartered Merchant Companies were too deeply in debt to commence in a new field.<sup>40</sup> Further pressure, either verbal or written, must have been brought to bear on the City magnates, for on 3rd April the Lord Mayor wrote curtly that the Court of Aldermen absolutely declined to have anything to do with the proposed company.<sup>41</sup> Just at this time England was accounted to be suffering an indirect loss of some 621,000*l.* a year by the occupation of at least sixty Dutch ships employed in transporting abroad fish taken by the English, but it is clear that the London capitalists did not see any likely prospect of winning an appreciable portion of this large amount for themselves.<sup>42</sup> It may be noticed that Sir John Coke, who has left a MS. account, of the usual type, of the fishery question, but of a date somewhat later than the moment with which we are dealing, says that sometimes 10,000 Dutchmen were ashore at Yarmouth drying their nets and for other purposes, and that their purchases of corn, beer, and other necessities were a source of substantial profit to farmers and tradesmen.

The accession of Charles was followed by several years of war with Spain and France, so that while privateering was possible there was little likelihood of the employment

<sup>39</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* cxxxix. 66.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* cxlii. 21.

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<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* cxl. 47.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* clvii. 48.

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of spare capital in fishing enterprises. Notwithstanding the laments of patriotic writers, the English fishery was by no means extinct. In January 1628 the men of Yarmouth, of the Norfolk and Suffolk ports, and of the Cinque Ports petitioned for convoy for 230 fishing vessels intended for the North Sea and 160 more for Iceland and the neighbouring waters.<sup>43</sup> From the Atlantic the Newfoundland trade brought wealth to the western counties and was approaching its zenith.<sup>44</sup> If James had been devoted to peace Charles was devoted to his dynastic schemes and *la haute politique*; he probably regarded the fishery chiefly as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Dutch in the larger area of European politics. But, whatever the motive, he inaugurated more active measures than his father had thought of employing. In 1630, after peace had been made with France and Spain, he informed the Scotch Privy Council that he intended to establish a Fishing Company, open to all his subjects, to exploit British waters, and Sir William Alexander, the Secretary for Scotland, was instructed to explain the King's views and obtain promises of assistance.<sup>45</sup> A subordinate agent, Captain John Mason,<sup>46</sup> was also sent by Sir John Coke, and no possibility of doubt was to be left in men's minds that Charles really meant to carry out the business in view of the 'great disparagement and prejudice' suffered by his subjects whose rightful profits were 'reaped only by strangers.' The company was to be on a grand scale; there were to be 200 busses of from 30 to 50 tons which were to be fishing for eleven months of the year for herring, ling, and cod, and were to return an estimated profit of 165,414*l.* a year.<sup>47</sup> Lewis was to be the headquarters of the fishery, and to that end the rights of the Earl of Seaforth were, as Monson

<sup>43</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* xc. 70.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *ante*, iv. p. 399.

<sup>45</sup> *Reg. Pr. Co. of Scotland*, iv. (2nd ser.), pp. xviii.-xxiii.

<sup>46</sup> Monson mentions Mason in connection with army administration (*ante*, iv., p. 142). He was retained in the employment of the Fishing Company later at Lewis.

<sup>47</sup> *Reg. Pr. Co. of Scotland*, ut supra; *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* clxxx. 102.

recommends (*post*, p. 259) to be bought out. Seaforth's patent was not original but had been acquired from the former grantees who had obtained it from James, and he had rendered the Dutch still more unpopular by giving them so many privileges that the native fishermen were deprived of all their opportunities. The King's proposals were not received enthusiastically in Scotland, partly by reason of the standing jealousy of England and partly because they desired to reserve Lewis for themselves. A great deal of correspondence and negotiation followed in which Charles showed himself more enthusiastic in proportion as the Scots showed themselves lukewarm. Scotch commissioners came to London, and we may note in their instructions that the Privy Council in Edinburgh held that Scotch waters extended half seas over to the next land, wherever it might be; much discussion and haggling went on in which the Scots, requiring privileges for themselves and restrictions on the English, defended their interests minutely, and it would have been interesting to have had Monson's comments on their business aptitudes as compared with those of the Dutch. It was during this period of protracted debates that Monson wrote this Sixth Book, which is an amplification of more fragmentary papers no doubt submitted to influential persons at the time.<sup>48</sup> Finally, an agreement was come to and on 19th July, 1632, a commission formally created 'The Society of the Fishing of Great Britain and Ireland,' the first of the many which followed it, with Charles as 'perpetual protector.'<sup>49</sup> Being founded under official auspices it was natural that Edward Nicholas should be named as secretary, or 'clerk,' and that a seal and other official necessities should be the first things provided.<sup>50</sup> There

<sup>48</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* clii. 67-70. Among the Museum MSS. is a 'Treatise of Fishing, 1630' (*Sloane MSS.* 26) which has been catalogued as being by Sir Robert Mansell on the strength of a contemporary note on the first page, 'By Sir Robert Mansell as is said.' However, from internal evidence it may be said positively to be one of the earlier forms of this Book VI.

<sup>49</sup> *Pat.* 6, Car. I., pt. vi. d.

<sup>50</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* dxxxiii. 109, 111.

were seventy-eight subscribers, of whom Monson was not one, who provided in payments or promises 11,750*l.*; of that sum 5,000*l.* was obtained from four persons of rank, and the list is deficient in the names of the business men who alone could have worked the company with any prospect of success.<sup>51</sup> Probably a certain amount of social pressure was brought to bear on those in connection with the Court or who had anything to expect from it.

The governing council of the Society suffered, however, from no want of self-confidence and proposed working on a scale which shows that they had no doubts about the sufficiency of their capital or of their knowledge. Their chief settlement was to be at Lewis, but they proposed to buy six acres of land at Broomfield Close, near Deptford, where a building might be erected for a general store and for the manufacture of cordage, nets, &c.<sup>52</sup> The Society was under the government of a council of twelve, of whom half were to be English or Irish and half Scots; the corporation had certain duties and was promised certain privileges of which perhaps the most valuable was the sole right of exporting fish abroad.<sup>53</sup> About this time it was estimated that there were in Scotland 100 and in England 500 fishing boats, large and small; <sup>54</sup> the Fishing Society added, according to their first balance sheet, six others at a cost of 5,400*l.*, a number which did not seem likely to revolutionize the trade or to tilt the balance of the industry in favour of England.<sup>55</sup> They had also spent 4,000*l.* at their Scotch agency at Stornaway, and, altogether, 11,500*l.* of their capital, while 2,000*l.* arrears of subscriptions, were still due. Difficulties arose locally with the natives of Lewis, who seem, of the two, to have preferred the Dutch, whose vessels, by the way, continued operations there with a total indifference to the Society and Charles's proclamations. But they did not show themselves so indifferent in the North Sea,

<sup>51</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* ccxxix. 75; ccxxxi. 151. It would seem, however, from later papers that this amount was only, as it were, a first 'call,' and that the subscribers were still liable for further sums in the form of a yearly subscription.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* ccxxix. 95.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* 76.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* 75.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* ccxci. 25.



and in 1632 two of the Society's busses were seized on some pretext by Dutch men-of-war and a third was taken by a Dunkirker. Another, bought at Ostend, was also taken by the Dutch, and from the fact that the council had been compelled to go abroad for a purchase it would seem that it had not been found so easy as had been supposed to build the typical fishing buss in England. With insufficient capital, and management which was ignorant as well as amateur, the enterprise was foredoomed to failure; in 1636 the council was composed of nine peers, two Secretaries of State and one baronet, of whom, perhaps, not one had ever seen a fishing buss. The balance sheet of 1636 shows that out of 22,682*l.* 10*s.* promised in subscriptions, only 9914*l.* 10*s.* had been received, and 3550*l.* had been borrowed; the assets were six busses, valued at 6000*l.*, and fish and stores in hand 6120*l.*, while the damage done by the Dunkirkers was assessed at 1166*l.* 14*s.* 10*d.*<sup>56</sup> In presenting the accounts for 1633-5 one of the reasons the council gave for the want of success hitherto was the quarrels between the captain in charge and the fishermen, a very significant admission.<sup>57</sup>

The settlement at Lewis had proved such a source of trouble and loss that in 1637 the council of the Society resolved to abandon it; they decided to confine their operations to the North Sea although their exports were so inferior in quality to those of the Dutch that they could only be sold at a lower price. Still, they flattered themselves that 'the true management thereof is by experience discovered' and were hopeful when Charles came to the rescue again with promises of aid and additional privileges. But subscribers were backward in throwing away more money so that in 1638 an Order in Council was required to enforce payment from them of the amounts for which they had rendered themselves responsible. Defaulters, therefore, were brought before the Privy Council and the Society was assisted with the gift of a captured Dunkirker valued at £800.<sup>58</sup> The position

<sup>56</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* cccxiii. 16.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* dxxxvi. 38.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.* cccxcviii. 26; cccc. 116.

of the Society became still less encouraging; between 1633 and 1637 they had received, in various ways, 16,975*l.* and had lost 21,070*l.*<sup>59</sup> During 1638 the Dunkirkers took vessels and fish to the value of £2500. In March 1639 Charles ordered Northumberland, the Lord Admiral, to retaliate by capturing Dunkirkers, an order more easily given by the King than carried out by the dull-sailing English ships,<sup>60</sup> and at the same time the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports was directed to seize any ships and goods in those ports belonging to Dunkirk owners. This last order led to protest on the part of the customs' officers at Dover, who showed how it might dislocate English trade and cause severe loss to innocent English merchants.<sup>61</sup>

Monson had not been one of the first subscribers but he had joined subsequently and was still liable for 100*l.* which may or may not have been the original amount; he was now one of the defaulters against whom the Order in Council was directed. In 1639 the position of the Society was no better and Charles ordered an inquiry into its management, what measures could be taken for its support, and whether it would not be advisable to forbid the export of lampreys, which the Dutch required for bait and without which, it was supposed, they could not continue their cod and ling fishery.<sup>62</sup>

In 1640 the Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, the President, reported that the whole of the capital had really been lost during the first two years by reason of the dishonesty and ignorance of the people employed at Lewis, that few of the associates had kept up their subscriptions, and that 5000*l.* had been lost through the captures made by the Dunkirkers. In 1639 the sum of

<sup>59</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* cclxxxii. 20; cccxcv. 100.

<sup>60</sup> Northumberland must have given a similar order on his own account in 1638, because on November 1 Penington directed the captain of the *First Whelp* to seize all Dunkirk ships in reprisal for "certain fishing busses belonging to the Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, captured by Dunkirkers" (*Lansd. MSS.* 115, f. 271).

<sup>61</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* cccxcv. 23, 31.


<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* cccxxix. 48; *Fædera*, xx. 346.

£2440 of the first year's subscription was still owing and the Society's creditors were petitioning the Privy Council to interfere on their behalf; as four more busses had been lost to the Dunkirkers during the year the prospects of any creditors must have become still worse.<sup>63</sup> Lord Pembroke now begged permission to establish 'a standing lottery' and, through that resource, had no doubt of future success.<sup>64</sup> This was granted.

As Charles became more deeply involved in domestic troubles he could give no further assistance to a pseudo-commercial undertaking which had never been anything but the fashion of the moment and had been kept alive by artificial methods. It lingered on for a few years, but the Civil War was its death warrant, and so ended the first attempt to found a Fishery Company, the project Monson had so much at heart and from which he had hoped and expected so much.

<sup>63</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* ccccxv. 43; ccccxix. 65.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.* ccccxviii. 65; ccccxliv. 68.



## THE SIXTH BOOK.

To the King's Most Excellent Majesty.

THE dedication of books is ancient, usual, and useful, though in these later times they are turned into apologies eloquently expressing the unworthiness of the author and the insufficiency of the matter, modesty carrying with it so shame-faced a countenance against the law of history. For Cicero saith, 'That eloquence is not so much to be respected in writing, as not to publish falsehoods and dissemble truths.'

For me to follow the rules of apology will betoken a great weakness and imbecility, and look as if I had obtained victory over an art I am ignorant in ; for eloquence belongs to scholars, who by their witty pleading will drive every circumstance to a consequence. Silence were better in my case than speech, were it not I am to speak of things I know, of things needful and necessary both for your Sacred Majesty and your whole commonwealth.

I need not reiterate what the ensuing narration imports. I only and humbly crave leave of your Majesty that my defects may not blemish the worthiness of the work now in hand, no more than a homely painter that takes upon him the draught of a fair face. The benefit of my labour will be to your Majesty an immortal honour and

glory, to your kingdoms an everlasting praise and profit, and to your faithful subjects an essential proof of happiness.

All in one must applaud your Sacred Majesty for achieving this work, which never any of your famous progenitors had in agitation. So that we may truly judge that from the beginning (by God's providence) it was reserved for King Charles to make your name, your fame, your fortune, and all other blessings, equal with your progenitors Charles's, and especially Charlemagne, from whom your Majesty is lineally descended. And as that Charles worthily deserved the title of Great, so I doubt not but the same God will pour the same greatness and happiness upon your Majesty, that our hemisphere may enjoy as great a renown by you as other lands have done by those from whom you are descended.

If your Majesty would have been swayed by pretended policy of State, by solicitation, by affection, or other enticements, and left the common utility of your subjects, this work had lain still like a child in his swaddling-clouts, without care of nursing it ; but your Majesty's virtue appears herein, and we, your loyal subjects, cannot honour you enough for it. And if we should speak all the truth of your Sacred Majesty, it were to say far more than we do of your most excellent virtue and goodness. But, for want of parts otherwise to express me, my office shall be to pray for your Majesty's long life, for your victorious achievements, the confusion of your enemies, and that all men's hearts may be as sensible of your Majesty's good as the meanest of your subjects,

W. M.

To all such Gentlemen, and others, that have had the reading of my former Discourses concerning the Sea.

I HAVE annexed this relation of fishing to my former treatises of the sea, which you have done me the honour to peruse. I confess it had been more proper to have inserted it at the beginning of these books than at the latter end, for these reasons: the dedication would have required it as being humbly presented to his Majesty's protection; the subject would have challenged it, as a ground and foundation of the increase of ships, navigation, and traffic; England would have stood upon it in right, as a work of greatest consequence, goodness, and renown, due only to her.\*

But being thus in a consultation herein with myself what to do I considered and concluded that the first view of a book either gave delight or disgust to the judicious reader, and if I should have presented you with this rude and laborious fishing as the first dish of my banquet it would have disheartened your farther proceedings. And therefore I chose rather to please your palate and taste with strange occurrences and accidents at sea, as most delicate meats to keep you from surfeiting.

There are two parts to be played in the scope

\* 'To him' in MS.

of my discourse ; the one by you, which is the speculative part, out of curiosity to inform yourselves of the secrets and practice of the sea, not intending to make profession or profit by it ; but like to a student in alchemy who covets to know the depth of the art but not to spend a penny in the practice, or design to compass it. The second part is only proper to those that mean to make themselves apprentices to the sea and the art of navigation, to enlighten their future knowledge and understanding. But this is not attained to by ease or sloth but by practice and pains ; not by imagining and reading but by peril, travel, and toil ; not by youth and carelessness but by years and stayedness. For though Alexander the Great was but twenty years of age when he began his conquest, yet none of his captains were under sixty, and though Demosthenes was the most famous of all philosophers for eloquence yet at first he was but a scholar and taught by Plato.


There are many things contained in the former several books which cannot be accounted within your element. I commend therefore such things to your idle hours, as give delight and recreation to your wasteful and consuming time, when leisure admits no matter of moment to think on, like the sport of young whelps, that are to be used for pleasure when one has nothing else to do or for want of other company.

The reading of these discourses is not worthy the name of study for they handle no serious thing, either of history or learning, but are to be esteemed for curiosity sake, as Romulus did carvers of stone, or Caius Cæsar goldsmiths, or Vespasian painters.

Your wisdom knows better how to apply yourselves to the reading and making choice and



use of what is comprehended in the former discourses than I can either advise or instruct. And (for a farewell) I wish you as much happiness as one friend can do to another; that is, content to your mind, honour to your deserts, wealth to your will, and blessing from God to your heart's desire. All happiness of this world is comprehended in these few words, and they are made the subjects for the eloquence of tongues to amplify upon. For it is matter that makes a good orator, though I confess form adds somewhat to it, both which I am ignorant in, and so rest your devoted servant with the kiss of your hands.



## BOOK VI.

*The last Book, which treats of a fishery to be set up on the Coasts of England, Scotland, and Ireland, with the Benefit that will accrue by it to all his Majesty's Three Kingdoms. With many other things concerning Fish, Fishing, and Matters of that Nature.*

- A Discovery of the Hollanders' Trades, and their circumventing us therein; and the Means how to reduce the Fishing into our hands, as of Right due to us. With the Profit, Honour, and Security that will redound to his Majesty, and all his Subjects within his three Kingdoms.

No man is so void of reason as not to know that he is born for the service of God, his prince and country. God requires it for our own good; a prince out of duty derived from the commandment of God; and our country by the law of nature, next to our parents. God directs us by his written word how to serve him, a prince by his human laws how to serve and obey him, and our country, by instinct of nature, how to serve and reverence her. The city of Paris had

a saying of old, 'One God, one King, one faith, and one law.' These four words are effectual, and as much as can be comprehended in our service to God, prince, and country. Cicero saith, 'That take away the piety towards God and you take away all conjunction of human society.'

As most men differ in feature of face, in diet, condition, and education, yet all good men agree in an unity of the service of God, prince, and country, in their several degrees and qualities; the divine with prayer, the soldier with arms, wise men with counsel, and rich men with treasure. These being done willingly, makes a sweet harmony betwixt King and commonwealth; for that prince is happy that has young men to take pains, and old men to counsel. The one supports the other in convenient time, like fruit that all comes not together nor ends together; some teaching and others obeying.

The next consideration is, how to make the people subsist in the service of God, prince, and country. For there must be a rational means to work by, seeing monarchy cannot be upheld and supported without people employed and set to work in their several labours, and therefore considering God has created man for the service of Him, his prince, and country, every one is bound to endeavour himself to the service of them, and to prefer them before all private respects. Let me follow that maxim, as the meanest of many thousands of other subjects, and offer my mite, as the first fruit of my harvest; not like the divine, the soldier, the wise, or the rich man I speak of, but with my poor talent God has endued me with, which is my experience, that could not have been compassed if God had not given me a longer life than many others and

if with that life he had not marvellously defended me from dangers of enemy, the sword, water, and many other casualties incident to mankind. If with those days and years he had not given me a desire and means to observe, confer, and be inquisitive, I had not been able to have presented this my desire to serve my King and country, but should have gone as naked out of the world as I came into it.

My meaning is not to leave our fruitful soil untilled, or seas unfrequented, our islands unpeopled, or seek remote and strange countries uninhabited, and uncivil Indians untamed, where nothing appears to us but earth, wood, and water at our first arrival. For all other hopes must depend on our labours and costly expenses, on the adventure of the sea, on the honesty of undertakers, and all these at last produce nothing but tobacco, a new-invented needless weed, as too much use and custom makes it apparent.

In what I propound I will not direct you to the eloquence of books to persuade, to the inventing wits to entice, to the affecting traveller to encourage, nor to any man that with fair words may abuse you ; you shall know as much as I can say in casting a line and hook into the sea. His Majesty doth justly challenge his own ; and by example of one line and net you may conjecture by multiplication the profit that will arise by the work. You shall be made to know that though you be born in an island seated in the ocean, frequented with invisible fish swimming from one shore to the other, yet your experience has not taught you the benefits and blessings arising from that fish. I doubt not but to give you that light therein, that you shall confess yourselves blinded and be willing to blow from you the

foul mist that has been an impediment to your sight. You shall be awakened from your drowsy sleep and rouse yourselves to further this best business that was ever presented to England, or King thereof, nay, I will be bold to say, to any State in the world. I will not except the discovery of the West Indies by Columbus, an act of greatest renown, of greatest profit, and that has been of greatest consequence to the Spanish nation.

You will wonder, being born a subject of England and casting your eyes upon the gainful soil of the land, that you never conceived what the sea afforded. I confess it were impossible for you to live in that ignorance if it did not appear by the ensuing discourse how you, your country, and especially the princes of these realms, have been abused and the profit thereof concealed.

*The Comparison betwixt the West India Trade and our Fishing.*

To make my comparison good betwixt the trade of the West Indies and our fishing, which of them yields most honour to their King and most profit to their country, and least labour to the subjects, I refer to my collected reasons.

If men consider the divine work of God and the end of his working, it is marvellous to behold that America, being a continent and equal to all the rest of the world in bigness, should be concealed from the creation till one thousand four hundred and ninety odd years after the birth of Christ, and not so much as imagined, though some philosophers seemed to rove at it.

And when it pleased his Divine Majesty to cast

that blessing upon Europe, if we consider the time he did it and the occasion why he did it, it will put us into admiration and acknowledgement of the power of Christ, against the opinion of Jews and Turks. For could he shew himself a more just and loving God than in pouring upon Christendom such a blessing of wealth at the time it was likely to be swallowed up by barbarous Turks and Moors, who were only withstood by the wealth of the Indies? We may hope the same God has the same happiness in store for this kingdom, to add immortal glory to his Majesty's goodness. Or else it was impossible, in human reason, that our loving neighbours, the industrious Hollanders, should for so many years enjoy this fishing, who, to their everlasting honour and praise, have increased thereby more vessels for the sea than all Europe besides can muster.

The first discovery of the Indies gave no great hope of profit at the beginning, till after a long, chargeable, and painful navigation it was brought to perfection.

The fishing upon his Majesty's coasts of England, Scotland, and Ireland needs no discovery, the experience of our neighbours having found it out and practised it since the year 1397, to their unmeasurable wealth and our shame. And for the honour of him that first found out the secret of pickling of herrings, which was one William Beukelsen by name, there was a famous tomb in the island of Biervliet \* erected, yet to be seen, where he was buried.

\* Biervliet, a short distance above Flushing, on the left bank of the Scheldt, was possibly an island in 1386 when Beukelsen introduced his method. He died in 1397. It has been said (W. M. Adams, *Fisheries and Fishermen of all*

The Indies send forth more gold, silver, and other merchandize than all the European trades besides. The fishing produces more riches by its trade than the others do, as I will make appear when I come to compute the one with the other.

The wealth of the Indies is not brought from thence without great expense and hazard, considering the casualties of the sea and the fear of enemies to intercept it. The fishing is still in view of us and our shores, our vessels daily expected into our harbours, and others ready to ease them of their burden and to transport it into other countries, not far remote, where they are in no danger of hurricanes, enemies, or other perils. The assurance in going and coming from the Indies may be valued at a great rate, which we shall have in our fishing, there being no fear or hazard in it.

The wealth of the Indies being surprised by an enemy is more prejudicial to the King of Spain than four times that wealth would profit him, his enemy being made strong and rich and he weakened and impoverished by it. No such accident can prejudice us, for in the miscarrying of our fishermen we shall only lose so many barks, salt, and nets, and no enemy enriched or fortified by it.

The inhabiting in the Indies causes a scarcity of natural Spaniards, whereby many times the

*Countries*, Lond. 1883, p. 37) that Beukelsen was an Englishman named Belkinson.

Beukelsen's system was no doubt an improvement and not a discovery. Some form of pickling must be very old. It is related that, at the battle of Swold Bay, A.D. 1000, when Olaf Tryggvason saw the Swedish contingent of the allied fleet bearing down upon him, he remarked that the Swedes would be better occupied 'at home pickling fish.'



King's affairs fail and perish. The fishing employs all our loose people, which abound in this kingdom, and makes them capable to serve their prince and country.

The Indies set to work four times more ships than all the rest of the dominions of Spain, and add more strength to them by sea. The fishing will maintain twenty vessels to one of theirs, and England furnish them with most of the materials belonging to them, whereas in Spain they are brought, in time of war, with great peril and danger of the enemy.

The Indies are far remote from Spain to be supplied if there happen changes in any part thereof which other nations may take notice and advantage of. The fishing is one body, governed by a company, that no enemy can annoy. And if questions arise betwixt parties they are speedily to be determined without charge or detriment to either ; whereas the others have their appeals to their courts of justice in Spain from the Indies.

The chief commodity of the Indies is bullion, hides, cochineal, &c. Our only fish doth counter-vail the value of them all ; and though for the present it affords no bullion in specie, yet it draws the money coined out of that bullion. The ships that trade to the Indies are great in burthen, and make but one return or voyage in a year. And when they are careened, the waters in Spain not heightening enough to ground them, it is done with far greater labour and charge than ours, that are brought on ground one tide and hauled off another, ready for a new voyage and never wanting freight. But what I have observed is not to be effected with words, but works ; not with talking, but doing and acting.

For betwixt words and deeds there is great difference ; words without effect are like water that drowns people and does itself no good.

The property of a merchant is to have money in his purse, and credit upon the bourse to advance his trade.

All men in this work must become merchants, not only for themselves but for their prince and country. All are to reap profit by it, none pain or sorrow but the slothful, idle, and base people, who are like drones amongst bees, for the purchase of sloth is dispraise. There are three things necessary in every work ; the man that works, the instrument to work with, and the matter. There is nothing required of the men in our work but labour and pains ; the instruments to work with are ships of several kinds to be made and erected ; and the matter to set on the work is money. All these concurring in one will make it a work of fame, renown, strength, riches, and all the good that God can bestow on a nation and people. But if sluggishness and carelessness, or other mistrust of return of gain prevail, it being out of the element and breeding of gentlemen and others that apply themselves to the profit of the land and not the sea, and that they neglect the offer and proposition following, we are worthy to be chastened with penury and want, and unworthy to live and enjoy the blessing of God, which he has poured on this land above all others he has been pleased to create.

What better light can we have for this work than from our inward and intimate friends the *Hollanders* ? Who, by their long travels, their excessive pains, their ingenious inventions, their incomparable industry and provident care, have

exceeded all other nations in their adventures and commerce, and made all the world familiar with them in trade. Whereby we may justly attribute to them what the Chinese \* assumed to themselves, that only they have two eyes, the Europeans but one, and all the rest of the world none. How can this better appear than out of their labours and our fish only? They have increased the number of vessels; they have supplied the world with food, which otherwise would have found a scarcity; they have advanced trade so abundantly that the wealth of subjects and the customs of princes have found the benefit of it; and lastly, they have thus provided for themselves, and all people of all sorts, though they be impotent and lame, that want employment, or that are forced to seek work for their maintenance.

And because their quantity of fish is not to be vended in their own provinces, but to be dispersed in all parts of Europe, I will give you an account of it as it has been carefully observed and taken out of the customs' books beyond the seas.

*The Quantity of Fish vended in other Countries.*

In four towns within the Sound, viz. Königsberg, Melvin,† Stettin, and Dantzic, there is vended in a year betwixt thirty and forty thousand last of herrings; which will amount to more than six hundred and twenty thousand pounds; and we none. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Liefland,‡ Rie,§ Regel,|| the Narpe,¶ and other towns within the Sound, take off

\* 'Cheneycies' in B. and R.

† Elbing.

‡ Livonia.

§ Riga.

|| Revel.

¶ Narva.

above ten thousand lasts, worth one hundred and seventy thousand pounds. The Hollanders send into Russia above fifteen hundred lasts of herrings, sold at twenty-seven thousand pounds; and we not above thirty or forty lasts. Stade, Hamburg, Bremen, Emden, and upon the river Elbe, in fish and herrings, above six thousand lasts, sold at one hundred thousand pounds; and we none. Cleveland,\* Juliers, up the river Rhine, Frankfort, Cologne, and over all Germany, in fish and herrings near twenty-two thousand lasts, amounting to four hundred and forty thousand pounds; and we none. Guelderland, Artois, Hainault, Brabant, Flanders, and the Archduke's countries, eight or nine thousand lasts, sold at eighteen pounds the last, amounts to one hundred and seventy-one thousand pounds; and we none. At Rouen, in Normandy, five hundred lasts of herrings sold at ten thousand pounds; and we not one hundred lasts. They are commonly sold for twenty, and sometimes thirty pounds a last.

Besides what they spend in Holland, and sell there to other nations, the value of many hundreds of thousands of pounds.

Now having perfected the valuation of the Hollanders' fish, caught on our seas and vended into foreign countries, our shame will manifestly appear that of so many thousands of lasts of fish, and so many hundreds of thousands of pounds in money made by them, we cannot give account of above one hundred and fifty lasts taken and vended by us.

The Hollanders are no less to be commended in the benefit they make of the return of their

\* Cleves.

fish. For what commodity soever any country yields in lieu thereof they transport in their own vessels into Holland, where they have a continual staple of all commodities brought out of the south. And from thence they send into the north and the east countries: the like from thence they do into the south from out of the north, their ships continually going and coming, and bringing inestimable profit, like a weaver's shuttle he casts from one hand to another, ever in action, till his gain appear in the cloth he makes. And if we compare Holland's forecast with ours, the imputation of sloth and negligence will lie heaviest upon us, like him that beats the bush for others to catch the birds. For Russia, with our adventure, charge, and shipwreck was first known to us, that for many years together afforded great profit by the usual trade of eight or ten ships yearly. About twenty years past, the Hollanders encroached upon us with two ships; and in continuance of time they brought us from ten to two or three, and themselves to sixty great vessels, or more, and lately to one hundred; \* the chiefest gain arising out of our fish and other English commodities they fetch from us.

Newfoundland being an ancient patrimony of England, and we the first discoverers thereof immediately after the finding out of the West Indies by Columbus, has been since a great enriching to the western parts with the fish there yearly taken. And now the Hollanders of late have found the way thither, and sent in the year 1620, and ever since, twelve or fourteen great ships, to buy the fish taken by his Majesty's subjects; whereby his Majesty does not only

\* There is no MS. authority for 'and lately to one hundred.'  
V. R

lose his custom in going out, if it be brought for England, but in the return of that commodity, which might amount to fourteen or fifteen thousand pounds, if his Highness's subjects had the carriage of it. To say no more of the Hollanders' greatest trade with England, there are three fishes of little note, and not regarded by us, which they make gain of themselves. The first is lobsters, the greatest part whereof that serves London, at the time of year, they bring from the furthest northern part of England, which is never practised by the English. The second is the great quantity of oysters yearly transported by them into Holland, which causeth the decrease and dearness of oysters among us. The third is lampreys, out of the river of Thames, which they use for bait for cod in the north seas ; and this is the cause of the scarcity and dearness of this fish in London.

*The Hollanders' Navigation into the Straits.*

But the greatest navigation of theirs, and of most importance to their State for maintenance of ships of burthen and strength, is into the Straits, from the port of Marseilles, along the coast as far as Venice. In this trade I will compute but sixty ships of two hundred and fifty tons burthen each, having above as many more trading into Spain, Portugal, and the south part of France, and all with our English fish, taken by his Majesty's subjects ; as, namely, pilchards caught in England and Ireland, bacallaos or Poor John in Newfoundland, and red herrings taken and made at Yarmouth. The Hollanders are almost absolutely masters of these trades ; what by combination made with

the merchants that deal in that kind of fish, and what through the cheapness of the freight in their vessels, which makes them sell the cheaper.

During these eighteen years last past they have so increased their navigation that whereas before they had not above one ship to five of ours within the Straits, within the said eighteen years they are able to shew ten of theirs to one of ours, and merely by the trade of fish. For true it is that there is no commodity in the world of so great bulk and small value, or that can set so many ships of burthen to work. As for example: A mean merchant \* may freight his ship of two hundred and fifty tons with fish that will not cost above one thousand six hundred pounds, that forty merchants cannot do of better and richer commodities. I speak not upon surmise, but what is approved by divers merchants, but especially one of good account whose name I must conceal, unless authorised by him to publish it, who computed sixty ships of these sorts of fish aforesaid. Of the which there is not returned one penny profit into England, where they gather the sweet dew of their food.

The principal work I aim at is how to undertake the Hollanders with our own weapons, and how to equal them with pinks, busses, and other vessels till we be made partners with them in their fishing. Not by hostility or uncivil usage, nor to deprive them by his Majesty's prerogative, which the law of nations allows us; nor out of envy to their labours, or to revenge discourtesies, only we will seek to do what Nature dictates, (*viz.*) to enjoy and make use of our own, by the countenance of our blessed King,

\* A trader of small capital.

that in justice gives all people their right and due.

Holland is enriched by the sixty ships aforesaid, which I have computed, by the carriage of red herrings, as I will after demonstrate, six hundred and twenty-one thousand seven hundred and fifty pounds, in their return out of the Straits.

*The Hollanders fishing in their Pinks, and Busses, that the English may not only equal, but out-do them in it; and the great Benefit it will be to the Nation demonstrated.\**

There needs no repetition of my former relation, for truth has spoke it, which is so glorious of herself that it needs no shade to give it better gloss. In what follows I will demonstrate by the particular proceedings of the Hollanders, in their pinks and busses, what certain gain they yearly raise out of them. And when experience, the mother of knowledge, shall make it apparent to you, I hope you will remember what you are and how easily you may make yourselves and country by it.

I confess this fishing is a business I have long taken into consideration. My Lord of Northampton, if he were now living, were able to witness how much it was solicited and desired by me, and no less wished and desired by his Lordship. I caused one Tobias Gentleman, a mariner by profession, but indeed a man of better parts than ordinary seamen, and much practised in the northern fishing, to dedicate a book to his Lordship which gave particular notice of the

\* In the MSS. this heading ends at 'busses.'



Hollanders' proceedings in their pinks and busses and what we shall do in the imitation of them.\* But by the death of my Lord it rested unthought on by me till the late Duke of Richmond revived it and importuned me once more to it. His death in the like manner made it die, till his Majesty, of late, out of his princely care for the good of his loving subjects, for the renown of his kingdoms, and desire of the unity and equal benefit of his two realms of England and Scotland, took more than an ordinary care how to effect it, well beseeming so blessed and benign a prince. And now I will descend to the particulars of the Hollanders' busses, pinks, yagers, lineboats, and the use of them in their several fishings as well in their taking herrings, as cod, and ling, and the seasons of the year for both.

From the Texel in Holland to Bressa Sound in Shetland, an island belonging to his Majesty's dominions of Scotland, is two hundred thirty and odd leagues, whither there resort the 22d or 23d of June wellnigh two thousand fishing vessels. The twenty-fourth they put to sea, being prohibited till that day, and a penalty upon the breaker thereof, holding the herrings till then unseasonable to salt for their fatness.

Every one of these vessels that day directs its course to find out the shoal of herrings, like a hound that pursues the herd of deer in hunting.

\* Gentleman's pamphlet, called 'England's Way to Win Wealth,' was published in 1614. It has been reprinted more than once and is easily accessible in the third volume of the *Harleian Miscellany*. He was a shipowner and received the bounty in 1600 for building, with his partner Thomas West, two new ships of 200 tons each (*S. P. Dom. Eliz.* 15 Jan. 1599-1600).

When they have laden their busses, which is sooner or later, as they find the store of herrings, they presently return home for Holland, and leave their herrings ashore to be there repacked, and from thence immediately to be sent into the Sound, where they receive them for a great dainty. The busses having thus disburthened themselves in Holland, once more furnished with victuals, cask, and salt they repair to sea to look out the shoal they had formerly left ; and then finding them, and filling them once again, they do as they did before, return to Holland. Nor thus ceasing, the third time they repair to the shoal, as aforesaid. And in their three fishings, computing with the least, they take to the number of one hundred lasts of herrings, which being valued but at ten pounds the last, which is no more than eighteen shillings a barrel, will amount to one thousand pounds sterling each ship.

Many times this fishing fleet is attended with certain vessels called yagers, which carry salt, cask, and victuals to truck with the busses for their herrings, and carry them directly into the Sound, without returning into Holland. For it is a matter of great consequence and gain to bring the first herrings into the Sound, for there they are esteemed as partridges with us at their first coming. But now of late years the Hollanders are prohibited by the State carrying or trucking away their herrings till they first land them in Holland which will prove the more commodious to us.

I will set down the rate of a buss, betwixt thirty and forty lasts \* new from the stocks, with the

\* The last of tonnage was of about two tons.

price of her nets, tackling, salt, victuals, cask, men's wages, and all other charges whatsoever belonging to her. And will rate the profit gained by her four months fishing, which is likely to continue twenty years, being the ordinary life of a buss.

*Imprimis.* A buss, with her furniture and tackling, will cost 500*l.*

*Item.* One hundred lasts of barrels, at 18*s.* the last, 90*l.*

*Item.* For salt, thirty weys,\* at 3*l.* 10*s.* the weigh, 105*l.*

*Item.* For beer for the men four months, a gallon a day to a man, 16*l.*

*Item.* For bread, after the same proportion, 12*l.*

*Item.* For butter, pease, bacon, cheese, billets, 20*l.*

*Item.* For men's wages for four months, 88*l.*

It is to be considered, that men's wages are not to be paid till the voyage be ended ; so that the present disbursement is but 743*l.*

Rating the hundred last of herrings but at 1000*l.* there is gotten clear in four months, 500*l.* in a buss, and 165*l.* in money ; so that the total sum as appears gotten is 665*l.*

Here plainly appears, that there is gotten six hundred and sixty-five pounds in one summer. Whereof, if you deduct one hundred pound for the wear of the buss, and the reparation of her nets against the next summer, yet still there remains five hundred and sixty-five pound, for clear gain by one buss in four months, a profit

\* The wey of salt was of 40 bushels, each containing 56 lb.

exceeding all other trades and a greater profit than can be thought on to be raised other ways.

\* It is to be noted that I have proportioned in this computation a buss of thirty-five lasts, that is to say seventy tons. But I consider with myself that we will make a greater gain with a buss of twenty lasts, which is but forty tons, than the Hollanders do with their seventy tons, in respect of the nearness of our harbours to put in upon all occasions. And after the proportion of our busses we must lessen so much out of the seven hundred and forty-three pounds, which is the first disbursement, as aforesaid.

Now having shewn you the charge of the busses, I will shew you the charge of a pink of twenty lasts, that is forty tons.

A pink being built new, and all things new to her, will not cost two hundred and sixty pounds, with her lines, hooks, and other fishing appurtenances :

	l.
<i>Imprimis.</i> A pink . . . . .	260
<i>Item.</i> Fifteen last of barrels . . . . .	18
<i>Item.</i> Five weys of salt . . . . .	18
<i>Item.</i> Beer, cask, bread, and petty-tally	12
<i>Item.</i> For men's wages for two months	20
Sum is	<u>l 328</u>

Twenty lasts of barrel cod, at fifteen pound the last, amounts to three hundred pounds ; and deducting sixty-eight pounds ten shillings, for

\* Instead of this paragraph B. and R. have :—' The Hollanders do make the gain of their busses so certain that they lay out their children's money, given to them by their deceased friends, in adventuring in them ; and there is also opened in Holland a treasury of orphans laid out in the adventuring as aforesaid.

the fitting her to sea, there remains two hundred and thirty-two pounds clear gain by one pink in two months, rating the cod and ling but as they are sold in England ; but being transported, commonly they will double their price.

I present you not with chimæras \* or turners' toys to please children, or with shadows of untruths for I know truth to be so noble of itself that it makes him honourable that pronounces it, and that an honest man will rather bear witness against friendship than truth. I have made it appear with what facility the Hollanders go through with the golden mine of theirs, which they so term in their proclamation extant. I make proof their busses and pinks are built to take fish, that they fill themselves thrice a summer with fish, that this fish is vended and esteemed as a precious food in all the parts of Europe, and that the return thereof gives them means to live and breathe without which they could not. It is manifest that fish has brought them to a great strength both by land and sea, and fame withal, in maintaining their intestine war against so great and potent an enemy as the King of Spain.

And if all these benefits appear in them, and nothing but shame and scorn in us, let us enter into the cause thereof, and seek to amend it ; let us labour to follow their example which is better than a schoolmaster to teach us. Nothing is our bane but idleness, which engenders ignorance and ignorance error ; all which we may be taxed with. For to a slothful man nothing is so easy but it will prove difficult, if it be not done willingly. There are but two things required in this work ;

\* ' Camerees ' in the MSS.

that is to say a will to undertake it and money to go through with it. Which being found we will place charity to begin at home with ourselves, before we yield it to our neighbours, and then this business will appear to be effected with more benefit, more strength, more renown, more happiness, and less expense, than Hollanders have or can go through withal. Time is the most precious experience; and you shall find that time will cure our carelessness past that reason could not hitherto do.

The instruments by which the Hollanders work are their vessels of several kinds, as I have declared, not produced out of their own country; for it yields nothing to further it but their own pains and labour. Their wood, timber, and planks to build ships, they fetch out of divers other places and yet are these no more available to undertake their fishing and navigation than weapons are without hands to fight. Their iron, hemp, cordage, barrels, boards, bread, and malt they are beholden to for several countries; and if at any time out of displeasure they be prohibited the transportation, they are to seek a new occupation for the State falleth. Comparing their casualties and inconveniencies with ours you shall discern the advantage and benefit God has given us in respect of them. For all the materials formerly repeated, that go to their shipping, England yields most of them, or in little time the earth will be made to produce them in abundance, so that we shall not need to stand upon the courtesy of our neighbours, or to venture the hazard of the sea in fetching them.

Whereas all manner of people, of what degree soever in Holland, have commonly a share, according to their abilities, in this fishing, and

that the only exception amongst ourselves is the want of money to undertake it, you shall understand how God and nature have provided for us. For I will apparently answer the objection of money and cast it upon the sluggishness and ill disposition of our people, who if they will take away the cause of this imputation they shall take away the offence due to it, and by which we are scandalized. In the objection of lack of money to set on foot this work, it would seem ridiculous to strangers that behold the wealth and glory of this kingdom, with the sumptuous buildings, the costly insides of houses, the mass of plate to deck them, the daily hospitality and number of servants to honour their masters, and their charitable alms distributed out of their superfluities. And to descend to people in particular, if they behold the bravery of apparel vainly spent, the rich and curious jewels to adorn their bodies, and the needless expenses yearly wasted, they would conclude that it were not want, but will, that must be our impediment.

But leaving these observations, let me tell you, there is never a lord, knight, gentleman, or yeoman, of any account in England, but for want of money is able to furnish either timber, iron, wheat, malt, beef, pork, bacon, pease, butter, cheese, or home-spun cloth out of their wool.

All which shall be taken from them at an ordinary rate, and the value allowed them in adventure. No man that has or hires land but may as well plant for hemp, to make lines, nets, and cordage, seeing the laws of the kingdom command it, as any other grain. Which hemp may be spun by their neighbours and tenants, and so all people set on work.

Then what need have we of money but for

the building of vessels? For you see with what ease every thing else is compassed.

Before these busses shall direct their course to Shetland, to be there welcomed by the Hollanders in their own houses (a thing not usual for strangers to entertain their true inhabitants) I will first view all harbours and creeks, capable for busses, in his Majesty's kingdoms of England and Scotland, and there lay such provisions for the benefit of our fishing, that it shall appear, if the Hollanders have usually made a thousand pounds in four months by their three fishings, we shall be able to exceed them in the course following:—

I will suppose our busses to be at Bressa Sound, in Shetland, ready the 24th of June to put to sea in pursuit and chase of the herring shoals. I will suppose, likewise, that the one and the other have fished their vessels full, the Hollanders ready in their way to Holland, there to unlade and return again as I have said before. If you compute the distance and loss of time in the four hundred leagues, running backward and forward, then shall you find great difference of gain betwixt us and them; for we shall not need to run many leagues, nor perhaps not ten, till we make our repair into the next harbour where provision shall be made of victuals, salt, and casks. And our busses putting the herrings ashore to be repacked again, with all speed they hasten to sea in pursuit of the shoal; and the herrings being repacked are immediately sent to the Sound to take their first market. All which will be effected before the Hollanders can be at home with their herrings, and after they are arrived in Holland they are to sail very nigh as great a distance to the Sound as we shall be from



England or Scotland. There needs no argument to prove the truth thereof, seeing a sea-card or plat will demonstrate it.

But I may be answered that the yagers, formerly spoken of, which truck with the busses for herrings will sooner be at the Sound than we, and make a great benefit by the first sale of their fish.

But to give you satisfaction herein I pray you conceive our busses are in harbour within the space of three hours after they have fished, and not subject to foul weather to hurt them. They shall have a convenience to mend and dry their nets; they are to unlade their herrings, and to lade their salt, cask, and victuals, without interruption, and to sea again speedily: whereas the yagers must watch their time for fair weather, and a smooth sea, to exchange their salt, victuals, and cask, for herrings. They must watch a fit time and weather to mend any defects in their nets, busses, or in drying them. Thus you may see, all casualties considered, our arrival at the Sound before them is more certain for the reasons before expressed.

But there was never any business so easy or facile but it either found objection or opposition, till made plain and apparent as well to the doubters as the beholders. For most men are guided by opinion rather than by judgement: and so fares it with this hopeful and unanswerable work, where some frame supposed reasons and impediments, but Time will determine their doubts and declare their mistakes.

There are three arguments, but rather errors, that possess people's tongues with the difficulty of our fishing; which I do not mean to convince with bare words, but with infallible truths, for

I had better offend in telling truth than please by feigning falsehoods.

The first objection is the taking our fish with greater charge than the Hollanders, by means whereof they will overwork us. The second, that they would do no less in the vent and sale thereof by their long practice in that trade. The third is the fear of fraud and deceit amongst ourselves, after the example of the East Indies, Virginia, and other companies lately erected.

Truth has no need of a ghostly father to absolve her. Reason shall make her speak to the first objection in taking our fish, with the comparison of Holland.

You must know that the charges belonging to a fishing vessel is her hull, tackling, nets, salt, casks, victuals, the number of men, and their wages. Butter and cheese excepted, there is none of the rest of the materials growing in Holland, and most of them afforded in England, Scotland, or Ireland; by reason whereof England may yield them better cheap than Holland. The several victuals carried to sea are flesh, fish, bread, beer, butter, cheese, and pease, for fish we may value at an equal rate, seeing it costs neither of us more than the taking. And as flesh is more chargeable than the rest, it will cost us nothing, for it is to be considered that a fat beef, in the island of Hebrides, is sold for less than twenty shillings, the hide and tallow whereof in England will give ten shillings, the other ten will be raised in carrying wine, strong waters, and other commodities desired by the people of the country. For every ten shillings so employed doubles the adventure as, namely, in *Aqua Vitæ*; ten shillings bestowed in England will yield more gain than will purchase the carcass of a

cow. For bread, beer, butter, cheese, and pease, England affords them better cheap than Holland: first, in respect they grow in England in greater plenty than in Holland: secondly, they all pay excise in Holland and not in England: and thirdly, no man but knows the difference of feeding betwixt the Hollanders and the English; and that a Hollander eats half as much again as one of our English at sea.\*

Both the one and the other carries an equal proportion of men, and their wages are upon an even rate; but herein we shall over-work them by the reasons following:—

In a buss of fifteen or sixteen men the meanest amongst the Hollanders has twenty shillings a month, and we will ease the charge of wages eight in sixteen in our fishing about the Lewis, *viz.* we will carry but eight men to the place of fishing, where we will hire eight more for less than half the wages we give the rest. And herein shall we save forty-eight pounds a year in every buss, by means whereof we shall go cheaper than the Hollanders nine thousand six hundred pound in our two hundred busses. And, moreover, in the wages and victuals of the eight men we shall leave behind us we shall save so much as will come to sixteen hundred pound.

Whereas it is conceived that the Hollanders will transport their fish at a less charge than we, it will appear otherwise. For the yagers that attend some of their busses to carry their herrings to their first market, as I have said, those herrings of theirs are not repacked but allowed more than two barrels to each last to make up their tale; by means whereof they

\* Cf. *ante*, i. p. 60, note.

pay two barrels freight in every last of herrings more than we that have the shore near us to repack them. Which, in two hundred busses, will amount to five thousand pounds more gain to us than to the Hollanders. Whereas every fishing vessel in Holland contributes to twenty or thirty ships of war to defend them from the Dunkirkers, our peace eases us of that expense. And this shall suffice in answer to the comparison betwixt the Hollanders and us in taking their fish.

And to the second point, to prove that we shall vend our fish at as easy a rate as the Hollanders, thus I say, that your experience must teach you that in the Sound, where the greatest quantity of herrings is uttered as I have before shewed, necessity will compel those countries to take them off. For it is not their affection to the Hollanders above us that will make them refuse ours to accept of theirs ; and then consequently ours will be better sold, in that we shall serve the market before them by the means and reasons aforesaid.

And if we go further from home, as to Spain or the Straits, you must understand that the Hollanders' ships go with fewer men than ours, occasioned by the slight building and tackling of their ships in comparison of us. And as there is twenty or forty men difference in the sailing of them, the like difference there is in the strength of them. Wherefore the merchant had better, for the safety of his goods, give fifty shillings freight to us than thirty shillings to the Hollanders ; his goods shall be better defended against pirates by our forty men than the others twenty. The English ships will double a lee-shore when the others will be forced in foul weather upon the rocks ; the cables and anchors

of the English will hold when the others will be forced to come home and break. The English will be able to put out sail at sea when the others will take in sail. The English, upon some accidents, may come on ground, and by their strength come off again without hurt, when the others will perish. The English go deep in water which makes them wholesome in the sea and carry the merchants' goods with little loss; the Hollanders are laboursome and dangerous in a storm, which causes great leakage in oil, wine, and such commodities, to the great annoyance of the merchant; yea, oftentimes, more than the difference of the freight.

As the English go in greater security than the Hollanders so shall the merchants save by not insuring the value of difference in freight, which I could compute and prove but that it is too tedious. And, moreover, if the English have the absolute carriage of all the fish taken by them, as the laws of the realm doth warrant it, our ships shall never want employment nor have cause to look out for freights, by reason whereof a ship of two hundred tons may go cheaper by two hundred pounds than usually they have done. And thus much for our foreign trades.

Now let us return to the vending our fish in the kingdoms of England and Wales.

If the late proclamation for the observing of fish days be duly kept it will be a means to vend our fish, and encourage others to venture in the fishing.\* So as there be a prohibition, as there is in Holland, that no fish be brought into any of his Majesty's kingdoms but by his own subjects.†

\* Proclamation of 27th January, 1632.

† In 1609 the Dutch taxed foreign fish imported at fifteen shillings a last (*S. P. Dom. Jas. I.*, xlv. 22).

Neither will it seem a thing unreasonable to enjoin every yeoman and farmer within the kingdom to take a barrel of fish for their own spending, considering they save the value thereof in other victuals, and that it is no more than the fisherman will do to them to take off their wheat, malt, butter, and cheese for their food at sea. The farmer by this means shall never be unprovided of fish to observe the days commanded by his Majesty, without sending to the market, as otherwise they would be compelled to do. The farmer will find by experience that it is as cheap a food as any other they can feed upon, and gives a better delight to the taste, considering the several ways in dressing it. The labouring man who works with the farmer takes of him his butter and cheese, for every poor man's case is not to keep a cow; and such labourers will be as willing to take fish from the farmer as any other victuals if he be willing to spare it. There are few farmers but will spend the value of a barrel of fish yearly, and he that does so shall save twenty in the hundred by buying the quantity of a barrel together rather than by retail.

And because the country shall be better served with fish and other commodities than they have been, we will make several staples of salt, coals, and other merchandize desired by the country, where boats may have passage up the rivers not used heretofore; as namely, Middlesex, part of Hertfordshire, Surrey, Buckinghamshire, and Oxfordshire, may be served by the river of Thames. Essex may serve itself, part of Hertfordshire, and part of Suffolk. Norfolk will serve Cambridgeshire, part of Suffolk, Bedfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Northamptonshire; and a staple there made will serve Warwick-

shire, for from thence go their empty carts to fetch coals, which may furnish the shire with little charge. Lincolnshire will furnish itself, Nottinghamshire, part of Rutlandshire, and Derbyshire by the Trent. Yorkshire will furnish itself. Cumberland and Westmoreland will furnish themselves by the east and west sea.

We will leap over the land to the westward, as Cheshire and Lancashire, which will furnish themselves, part of Shropshire, Worcestershire, Staffordshire, and the north part of Wales. That side of the sea will furnish Wales till you come to Severn. The north side thereof will furnish Pembrokeshire, Carmarthenshire, Glamorganshire, and Monmouthshire, and the south part thereof will serve the north side of Cornwall, Devon, and Somerset ; and up the river of Severn will serve Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, part of Shropshire, Worcestershire, and Wiltshire. The south sea of England will furnish Cornwall, Devonshire, Somersetshire, Dorsetshire, Hampshire, and part of Wiltshire, Sussex, Kent, and part of Surrey.

Thus is England and Wales compassed, and a consideration to be had for the meetest place to erect our staples to utter the commodities brought them and to receive from them. If at any time corn fails the countries we will hereafter supply them at a reasonable rate with our trade in Dantzic with herrings. If plenty make it warrantable to transport by the statute we will take it off from them, so as they shall have no just cause to complain either of dearth or abundance. We will provide that no rogues or vagabonds shall be to them annoyance, or the poor of the parish charge them. For all such people shall be set to work by us. Then will

the contributions to the house of correction cease, which will be a more ease to the parishioners than the value of many a barrel of herrings which they shall take off from us.

When our staples shall be erected in the country as aforesaid, out of them we will furnish every parish within the kingdom with hemp by weight to set the people to work, and to receive it again by weight, allowing every one such a rate for their work that they may live well thereby. No girl nor boy of nine years of age, no man nor woman, how lame of their legs soever, but shall be able to get their livings, no person so blind but may live without alms. For, besides the making of nets and such work as belongs to it, we will set up a trade of making of cables and all manner of ropes, as well to vend abroad as furnish the kingdom at home. As also poldavies for sails, and not be beholding to France for them. Whereas there are many yeomen and farmers who have divers sons that put them to great care how to provide for them out of their mean estates, this fishing will take off all such youths, make them capable of getting their livings, and ease their parents of their care and charge.

All these reasons considered, it is apparent that the farmers and people of the inward country, who hitherto have not tasted of these happinesses, and whose passages by water have not been frequented or known, shall reap as great a commodity and profit by this fishing as ourselves, and have no more reason therefore to refuse the taking of our herrings, in the manner aforesaid, than we have to take off the commodities by which they live. And this shall suffice for the second point of vending our fish.



These six several trades following we will erect in all parts of England, not hitherto practised but in some places near the sea side :—

Hempsters,	Ropemakers,
Spinsters,	Weavers of Poldavies, and
Carders,	Netmakers,

besides the increase of coopers, smiths, shipwrights, caulkers, sawyers, sailors, fishermen, biscuitmakers, sailmakers, labourers, and many other trades in great abundance.

In answer to the third allegation of cozenage and deceits amongst ourselves, by example of the East Indies, Virginia, and other trades. I cannot say whether they deserve the imputation of the fraud that is cast upon them, or no, for report is like an echo, heard, but no man knows where. But to give satisfaction as well in the managing our trade, as that truth speaks it, no deceit can creep in at it, as that which follows shall declare : it is not intended (as I conceive) that a select company shall have the disposing of this fishing, as the other has, or to receive, disburse, or employ the moneys raised by the adventurers, or to direct and order things at their pleasure. But contrariwise, for example, whosoever shall be a member in it shall have his choice what to adventure, with whom to adventure, and the manner how to adventure without controlment of any other : as thus, if he undertake for a buss or a ship it shall be in his choice to accept of a partner, two, three, four, or more. And, after the value of their adventure, to erect so many ships as it shall please themselves to nominate, and appoint such persons for the ordering of it as they shall make choice of. So that if deceit

appear it will be among themselves, for no body else shall meddle in their adventure.

But because in all commonwealths there must be a head to govern and execute justice, to which the rest of the body must submit, it is convenient that the supreme commission and authority be given to some of the Lords of his Majesty's honourable Privy Council, and other persons of quality to be chosen, as well in the kingdoms of Scotland and Ireland as in England, to settle a form of government with a judge to rule, and to provide for all mischiefs and inconveniences that may happen betwixt man and man, and prevent the abuses and questions that may arise betwixt merchants, mariners, owners of ships, salters, coopers, and others whom it may concern. But these commissioners are in no wise to handle or meddle with the parties in their adventures, or with their stocks of money, or with the employment of it. Furthermore to stop the mouths of such suspicious conceits of fraud you shall find it is not in the wit of man to overreach them, for the reasons following: the quantity of fish that a buss takes cannot be concealed, for of necessity she must repair to the ports of England or Scotland, where the customers enter every barrel of fish in their books, and none can be transported without a cocket: besides, the number of cask they pay for they must look to have them filled, and likewise the quantity of salt bought, to have it employed. The price, as well of those that are vended at home as transported abroad, is easily known; the usual freight of ships and the factorage is soon guessed at, and therefore no means left for deceit to enter in at.

Now to return once more to the fishing where

we left the busses for that summer, and provide them against the middle of November to repair to the island of Lewis, where, till the beginning of February, they shall take the principal herrings of all others in loughs and harbours as I have formerly declared. Which being done, about the first of March they depart from thence to the island of Rona, betwixt fifteen and sixteen leagues from Lewis, from whence there runs a bank of one hundred miles in length and as far as Teelin Head in Ireland, which bank affords the best quantity of cod and ling of any part of the seas, and this one hundred and odd years not used.

From the 1st of March, as I have said, to the 20th of June, is the time I have assigned to repair to Bressa Sound in Shetland. In which space I make account they will fill their vessels twice or thrice with cod and ling, and leave them in the island of Lewis, there to be fetched by other ships that shall bring salt and all other kind of necessaries which shall be fitting. The 20th of June approaching, the busses are to repair to Bressa Sound, as I have said before, from whence they must prosecute their fishing of herrings, as in the former year, till their arrival at Yarmouth. If then they please to take an account of their year spent it will appear that one buss employed by us, as I have projected it, will be of much more value than to the Hollanders, and be the way to teach us how his Majesty's dominions shall flourish, not for a while but for ever.

At Yarmouth we may account the goodness of the herrings spent. For betwixt Winterton and Orfordness they use to spawn and are called by the Hollanders the ropesick herrings, which they forbear to take.

The nature of the young herring, after it is spawned, is to seek the comfort of the fresh water, and put themselves into the mouth of the Thames or amongst the sands, where the water is not altogether so brackish. But like poor silly creatures they are here entrapped by the stow-nets that use to take the sprats. But for one sprat they take they catch one hundred of these young herrings and bring them to Billingsgate, where they sell them not for above twopence or threepence a peck; which if let alone would by midsummer following grow to be a perfect and big herring, worth twenty-five or thirty shillings a barrel. This mischief must be prevented, and the fishermen enjoined not to go to the westward of Orfordness to take sprats.

From Orfordness the herrings direct their course to the North Foreland in Kent, where they furnish both the English and French shores with so many as are taken by both nations, though they be both shotten and of the worst kind. Their abiding hereabouts is according to the winds. If it hang southerly or westerly they remain the longer; but if easterly they are taken, as it were, with the wind in the poop, which carries them the length of our Channel, till they arrive at the Lands End in Cornwall, from whence they divide themselves like a fleet of ships that should be directed by a general. Some go through St. George's Channel, betwixt England and Ireland; others to the westward of Ireland, till they arrive at the islands of Hebrides or Lewis, the place of rendezvous. And we may suppose they are at home by the strength and goodness they find in that place, for though they run the length of our Channel lean and sick

yet as soon as they repair to those islands they become the largest, the fairest, and the best herrings in the world. And here they are taken in loughs and harbours, as I have said, and valued at forty shillings the last above all others.

Here I will leave them taking their rest and shew another benefit we shall receive by our fishing upon the shoals \* of Shetland, Orkney, and the Hebrides, which the Hollanders have not, nor cannot make use of, in respect they are not subjects of his Majesty.

And because I have pursued the herrings till I left them at the islands of Hebrides, I will begin with those islands, and truly say they are placed for the benefit of fishing above all places in the world. The condition and situation of those islands I refer to the map that will give you light of their seat, their altitude, and their neighbourhood with Scotland and Ireland. But the nature and disposition of the people you shall receive from me, who have seen them and can best speak of them. Of many hundred islands belonging to these kingdoms of Scotland and Ireland, I must say the Hebrides exceed the rest in fertility of soil. Lewis yields, without the labour of people, which they are not guilty of, all manner of grain, cattle, fish, and fowl. And although their fire be not of wood or coals, which we esteem the best fuel, yet it hath plenty of peat so that they have little cause to fear cold. There is an old saying, which may be well applied to those islands and the inhabitants of them, that they have a good land and are ill people for, to speak the truth, the Christian world cannot shew

\* B. and R. read 'shores.'

a more barbarous, more bloody, and more untamed generation. But his Majesty, being lately informed of their breeding, and uncivil living, is graciously pleased to reduce them to the knowledge of God and the acknowledgement of him, which hitherto they are ignorant in. This being done, and the islands being furnished as is intended, I will make it appear that the seas about them and the loughs and harbours within them, will yield more commodity to the subjects of his Majesty's three kingdoms than any other trades whatsoever, either near home or far abroad.

Now I will stand over for the islands of Orkney and Shetland, which have no need of other description than that it is pity so good and civil people should inhabit no better a country. We may say the contrary of them that we said of the islands of Hebrides that it was a good land but evil people ; these are good people but possess an evil soil. The way to relieve them is humbly to entreat his Majesty to be pleased to accept of his revenue in Orkney and Shetland in fish, to encourage the people of those islands to undertake and practise the use of fishing, which, through poverty and the want of trade, they are not now able to go through with. Besides the rent to his Majesty in fish, whatsoever fish they shall take by their own labours we will take off from them, and supply them with salt, nets, hooks, boats, and what else they shall stand in need of. By means whereof, every man in those islands shall be able to subsist and maintain himself, that now knows not how to get his living, but is brought up in sloth and idleness. This is the only way to bring them to civility, wealth, and strength to defend themselves against an enemy.

*What is requisite for the Planting of the Island of Lewis, and other Islands adjacent.*

1. It is fit his Majesty call in the grant lately made by the Earl of Seaforth to the Hollanders for inhabiting of the said islands, who take them purposely to erect a fishing upon that coast whereby to defeat his Majesty's subjects of that benefit.

2. That his Majesty grant liberty and privileges to his subjects of England and Scotland, there to erect and inhabit towns, villages, storehouses, and all manner of manufactures and trades, that hereafter we shall not need to supply those islands but find all things established to our hands, as in all other places of Europe where trades are upheld and maintained.

3. That his Majesty do institute a governor there, to be resident for the space of three years, and not exceed that time, lest in longer continuance abuses creep in through the avarice of governors.

4. That in every island there be erected one principal town above the rest, and a citadel in it to keep the people in obedience. For the inhabitants of those islands are naturally inclined to incivility, treachery, and liberty, which are next neighbours to rebellion.

5. That every child be taught the English or Scotch language, and that their education be according to their abilities of body and disposition of mind, or as the estate of their parents are able to maintain them, some in learning, some in manuring and husbanding of grounds, but the most part in fishing and sea-affairs, having so convenient a seat for the same.

6. That the natural inhabitants of those islands have no correspondence with the Hollanders

upon the main continent more than is needful, considering the danger that may ensue by their too great friendship, who are naturally the most dangerous and worst people of all his Majesty's dominions. And that there be special care that they marry one with another in the island, or with English or Scotch. And in any case to prohibit all marriages between the Hollanders and the islanders aforesaid.

I have annexed hereunto what I think fit to be put in present execution for planting the islands of Hebrides, which, being done, all the good formerly expressed will follow. Besides, there are other things, which I forbear to touch, as matters not fit for me to handle.

I have brought my intention to an end and laid open the mischief our State has long suffered by resigning, at least conniving, at the Hollanders' fishing, who have made long use of it. I have made it appear how easy it is for us to enjoy, or to be restored to, what we have lost, and the profit all kind of people shall reap by it if will and money be not wanting. I have made it plain to as many as desire to know the truth that the increase of ships in Europe is occasioned by the taking and transporting our fish, that nine thousand Holland vessels are kept by it and all their people daily set to work, insomuch that I dare boldly say if the food of fish were prohibited to all sorts of Christians, and duly observed, it would lessen the number of shipping three parts in five. And therefore, seeing our fish is able to make us happy, and this narration lays down the way how to attain to that happiness, let neither excuses, calumnation, false pretences, or affection to the Hollanders, divert us from it, as



it did in the year 1609, when by proclamation the Hollanders were to resort to London for licence to fish on the coast of England, and to Edinburgh for the like in Scotland, and yet neither of them both was performed nor the contempt questioned.\*

Two hundred usurers, with willing minds and forward purses, are able to master this work, but I fear the Devil, whose friendship is not to advise them, but to deceive them, will not allow a gain so well gotten. The excessive practice of usury is the decay of commonwealths, repugnant to all humanity, charity, and natural benevolence, and a slavery to those that desire to live poor to die rich. But, to speak the truth, it is pity that a work of so great goodness and gain should be tainted by men of so penurious a condition, who are neither good nor evil by the disposition of another, but by their own perverse will and nature. God, I fear, will bless our endeavours the worse for them; they are like trees that carry no blossoms in the spring and therefore no hope of any fruit at the fall. This work is unspotted, and pity it should be defiled with the sin of avarice. His Majesty's greatness and glory will appear by it, for nothing can be to a prince more royal than to make the state of his kingdom better than he found it; or to make evil and slothful servants profitable to the commonwealth.

This shall suffice for so much as concerns our manner of fishing, our commodity arising by fishing, and the use other nations make of our fish, which I have divulged to many of my intimate friends. And now shall follow other matters, still concerning the subject of fishing, and the first shall be touching salt and cask.

\* Proclamation of 6th May 1609; renewed by a similar proclamation of 10th May 1636.

*Concerning Salt and Cask.*

The next necessary thing we can endeavour and labour to advance our fishing by, without being beholden to other nations, is salt and cask. For in my former narration I have shewed that most of the materials belonging to our fishing may be found in England, except salt, pitch, and tar, and to take fish, without salt to save it, is like choice of meats and no cook or others to dress it, for both putrify without present help. Such salts as are for the use of fishing are of divers kinds and strength, some too hot and strong, others too weak and faint. And therefore if a mean betwixt both could be invented, and made within his Majesty's dominions, we might esteem it a great jewel and next in value to the philosopher's stone, and the finder out of the secret to deserve as great honour of his country as William Beukelsen, who was the first deviser of packing of herrings amongst the Flemings, as in my former relation I have declared.

There are many, as I am informed, at this day who make trial to attain to the art and secret of making salt; I mean with the convenient strength for the salting and pickling of fish. I do not speak of the making of our white salt, long practised in England and Scotland, for that kind of salt of itself is not for this use, and yet not bad if, according to the quantity, it be mixed with the stronger salt. For it makes a fish the whiter and better to the eye for sale. Those that undertake this work and invention of adding strength to salt, above our ordinary white salt, must have a care of the place they choose to make it in. First, for the convenience of the

taking it off by fishermen when it is made; secondly, such a place where the salt water hath no mixture with freshes or sands; and thirdly, where they shall find plenty of fuel for their purpose.

The first practice that was made of it was in the Isle of Wight, a place, in my opinion, ill chosen by the projectors. First, for uttering of their salt if they had brought it to perfection, for the greatest quantity they could vend is at Yarmouth, in Norfolk, and the coast towns thereabouts to the northermost part of all Scotland, which was almost as great a voyage as to bring it from the coast of Brittany where it is made. Neither had the west country any advantage in the transportation, for that all the ports of Dartmouth, Plymouth, and all parts of Severn, which only use the fishing of Ireland and Newfoundland, shall be easier and more conveniently served out of Brittany with salt than from the Isle of Wight. Southampton and Portsmouth alone would receive benefit, by reason of their nearness, and that not considerable in respect of the little fishing they use.

The Isle of Wight was a place as ill chosen in respect of the brackishness of the sea and scarcity of fuel in comparison of the northern parts, that can be supplied with coals at an easier rate. And for proof of the freshness of the sea, in comparison of other seas, these are my reasons:—where two lands make a strait so small as betwixt England and France, and both the kingdoms send forth many fresh rivers which fall into the sea, the sea cannot have such force of strength or saltness as the northern coast has, where the ocean comes pouring in upon them.

We see by experience in Holland that the

salt they make is not with the water that comes near those towns where they make it, though a man that knew not the contrary would sensibly think it had sufficient saltness for that purpose. But they find it otherwise, and have ships purposely made to fill themselves with the salt water off at sea and not near the land. And if the Hollanders make so great a profit as they do by their salt, imagine what we shall make of it when we have obtained the use of making it, considering our water by proof is salter nearer hand, and our coals at a far cheaper rate if our works be set up at Yarmouth, Lynn, Boston, Hull, Tinmouth, the Holy Island, and all the parts of Scotland. In which harbours our fishermen either dwell or will resort thither daily for salt.

Therefore, I conclude, if the perfection of the work may be brought to pass either in making salt of sufficient strength, out of invention, or if not, in imitation of the Hollanders to make salt upon salt, the towns aforesaid are the meetest to set up that trade of salt. And the rather because they have now in practice the making of white salt and the other will be the sooner effected by it.

And for such salt as shall be used in the Lewis, there is no place lies more convenient for the making of salt of any kind than in that island, the sea having an extraordinary saltness and the country affording so great plenty of fuel. The English and Scotch fishermen that shall use that fishing shall find as great and as extraordinary profit and gain, by receiving their salt at the island when they shall there arrive, as the freight of their ships will come to. For whereas they use now to bring in their ship the best part of their lading in salt, then finding their salt made

ready to their hands, instead of salt they shall lade themselves with cask and other things wanting for their use.

Salt upon salt is made out of the strength of salt that cometh out of other countries. France sends out the greatest part of salt ; and, according to its strength, the salt it makes is of less virtue and operation and the more of it is spent in the salting of fish. The Portuguese and Spanish salt is the stronger in substance by reason of the sun's power, for according to the heat and force of the sun salt increaseth in strength. To the southward of Spain, and as far as Cape Verde and the island of Mayo, as also westward from thence to Cape de Raz and other places in the West Indies, the salt is far stronger than in Spain by reason of the force of the sun, and it will make double salt to the other.

But whereas it is alleged by some, that know not what belongs to the business, that the going so far as to the places aforesaid for salt will not quit the charge. To answer that objection they must know that if profit arise by this trade it must be in the build and bigness of ships they employ, for I would not advise a ship of less than three hundred tons, but as much bigger as they please, to be sent upon that voyage. And such ships to be provided out of Holland till we get use in building them, for they will sail with two-thirds less men than ours. And moreover it is to be considered that the salt they there fetch costs nothing. For it is there naturally made of the sea water and the sun, and nothing is required but their labour and pains in bringing it aboard.

If we hit of our salt-making in England it will prove a great benefit to us. For the King of  
v. T

France, and the King of Spain, lately finding a necessity for all nations to take of their salt, have laid a gabelle and custom upon it, and thereby increased the price so much that we and all Europe besides find it. For such parts of the west country as border upon the south sea, or upon the river of Severn, either on the English or Welsh shore, I will refer to their consideration whether they will be served out of France, Spain, and the Isle of Mayo, or other places ; or whether they will follow the example of the northern parts in making salt upon salt as I have shewed. If they intend this latter, their country lies very conveniently by the help of coals they shall have from Swansea in Wales.

After this work is settled and brought to perfection I advise that there may be an equal carriage of it, betwixt the buyer and the seller, that they may both live with an indifferent profit and gain, and so to accommodate it that the buyer may be certain of the price ; if not, this inconvenience will follow, that the salt-master will transport the salt beyond sea where it goes at the greatest rate. Like corn-masters, if they were not prohibited by a law, not respecting the good that would redound to their country, so much is their covetous desire of profit. But being bound to serve the kingdom at a certain price, and that we shall find no want or scarcity of it, let them after have liberty to dispose of it for the best benefit ; but, according to the old saying, charity should begin at home. There must be a penalty also upon him that will buy or be furnished with salt, under colour of fishing, and shall notwithstanding transport the same into any parts beyond the seas, or otherwise, for his private gain. As well this abuse,\* as many

others that can be imagined to creep in, must be foreseen and prevented.

According to the strength of our salt you may rate the quantity that goes to the salting barrel of herrings, and so estimate it from one barrel to one hundred last, *viz.* a wey of salt is forty bushels, and every bushel will salt a barrel of herrings, so that twelve bushels will salt a last of herrings, being twelve barrels of thirty-two gallons to a barrel. A last of herrings is two tons after the English account. And if you can bring the salt to the proportion of three pounds ten shillings the wey it were a price indifferent betwixt the buyer and seller. Yea, though you proportion the Spanish salt at a greater price and our white salt at a lesser, yet, if betwixt both it may be rated equal, as I have said, at three pounds ten shillings the wey, it were very well. The same proportion of salt you must use to the cod, *viz.* a bushel of salt to a barrel of cod. And as for ling, it is not to be barrell'd up but to be salted in bulk, which will take up much the less salt.

The next consideration about our fishing, is how to make our provision of cask, as well for herrings as for cod. The greatest quantity which furnishes the Hollanders is brought out of Norway, Sweden, and other parts of the Sound, which they return in their ships after they have made sale of their fish in those parts. The same course we may take, if we be so pleased, or that we cannot return a better freight for our ships. But we have an easier and a nearer way to be supplied with cask, for no country of Europe affords better provision of timber or ash to make them, or more convenience to transport them to what coast soever we shall fish on in his Majesty's

dominions. This benefit we enjoy above the Hollanders, who have not in their country one whole timber tree for this purpose, but are served from abroad as I have formerly said.

All kind of wood that belongs to the building of ships, or other works that have relation to timber, we do and shall find, in a little time, a great want of. For wood is now utterly decayed in England, and begins to be no less in Ireland, if there be not a speedy course taken to redress it and a prohibition against the transporting of it out of Ireland into Holland, which the Hollanders make a continual trade of, not only of timber but also of all other commodities Ireland affords, greatly to the prejudice of the English. And for the better proof thereof they have erected a company in Amsterdam, by the name of the Irish Company. And therefore I would to God his Majesty would take these things into consideration. As also to restrain the felling of timber in England, which is too common by the liberty that is given to widows to fell and sell without impeachment or waste, and to young heirs after they come to possess their father's lands. For the readiest monies they can think on towards their wasteful expenses is a sale of timber, and whilst this is suffered, and no provision for preserving or planting of trees, as the law provides for in that case, what can be imagined will befall England hereafter in succeeding times? For if money, or wealth, decay in a kingdom there may be means by trade to recover it again; if seamen die so long as there are ships and navigation they will soon increase and make their deaths forgotten; but if our timber be consumed and spent it will require the age of three or four generations before it can grow again for use, which



we ought the more to respect because the English timber far exceeds the Irish in lightness and goodness.

Though the carriage of ship-timber be prohibited, and as daily executed, yet there are divers abuses that must be looked to and prevented, as well in this kind of timber as in vent of our own red herrings. The deceits whereof, betwixt the English and the Hollanders, combiners, you shall understand by this that follows. The Hollanders have gotten a late practice, by their inwardness and friendship with some men of Yarmouth (for naturally that town is more inclined to Holland than England as descended from thence), these English dwellers take upon them the building of ships according to the direction of the other, who underhand disburse the money; and the ship being built the English in shew make sale of her to the Hollander when his title in the ship is, perhaps, thirty pounds to colour the deceit. There are many other things to be proved that upon examination would discover many abuses offered both to the King and subjects.

These combiners stop not here but craftily avoid his Majesty's proclamation. For whereas, as I have formerly delivered, the red herring is only made in Yarmouth, and the Hollanders have in a manner the absolute carriage of them into the Straits; and although the State is many times willing to prevent the carriage of them by strangers, yet craftily they use this policy of speedily sending away the herrings in English vessels to Holland as soon as they are made, from whence they immediately ship them for the Straits before our great ships can take them in at Yarmouth. Other times they meet such ships as come from Yarmouth laden with herrings, off

the sands of Yarmouth where they ride, take them in and carry them directly to the Straits many days before ours can be ready at Yarmouth in our great ships. By which advantage of time they get their port and make sale of their herrings long before our arrival there, and sell them at a double price to us at our coming, to an inestimable loss, both to his Majesty's subjects and to his customs as I have said before by the precedent of a ship freighted from Yarmouth to Marseilles. And therefore to avoid this cunning and cozenage, it is fitting his Majesty prohibit the transportation of fish, except in his subjects' bottoms, and a day to be limited for the transportation, that we may be sure to be near our port before the strangers can follow us out of England.\* So shall we be sure to make our market before the strangers can depart England, which will be a great advantage to us.

As this deceit appears in the vent of our red herrings so there is no less an unconscionable course held betwixt the Hollanders and English fishermen that take the pilchards and poor-john, the one in England the other in Newfoundland. For such is the necessity of the poor fishermen that they receive impress of part of their money beforehand to perform strict conditions they are bound to, much to their prejudice and the Hollanders' advantage. Whereas if the English had the absolute carriage of fish they would attain to the secrets of that trade, and deal more reasonably with poor men than the others do.

\* It was prohibited by an Order in Council of 29th September, 1630, but these prohibitions were never systematically enforced, *e.g.* licence to Yarmouth merchants 28th October, 1631, to export 1000 lasts of fish in foreign bottoms (S. P. Dom. Chas. I. ccii. 34).

I have before in this book computed the value of sixty ships, of two hundred and fifty tons each, that the Hollanders gain by the trade of our fish into the Straits, and not one penny thereof returned into England. And for a more authentic proof I desire that merchants may be examined upon the truth thereof, and then you shall find my computation to fall out right. And, for your better satisfaction, I will set down the several ports within the Straits and the number of ships that repair to them, by which it will appear what loss this kingdom has for so many years sustained, and what gain and profit may be made by it if it be reduced into our hands ; besides the strength of ships, the increase of mariners, and fame this nation will reap by it.

*An Estimate of what went before.*

	<i>l.</i>
A ship of two hundred and fifty tons will	
carry, in fish, to the value of . . . }	1,600
Freight for the same, at 5 <i>l.</i> the ton . . .	1,250
Assurance, 5 <i>l.</i> per cent. . . . .	80
Charges at Venice at the least . . .	400
All this is lost by the stranger's carrying	
of it and calculating sixty ships after	621,750
this proportion there is lost the sum of	

Twelve for Venice ; eight with pilchards, four with red herrings.

Four to Ancona ; whereof three with pilchards, one with red herrings.

Six to Civita Vecchia.

Six to Genoa.

Eight to Naples.

Twenty to Leghorn.

Three to Villa Franca.

Forty-six to Marseilles, whereof thirty with dry fish.

In all one hundred and five ships, besides many more smaller for Spain and France; as I have shewed.\*

Here shall follow some indirect dealings of the Hollanders, which I forbore to insert in the former discourse of fishing, and shall be inserted at the end of this book, calling it an addition to my Sixth Book. But I will still prosecute the subject of fish and fishing, and will not cease till I have laid open every coast of the known world whither fish resorts, and shew the benefit that is or may be made of it, as well by the inhabitants as strangers.

*Concerning Fish and Fishing.*

There are two natural foods for man to feed on. The one is flesh, maintained and increased by the fruitfulness of the land and soil of the earth; the other is fish, swimming in the common, spacious, and open sea, which no man can challenge a right to, as to the land they may; and therefore it may be called common.

This fish requires no head, as beasts and cattle do, to overlook them or to keep them in their limits or bounds. No man can set his mark upon them to challenge a property in them. No body that casts a net into the sea can say what belongs to them till it be drawn again. No difficulty or care can be required to nourish it, seeing there is such abundance increased over all the seas and coasts in the world, as experience teaches us. The difficulty in making use of this

\*  $\text{£}3130 \times 60 = \text{£}187,800.$   $\text{£}3130 \times 105 = \text{£}328,650.$   
 $\text{£}187,800 + \text{£}328,650 = \text{£}516,450.$

food is in the taking it, which is done by art, engines, and pains. For, unless the prerogative of princes in some cases and upon some coasts prohibit the sufferance of taking fish, it is as lawful for a beggar as a king to challenge a right to it after it is taken.

The use of fishing and the benefit that arises by it needs no other repetition than in my former declaration.

There now only remains my labour and observation to collect the sorts of fishes every country affords, which are used for present food and which are sent abroad by way of trade. And then I will refer it to consideration what penury Europe, which is the most flourishing part of the world, would be brought to were it not for the endeavours and labours of the poor fishermen. Besides the general fishes of herring and cod taken upon the coasts of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and vended as in the narration aforesaid, there are many excellent fishes upon every maritime shire in England, which are of great sustenance to the inhabitants, and which I forbear to name, but will set down only such fish as is vended abroad, and returns gain and commodity to the kingdom by way of traffic.

As the northern parts of England yield both cod and herring, as aforesaid, so do the western coasts pilchards in such abundance that many times they are not able to save the third part of them for want of salt, as appears in the last wars with France. This fish the Straits take at an exceedingly great rate if they arrive there before Lent; if not they are of little esteem and therefore called by the merchant either gold or dirt. Ireland affords these three kinds of fishes in as great numbers as England; and the herrings and

pilchards exceed ours, which makes them valued above the English in other countries. They have another fish, which frequents not our shores, called the hake, taken in the deeps betwixt England and Ireland, and much prized in Biscay. They have plenty of ray, or thornback, and buckhorn, which is dried skate, and whiting, much desired in Brittany.

The several parts of England have several seasons of fishing, some whereof I have shewed, but will add to it our fishing at the Sowe, a rocky ground a league and more in length, and six leagues south off at sea to Rye. This is the principal place that yields that primest fresh fish that serves London, and the place France did lately encroach upon, under colour of five boats licensed by King James at the request of the French King. But his subjects increased almost to as many scores as boats, till, by order of the State, I reduced it to the allowed proportion as is to be seen in my Second Book.

Upon the coast of Lancashire, the fishing for cod begins at Easter, and continues till Midsummer. For hake, in the deeps as I have said, betwixt Whitsuntide and St. James's-tide. About Padstow, for cod and ling, from Christmas to the middle of Lent; on the north part of Ireland, from Christmas to March.

Englishmen have not the use of barrelling up of cod; and if it be not barrellled it is not vendible in France. Neither can they make haberdine, for if they could, it would be well sold in Spain and Portugal.

Now to the fishing upon the coasts of Holland, France, Flanders, Portugal, Spain, and other countries, where the sea affords fish, but no great use is made thereof more than for present food.

For neither herrings nor cod are there to be found, which are the staple and vendible fish for profit.

The coast of Holland yields the least quantity, and the worst choice of fish of all the rest. And yet fish is there most eaten out of necessity, having so many people that inhabit the country and so little quantity of land for their sustenance. And therefore the greatest store of fish that maintains them is taken upon our seas, and kept alive in well-boats, and brought into Holland where it is vended and sold. The coast of Flanders affords good store of fish for daily food, but the Hollanders, by reason of their unnatural war, impeach the taking it which proves discommodious to the whole western provinces of Flanders.

Coming upon the coast of France, the first town you shall find to entertain you, will be Calais, which in truth exceeds all other places of that kingdom for the present food of fish. Not that they are such fishes as I have named before, either for quality, for quantity taken, or provision to take them, for their boats are only shallops, not above a ton or little more in burthen, unless it be in October when their bigger vessels resort thither to take the last shoal of herring that comes from the northward. And it happened in the year 1610 that fifty sail of those vessels were sunk, and eight hundred people in them, as they were there fishing. If you keep along the shore of France till you arrive at St. Jean de Luz, the furthestmost part thereof, it affords no other fish but for present spending, except at some time of the year that they salt their spare mackerels, which at the time of the year they take.

Biscay is like France in the nature of fish and fishing upon their own coast, but what profit either of them take by their fishing upon the shores

of America I will after shew. Only I must say that Biscay is often visited with monstrous fishes, as whales and grampuses, which none of the rest I have spoken of are, in that abundance that it yields the taker of them more commodity by the oil than the value of other fish. The next in order is Galicia, and Portugal as far as Cape St. Vincent, the southermost promontory of all that coast or of Europe. I will join them in one because they are all one continent and subject to one King. They both afford fish alike in a reasonable quantity, but especially of sardines which we call pilchards. And here they are so excellent above others, and so necessary to the people of Portugal, that the country had better want their East India trade than their fishing for pilchards upon that coast. Doubling the Cape of St. Vincent, you trend east as far as the Straits of Gibraltar. Besides the fish these seas afford to equal the rest of Portugal it is haunted with a fish called tunny, a victual of great use, in that it is pickled up in barrels and serves for sea-store, besides a great quantity that is transported into the Straits. The custom of this fish is worth in value to the Duke of Medina Sidonia thirty thousand pounds sterling a year. The fattest tunny is near Gibraltar.

After you enter the Straits that sea cannot be compared to the others, neither in quantity nor in goodness of fish, though one kind of fish they have which the others have not, which is anchovies, esteemed for a great dainty amongst us because of the rareness of it and coming so far. And yet I think our sprats and young herrings in England might be made to equal them in taste.

In returning out of the Straits we will keep the coast of Barbary westward, as high as Cape



Cantin, in which circuit there is very little fish taken, though no doubt but the sea affords as good fish as upon the Christian shore opposite to it, but that the Moors are no fishermen, nor have provision or harbours for it. The Christians enjoy all these ports except Sallee; so that if the Moors had convenience of fishing, yet the Christians would not have suffered them to peep out of harbour so that they should have reaped no benefit by it.

From Cape Cantin to the southward there are two roads upon the coast of Barbary, Saphée and Santa Cruz, and in the middle betwixt them there is a small island, called Mogador. But no manner of fish in any of those places nor vessels for that purpose. To the southward of Santa Cruz there is plenty of hake taken by the Spaniards who go purposely out of Spain thither to fish. Somewhat I can say hereof, by proof of a bark of mine that was freighted from Seville, and fitted with salt, hooks, and lines, and made a good return of her fish into Spain back again.

To the southward of this place, and as far as Cape Blanco, the hithermost part of Guinea, there is an excellent fishing for porpoise, somewhat like to a great over-grown sea-bream, but much bigger. There are yearly employed out of Spain fifty or sixty vessels, called canteras, upon that fishing only, and if they escape taking at their return they make commonly a good voyage. The only inconvenience is that upon that coast the winds hang continually betwixt the north and the east, so that many times they are forced to run a westerly course as far as the islands of Terceira, which makes the voyage the longer and more dangerous for meeting with the enemies.

From this part of Guinea, to the southermost

place thereof, which is the Cape of Good Hope, the coast is inhabited by negroes, except it be in some few places where the Portuguese have their abode. But the negroes are so ignorant in fishing in boats that they know not what belongs to it, though there is plenty of fish for food if fishing were exercised.

It is an old saying that there is water enough in the sea, but of no use because of the saltness ; and fish sufficient in the ocean but not possible to take it. The greatest store of fish for food is upon coasts, especially islands, where they have space to swim about it, or in shoal water where a line may reach the bottom ; for in the main and large ocean it is impossible to find ground with all the lines you can lengthen. Yet in the hot and southern seas there are these kinds of fishes for food, which swim high, and sometimes appear above the water, *viz.* the dolphin, the bonito, the dorado, and shark ; the last whereof does not spawn but whelps like bitches. She is ravenous, unwholesome, and untoothsome to eat, and so eager upon a bait, or a thing she shall light upon, as I have known them bite a man's leg and thigh away at a bite as he has been swimming. These fishes are taken with harping-irons, sharp iron fishgigs, and hooks made purposely. Besides these fishes, which are good sustenance to long navigations, there are also flying fishes, but never taken but accidentally when they are chased by the dolphin and forced to put themselves to flight. But as soon as their wings or fins grow dry they may by chance light into a ship, for longer than their fins are wet they cannot fly.

There are no islands to the southward, great or small, beginning with the Terceiras, the Canaries, Cape Verde, all the islands of the West Indies,

the Bermudas, St. Helena, &c. but have great store of fish about them. But the least number in all the seas is betwixt the two tropics, where there is no use made of them for want of harbours, want of inhabitants, fear of enemies, and other inconveniences. Such fish as are taken about the island of St. Helena, or the coast of Brazil, the next westerly land to it, have a virtue above all fishes for delicious taste and wholesomeness, in both equal to the best flesh with us.

Having followed and chased the fish as far to the southward as any known land has given light, let me once more return to know what the northern seas and the islands yield in that cold climate and habitation, and we shall find it a greater proportion for the food of man. The fish more naturally desire the cold and northern seas than the hot and southern shores, where the sun has so predominant a power and heat.

And, to begin with the northern parts of Europe, I will arrive at Denmark, Norway and Liefland, whose coasts abound in fish, as well for their own food as for sale abroad. I will call it food to them, for in many places of Norway and Finland it serves for bread to the inhabitants after it is dried in the frost and made stockfish.

Now let us leave these shores and stand over to the islands placed in those northern seas, a great many whereof belong to the Crown of Denmark; as namely Northfare,\* containing thirty in number, Frizeland,† Iceland, and others. And

\* The Faroes, twenty-five in number.

† Frisland was disappearing from maps during the first half of the seventeenth century. A whole library has been written about its identification. It is impossible to say what Monson understood by it—probably, to him, it stood in the same category as the 'others.'

it is a marvellous thing to see with what abundance of fish they are frequented, and what a number of ships resort thither to take them and after to vend them. For, to speak of England alone, there go yearly from the northern and eastern coast one hundred and fifty ships, which employ two thousand five hundred seamen, that upon all occasions are ready to serve their prince and country. All these trades aforesaid are not to be told like new stories, to breed wonders; for time and proof have made them plain ever since those lands have been known to us. But as God gave a new light of a new world by the discovery of America, now daily known and frequented by us of Europe, and whose soil yields benefit to the Christian world, so did that God, that was the maker of the land, shew himself the same God in pouring forth his blessing upon the sea by the riches and increase thereof, wherein England had some honour thereby in the discovery of Newfoundland that since proved most commodious to the commonwealth, and most especially to the western parts thereof by their yearly employment of two hundred sail of ships thither.

The French, the Biscainers, and the Portuguese, were so much encouraged at our discovery of Newfoundland as from that time till this very day they have upheld the trade thereof by the fish they call Bacallaos, and we Poor John.\* But by our continual haunting that coast we have found an inconvenience alike, that the fish grows less, the old store being consumed by our continual fishing. The Biscainers not being contented with

\* Poor John was usually considered to be of worse quality than bacallaos.

this trade, where they found so many neighbours to join with them, went farther to the northward and possessed themselves of a harbour which they named the Grand Bay, where they find, besides their bacallaos, abundance of whales, where they make more advantage by their oil than of the other. The French being desirous to try experiments, as well as the Biscainers, found a fishing ground fifty leagues off to sea from Newfoundland, and called it the Bank, where commonly they make two voyages yearly without resorting ashore to dry their fish, and therefore it is called wet fish. And this I hold one of the best means to maintain their mariners in all France; which, if in time of war we seek to beat them from this fishing, we shall find them but indifferent enemies at sea. The French alone, and no other nation, have continued a footing in these countries, though we have often attempted to do the like and failed. But in the late years of our wars with France, in 1628, we took their port and possessed it some time.

The English have had more absolute trade to Newfoundland, since the year 1585 than ever before. For in that year the war broke out betwixt Spain and us, whereupon the Queen sent certain ships to take such Biscainers and Portuguese as fished there; a service of great consequence, to take away the ships and victuals from our enemies' subjects, and ever since they have abandoned their fishing thereabouts. Out from these men thus taken, and brought for England, came the great sickness that the judges and justices died of at Exeter.\*

Going southward from Newfoundland the

\* This last sentence is not found in MS.

English have had a new plantation, by the favour of the sea, that yields them great store of better and a larger sort of fish than all that coast affordeth. Only it is too thick to dry like that of Newfoundland, and therefore not to be vended in the Straits or the southernmost part of Spain, as in Biscay or Portugal, where it is much esteemed. As you sail from thence farther to the southward, though it be as far as the Straits of Magellan, you shall find all that coast in the nature of the shores of Africa as low as the Cape of Good Hope, both in the condition of the fish and in taking it, and therefore nothing more to be said to that point than I have before expressed. But something I will say of strange fishes found in the West Indies, and the coast of Brazil, not known to us in these parts.

There is a fish in the West Indies called the Malatia, that has a stone in its head the most sovereign remedy for the cholic in the world, which I have often seen proof of. The tortoise is now familiar to us, by our usual navigations into the Indies. They lay very large eggs, and a great quantity together, which are hatched in the sand by the heat and operation of the sun. The young ones as soon as hatched creep into the sea. I will not speak of the Remora that stays and stops a ship in her course under sail, because I have spoken sufficiently of it, treating of the East Indies.

Upon the coast of Brazil these several fishes are of account and name:—the Varania, good meat to eat and as big as any ox; the ox-fish, a fish royal, esteemed above all fishes and healthful to eat, of a good taste either fresh or salt, it eats rather like beef than fish; the Benuperia, like a sturgeon, of a good taste and

wholesome, and abundance of them are taken in the sea with hooks and lines ; the ox-eye is like the tunny, an excellent fish, and looks like the eye of an ox ; the Canury, a royal fish, and much esteemed, for it is fat, wholesome, and of a good taste and it yields good store of butter ; the wild fish, which the Indians call Peckanube, and know where it lies by its snorting ; it is of a good bigness, taste, and much esteemed. All fishes found upon the coast of Portugal are there also in abundance. There are many sword-fishes and whales, betwixt whom there are frequent battles as I have shewed before. The whales upon these southern coasts are more furious and dangerous than in the northern, though the northern be the bigger, but not so nimble with the tail, which is the peril of the whale. For if a boat come ahead of her she cannot do much hurt but in rising from the bottom, as I have shewed before.

There are many venomous fishes upon that coast, as namely, the toad-fish, of no small bigness. Taking it out of the water it snorts, and poison lies in its skin, and whoever eats it with the skin dies. There are two other fishes of the same nature called toad-fishes. The Perachie is like a skate, and whosoever toucheth it has the palsy, or is benumbed. There are the Camaruma, the Amoriatie, the Anicurub, the Irepourungo ; besides many others that are venomous and of the same nature to poison people.

There are many mermaids and strange shell-fishes, as well those that are known to our coast as others unknown.

I have seen a fish very monstrous in the island of Flores, that appears, with its fins about the gills, above the water four or five yards, and its jaws gaping above a yard broad, which puts

the beholders in fear. This kind of fish I never knew nor heard of but in that place.\*

*Something concerning Whales and Fishes of that nature.*

And now another while I will speak of monstrous fishes that are useful and profitable but not to be valued or eaten for food, and these they are: the whale, the grampus, the porpoise, the sea-horse or morse, the seal, &c. All these afford the commodity of oil which is made of them when dead, and the manner to kill them is so commonly known that I need not repeat it. The whale yields, besides her oil, bones which are for divers uses employed in several trades. She yields spermaceti,† the virtue whereof is known to us and is sold by apothecaries. Some are of opinion that the ambergris comes from the whale and is cast ashore where it is found.

Some there are likewise that believe the teeth of the sea-horse are medicinal; but for my part I believe the contrary, and that the only use to be made of them is for hafts of knives and other works that ivory is put to.

The whale and most of the other fishes are as frequent and common in the hot and southern climates as in the cold and northern countries, though we only use the cold, as Greenland, where we kill and make great benefit of them. The European shores have the least number of whales, which I impute to shoal water because the greatest quantity known are about the great Bay of Biscay, from which place we had men to instruct us in

\* The portion 'which puts . . . that place' is not in MS.

† 'Parmy sitte' in B. and R.



our whale fishing when we began it in Greenland. The whales that are found dead amongst us, of which I have had some proof by one or two cast upon my land, come dead ashore by some hurt received at sea. For the nature of the whale, after she is hurt, is to seek the land where she leaves her body to enrich him that has right to her by her coming upon his shore.

Besides the great number of whales that make their habitation in the north seas, and the farther northward the greater store, there are abundance of them upon the coasts of Brazil, the West Indies, and Guinea, which may the better appear by the Indians' conceit, who thought the first ships they saw, when the Spaniards came thither upon the discovery, had been whales. Upon the coast of Brazil there are such abundance that if the Portuguese who dwell there would employ themselves in killing them it would prove a commodious thing. But, I conceive, the reason they put it not in practice is the mass of gain they make by their wood and sugars, holding the other not worth their labour, and having no vent for it but in Portugal.

By this you may perceive the pains and industry of man, and the difference betwixt men and nations, for if the Hollanders were planted in Brazil and had that benefit of the whale the others have, they would, and might very well, with their cheapness of freight, serve Europe with their train oil from thence. For I remember that two ships of Holland went to Saldanha Bay, as far as the Cape of Good Hope, to kill whale, for upon that coast there are abundance, but it happened that one of the two ships was there wrecked, which perhaps might discourage others to farther proceedings upon that voyage. But

if we consider the industry of the Hollanders, and compare it with the sloth of the Portuguese, that the Hollanders went two thousand leagues to lade themselves with train oil when the Portuguese might have done the like at their own home, and rejected it, we must consequently attribute as great praise to the one as blame and sloth to the other.

There are many dangers that may happen, and have happened to ships, by their accidental meeting with whales at sea, some whereof I will mention upon my own knowledge and remembrance. The nature of a whale is, when she receives a hurt, to seek the bottom of the sea and with fury to rise up again and shew herself above water. If in rising she chance to come under the keel of a ship she utterly destroys the ship and the men in her. I remember that being upon the coast of Barbary, and not far from a whale, in 1587, I saw her mount above the water as high as the top of a ship, occasioned, as we conceived, by the sword-fish, who is an enemy to the whale, and upon their encounter cunningly gets under the belly of the whale and with his sword vexeth and forceth her to mount above the water, as I have said. This whale, upon her falling down again into the water, made as great a noise as the report of a cannon.

A whale in a calm betokens foul weather, for there cannot be a truer sign of a storm than whales and porpoises playing upon the water. It happened in the ship in which I was taken prisoner off the Burlings, in 1591, the day seven-night before my taking, in the night-time, the ship gave stem to a whale that lay asleep with her back above the water. The accident was so strange and rare that it amazed the company, who at an

instant gave a shout, thinking the ship had been foundered upon a rock ; but looking overboard they beheld the sea all red with blood, which comforted them, conceiving it to be, as they found it was, a stem upon a whale. In the year 1589, being at the islands Azores with my Lord of Cumberland, after our overthrow at St. Mary, as I have shewed in my First Book and have had more particular occasion to speak of it in my Fifth Book, to bring this for an example of the greatest hazard I ever endured in my life, occasioned by a whale there, as you shall understand. To which place I refer you because I will not be too tedious in this discourse.

In the reign of King James there was a ship of Portsmouth, the owner thereof my good friend Captain Towerson by name, who in her way, in company of other ships, to a fishing in Newfoundland gave stem to a whale as she lay asleep. The ship had all her sails drawing, and a large wind, but for want of the company's good looking out she gave such a blow to the whale that she presently foundered. But by the help of other ships of her company the men were preserved, who otherwise had perished.

Many other accidents of this kind have happened to ships which I need make no repetition of, they are so common. And this shall suffice for the subject of fishing, as well for food as others that yield the commodity of oil.\*

I will speak little of the mermaid because there are diversities of opinions. Some think there are none, others that there are, though there be little doubt thereof for we shall find in the year 1322, in our English chronicles, one taken

\* This paragraph is not found in MS.

in England, another in Holland, and a third in Brittany, for the relation whereof I refer you to the authors aforesaid. There is a tradition to this day in Galicia, one of the kingdoms of Spain, that a mermaid coming out of the sea engendered with a woman ashore and begat on her a child. And to speak of later times I see divers have seen them, who are now alive and can justify it.

There are other strange fishes to be seen on the coast of Norway, besides the monstrous fishes before spoken of in the southern parts of the world. As to the northern, there is a place upon the coast of Norway, sixty-eight degrees in latitude, which produceth a great wonder not only by the strangeness of fishes thereabouts but also by a miraculous and terrible peril that place doth yield more than any other sea in the world yet known to us.

In the country and height aforesaid there is a well called by the name of Neal-stream,\* which well draws the water to it with an indraught and with so great a force, noise, and dread to the hearers, during the time of the flood, which is six hours, that it is to be wondered at above all wonders a man can report. The force and violence of this flood is such that its power reaches two miles about it every way. So that if a ship or vessel happen to be within that compass it draws her into its gulf, where she is presently swallowed up and perishes. The ebb has the contrary effect, which endures the same space of six hours and sets off with the same violence the flood draws to it, insomuch that it will not suffer the heaviest thing that can be thrown overboard to sink. At this ebb the fishermen use to take away many

\* 'Maelstreme' in MSS.

sorts of strangely formed fishes, not seen elsewhere upon any coast whatsoever. Of one I will take special notice, which has been avowed to me by a very sufficient man who saw it ; it is like an eel, and one hundred fathom long, which has sometimes entered a boat on the side and passed through her on the other side. And if it be cut asunder, which a knife may well do, it casts forth the greatest stink in the world and enough to poison a man that smells it.\*

Some are of opinion that the stream passes under the ground through the parts of Norway, and bursts out again at the northernmost part of Finland, where is another Neal-stream, though not so violent or dangerous as this, and where the same kind of fish are taken as in the other aforesaid.

This place is called by some the 'Navel of the sea' ; and some think the ebbs and floods upon all the coasts on this side the equinoctial line are caused out of this miraculous Neal-stream. I set this down but as a conjecture, not to be relied on, for the secret of ebbing and flowing is only known to God, and not to be apprehended by man, and so the philosophers acknowledge.

There are many other dangers appearing upon other coasts but not so terrible and fearful as those of Norway, and for which there may be reasons given, as namely the race of Portland in Dorsetshire, the race of Conquet in Brittany, the race of Lyons in Italy. And I have seen another, not much inferior to the least of these, at the Isle of Palma in the Canaries. That of Portland has been the destruction of many a ship and man, though it may be avoided, either by going within it

\* This passage, 'Of one . . . smells it,' is not found in MS.

towards the land or without it to sea. The ship of war wherein I went the first time to sea, in her return from the coast of Spain,\* where she had made a profitable voyage, taking sundry Spaniards, as her lading would have witnessed, out of a covetousness to gain a league or two, though she might have easily avoided it, put herself into the race, little valuing the danger, and was presently swallowed up in view of her consorts, and neither man nor boy escaped drowning.

The cause of these races that makes the tumbling and turning of the water and streams is the meeting of tides and the foulness and rockiness of the ground, which makes the space of the sea, where this happens, to boil up like a pot upon the fire. There are other places where the tide sets with wonderful force and swiftness, as well upon the ebb as flood, namely Pentland Frith, which divides the whole continent of Britain from the islands of Orkney. I have passed it, and found such admirable tides that I was amazed. I have heard people thereabouts say that the force of that tide is such that if a ship chance to anchor in it, and the cable and anchors hold, the strength of the stream is so violent that she will be swallowed up at an anchor. In the island of Orkney adjoining to it, as also upon the coast of Norway, the tide sets with that force that he who knows not the nature of it will be afraid to approach near the shore. And yet experience tells us that the tide sets with that violence from the land that though a ship had a desire to run ashore the tide will keep her off.

\* The Churchill text adds here 'in her second voyage after.'

The sea produces many other strange things of nature which I forbear to repeat, but the thing I most covet to know is what wonders the sea produces under the North Pole, not yet purposely attempted by any nation. Though the English have approached nearest it since the discovery of the island of Greenland, whither they resort to kill their whales.

Philosophers mention four indraughts in the ocean sea, in the four quarters of the world, from whence many conjecture that as well the flowing of the sea as the blasts of the wind have their original. \*But these being mysteries above my capacity or reading, and nothing tending to the subject of fishing, which at last I have brought to an end, I will draw to a conclusion of my whole Six Books, making account, after a long and tedious navigation, I am at last arrived in a safe and secure port where I have leisure to recollect myself, and think of my errors past in taking so great pains to so little purpose as to write so many lines and leaves of the sea only, few gentlemen delighting in it or making profession of it. But before I end, as in my former navigation I have spoke of the profit of fishing, I will set down the enemy to fishermen and fishing in this that followeth.

There is no action at sea, be it great or small, that brings not with it both charge and danger ; nor no business so easy that it can be done without pains and difficulty. And this subject we are now upon, that is fishing, the only thing that is required in it is labour and pains ; for danger is little to be regarded considering it is not far from home we are to seek our profit, nor our harbours so few but they may be entered for our safeties both day

\* From here to 'making profession of it' is not found in the MSS.

and night by erecting lights. But indeed the greatest danger that may be feared to our fishermen is interruption of pirates, who are the very scum of a commonwealth, and people to be abhorred by all honest and laborious men. It is usual, when these miscreants fail of relief of victuals, and are made desperate by want of it, to place all their hopes of food upon the poor laborious fishermen, who, we may truly say, get their living with more hazard, with more pains, with more cold and watching, than any other trade or people whatsoever. Their labour produces nothing that is ill, but the best help for man, which is food to live on.

Husbandmen and fishermen are the upholders of commonwealths ; all other people live by their labours. They are stewards to provide sustenance to feed on. And yet comparing them together there is great difference betwixt their lives and pains : the husbandman's work is without danger or hazard, and if he be wet he has present help of fire to dry him. He is allowed a bed instead of the other's board to lie on ; his diet is certain, and in a quiet manner, when the others are tossed to and fro without a steadfast standing. If the one be cold he may recover himself with exercise and work ; if the other be cold he is made colder, his labour being in cold water. The one keeps his certain hours for sleep, the other has no certain time to rest but must attend his danger, which he is never free from. Every hour he must be ready to look out for his shoal of fish, and watch his opportunity of weather and tide to take them. The one has pleasure on holidays and is free from labour ; all days are alike to the other, and the Sunday can give no more content or comfort than the rest of the week.



What heart can be so hardened, or pirates so pitiless, as to disturb those harmless and innocent creatures that make pain their pleasure, and their labour their country's plenty, procuring good for it by their own toils. And because such wickedness will never escape unpunished or unrevenge, as these pirates commit upon such harmless people, I will a while digress from the subject I have in hand, and relate a strange and tragical accident that deservedly befell two pirates that were disturbers of the innocent fishing.

*A Story of two Pirates.*

After my return from Ireland, in 1614, where I had been employed to suppress the arrogance and insolence of pirates, and where I punished the conniving that was betwixt those people and the inhabitants of that kingdom, I once again sent a bark for that coast, to be informed how things stood after I left them, and whether the severe course I had taken against them, in doing justice by death upon one of them, wrought better effect than before.

The first harbour my bark arrived in, she met a pirate named Tucker, a seaman bred from his youth, and continual practice made him excellent in his art and profession. He was very glad upon this occasion of meeting my bark to insinuate into my man's acquaintance, thinking thereby it would be a means for him to bewail himself to me and to obtain the thing next to life he desired, which was his pardon, though he departed with the best part of the spoils he had aboard him, which were things of good value. His persuasion prevailed so far with my servant that though his directions

were to view the northern parts of Ireland, where I had lately been, and there to inquire after the behaviour of pirates and the entertainment the country gave them, yet, as I have said, by the importunity of Tucker my man was drawn to give over his employment, and persuaded to return with his letter of submission to me, on whom he wholly cast himself to dispose of, with promise there to stay a certain time to expect my answer. And to sweeten me the more he presented me with a remembrance worth accepting, but that I was always cautious in such cases how to connive at pirates, as in my answer I expressed. I mistrusted, before he could receive my answer, the winds then hanging contrary, he would depart from Ireland ; whereupon I directed divers letters to one effect, and sent them by several ships if they should chance to meet Tucker upon their way in their voyages. But, as I have shewed, the last refuge pirates have for victuals is to feed upon the fishermen ; and Tucker finding that Ireland could not supply him, by the strict course I had formerly taken with the Irish was forced to go to the northward to seek succour of the poor fishermen, a contrary course to the ships that carried my letters. And coming to the north Faroe, there he met with another pirate of the same sort, but far less honest, as it proved. These two consorted together, as thieves use to do in mischief.

The islands of Faroe are dangerous by reason of the great tides, and their setting ; and it happened that Tucker's ship was wrecked upon one of them, in company of his companion, the other pirate, who, seeing it, did not degenerate from his kind, for all spoils were alike to him, friend or foe. Instead of help in that case of distress he played

the part of a hawk over his prey, and had no more pity of him than of a Spaniard, who were most obnoxious to pirates in those days.

To be short, this pirate, who falsely called himself Monnocho, suddenly possessed himself of Tucker's ship, himself, his wealth and company, and used them with that rigorous cruelty as though his action had been lawful, and allowed by authority to punish delinquents and offenders, and rather out of fear than pity he shewed mercy to their lives. But mistrusting if he should detain them in his own ship they might make a party and faction, for the condition of such people is never to be constant or honest longer than their devilish humours hold, therefore to avoid any such tumult Monnocho seized upon an English fisherman, amongst many others he had taken, and put Tucker and his company into her to seek a new fortune ; which you must think was like to thrive if you consider their course of life. And here they parted company like two wolves that should separate themselves to seek their prey, they care not where nor of whom, purposing never to see one another unless the gallows gave them a meeting. Monnocho was a fellow of as base a condition as his present profession made him, being not long before a surgeon's mate in a pinnace serving under me. And now, hovering about those islands, it was his hap to meet a ship of the King of Denmark's, to whom the islands belong. This ship, after a little encounter, apprehended, and knew well what to do with him, so just that nation is to the detestable course of sea-rovers.

Here Monnocho found worse usage than he gave Tucker. For the time was not long before his ship made a return into Denmark, and in as short a while after he tasted deserved death upon

the gallows, where he hung a spectacle for all men to behold.

Now Monnocho is brought to the destiny by right due to him. I will go scour the seas and look if I can spy Tucker, being out of hope to find his ship put to that use for which she was first designed ; I mean fishing.

After Tucker had spent some time at sea, domineering over the poor fishermen, they now tired with the usurping tyranny of the pirates, and being desirous to live by honest labour rather than by evil pains, privately practised, and watching their opportunity effected that they had determined to put in execution, which was suddenly to surprise and seize upon the pirates' persons when they should least suspect it. The attempt proved fortunate unto them, for some they slew and others they hurt, and Tucker they took prisoner and insulted over him as he had immediately done before over them. This lucky accident made the fishermen repair to shore to supply their wants, their provisions being consumed by the pirates ; as also to deliver the men, as delinquents, into the hands of justice, who were after conveyed to the Marshalsea \* where they daily expected the doom of death.

The poor man, Captain Tucker, being hopeless and friendless, sent me word of his misfortunes after his departure from Ireland, bewailing his hard hap and heavy chance not to meet with any of my letters written to him as aforesaid. He shewed that all comfort of life was taken from him, and confessed his offences were above satisfaction ; and that I was the only sheet anchor

\* The Marshalsea was especially the Admiralty Court prison.

he was to rely on, otherwise he was to perish. I confess I was much moved and grieved with his calamity, when I remembered how his penitence appeared in his former letter to me, repenting his misdoings and detesting his kind of life, with a desire of pardon and forgiveness of his offences past.

This complaint came at an unlucky hour, both for him and me, it being in the midst of the time that malice set herself against me. For in few days after I was unjustly committed to the Tower; and yet I thank God by his providence that not an hour before I was imprisoned I had finished and ended his pardon, so that I might say the ending of his trouble was the beginning of my own, but not through his cause or occasion.

Tucker, being set at liberty, was to dispose of himself as he should be guided by grace. And to give some sign of his thankfulness for the favour I did him he resolved not to depart London, what shift soever he made to live, till he had acknowledged his life from me. And though at that time there was a general restraint of all people's resorting to me in the Tower, yet that prohibition was no sooner taken off but Tucker was one of the first that repaired to visit me, with that protestation of thankfulness, and vows of amendment of his life, that he gave me satisfaction it proceeded from his very heart. It joyed me much to see his reformation and I held myself happy for the deed I had done in regaining a lost sheep that had strayed out of the flock.

His credit being lost, which made him unfit for employment, moved pity in me what course to put him into. For no beginner can set up trade without a stock to enable him. And to requite his remembrance of me, by the present

he sent me from Ireland, I returned him the better part of that gift with hearty wishes that good fortune would attend his happy beginning. He was not long determining with himself but immediately took a voyage to Denmark, whither he had often before traded. Arriving there, and having occasion to go about his affairs, it happened that, passing a river, the ferryman of the boat knew him by an infallible token, for not long before the man was taken by Tucker at sea. The fellow had no sooner landed him but speedily he hastened to the magistrate, requiring a warrant for his apprehension, alleging the cause, which was no sooner demanded than granted, all people of that country being so naturally bent to revenge themselves upon offenders in that kind.

Being thus arrested he was carried to prison where he received the rigour of justice, and upon trial, by the accusation of the ferryman, was sentenced to die. The gibbet was erected near joining to that where Monnocho, his former companion, was still hanging for him to behold, which was very odd. For it is not the greatness of the person, nor of the accident, makes a wonder the greater, for all things, be they great or little, are at the disposal of God alone who many times advances the mean and casts down the mighty. And it is worthy of observation how in many cases he gives light to men, to discern his just punishment to some for example of amendment of life to others. And, amongst the rest, this accident of these mean and unlucky pirates is no less strange, if we call to mind God's justice towards them, if you will consider the first progress of their beginning, till death cut them off, as it does all people that commit unnatural crimes. For such men never escape with-

out cruel revenge, for a father of the church saith, 'He ceases to be a man, and becomes a brute beast, that leaves the rules of reason and honesty and gives his mind to mischief and sensuality.'

These two men's cursed courses may be compared with the strange accidents of strange invented stories ; first, in their unexpected meeting in remote islands where they were both strangers ; secondly, that upon their meeting they protested and vowed friendship, though I must say that the agreement of evil men in mischief cannot be called friendship. But call it what you will it did not long continue, for there was a bone cast betwixt them, as it were betwixt two ravenous mastiffs to strive for and the stronger to carry it away. After these two pirates had parted company, the one stood to the northward, the other to the southward, a quite opposite course to one another and where there was never likelihood of meeting more but rather to avoid and eschew each other, their quarrel was so mortal. And yet both of them tasted one fortune alike ; first in their apprehension, and after in their manner of execution. But above all at a place never doubted or feared by them, and where, perhaps, in many ages the like will not happen again, it being out of the roadway for such people to resort to.

This shall suffice for God's justice by example of these two miscreant pirates, and his detestation to their wicked courses against the silly and innocent fishermen, who, we may truly affirm and say, of all other people get their living with the painful sweat of their brows. And we have precedents of no less wonder of God's miraculous working against the covetousness of some that prefer their private gain before God's general

blessing he sends upon them with the abundance of fish. And though I may name many by hearsay I will recite but two examples which I have heard verified by the oaths of divers men where I have been and where these accidents have happened. The one at Tenby in Wales, a place not inferior to any that I know in his Majesty's three kingdoms for situation, air, plenty, and pleasure, which in times past enjoyed a plentiful fishing; the other is the island of the Lewis I have so often treated of.

These two places abounding at several times with an extraordinary quantity of fish, the minister of the one, and the bishop of the other, envying the prosperity of the poor fishermen and being led out of a covetous desire, sought to impose a greater tax by way of tithe than had ever been before paid to their predecessors, which was no sooner questioned but the fish vanished and for a time became strangers to those shores where this happened. And although I will not judge of the cause thereof yet I will say with a father of the church, '*Non est bonum ludere cum sanctis.*'

\* This shall suffice for so much as is contained in my Sixth Book, touching fish and fishing, and the merchantable commodity arising out of it. In which I will compare myself to a merchant that freights his ship with sundry and several commodities and sends them to several ports, thinking by the variety of wares to countervail the charge of the rest. For what commodity is desired in one country is commonly little esteemed in another, as by example of gold,

\* There is no MS. authority for the remainder of this section.



which above all other things is coveted in these parts of the world where we live and nothing accounted of by the Indians where it is produced : hatchets, knives, and glasses, are held gross, base, and of little value by us, and yet esteemed in the highest degree of treasure amongst them ; and so fares it with these Six Books, which are freighted and stuffed with superfluity of needless collections. Some perhaps may be delighted, and take advantage of them, how unworthy soever they may seem of themselves ; for I remember the saying of that matchless and generous gentleman Sir Philip Sidney, that there was no book so bad but had something in it that was commendable.

Whosoever is desirous to be informed in sea affairs and actions in the late wars betwixt Spain and England, will find it in one of my Six Books. Whosoever will seek to avoid errors and oversights by example of that war may learn it. Whosoever shall desire to know how a General ought to carry himself in the government of his fleet will be instructed in it. Whosoever covets to understand how to defend his country, and offend others by sea, shall be taught it. Whosoever is desirous to sail into any of the four quarters of the world, as America, Europe, Asia, and Africa, shall find the sea open and discovered to his hands. Whosoever will delight himself with the passages, troubles, and conquests of the Spaniards and Portuguese, and their enterprises upon new worlds, shall understand it. Whosoever will hear how the Indians were reduced to civility and Christianity, he shall not be ignorant in it. Whosoever will put his hand to further such projects as are contained in the Six Books shall not only see reasons to induce him but shall deserve everlasting praise of his country for his forwardness

in them. Whosoever of Englishmen will live no longer in ignorance of what our seas produce to enrich them shall have it discovered to his hands. Things to be admired at, when they shall remember their former errors.

I will say, with Sir Philip Sidney, if any of these prove profitable, commendable, or delightful, the author is not to be condemned or blamed. For indeed he is like the merchant, spoken of before, that must seek to put off his wares not by words, but worth. And as he refers himself to the buyer, so do I this discourse to the reader, to judge at his pleasure. For things give better counsel to men than men to things, and in recompense for my labour and pains I only crave a favourable construction, howsoever they shall appear in your conceit.

An Addition to the Sixth and last Book  
of Fishing, and the reasons why it was  
divided from the other former discourse.

\* I FORBEAR to annex this addition to the former relation of fishing to avoid giving public offence to the Hollanders; for it is an old saying that truth many times turns a man to ruth; and I see that the present policy of our State is rather to dissemble an injury than to revenge it, though the Hollanders' secret envy is more to be feared than when they declare themselves openly against us. But yet it shall appear that I have not been altogether ignorant of their beginnings and rise but have carefully beheld their proceedings and actions, and can judge of their malicious detractions to us and others, which is the nature of faction that at first it shews itself humble till it mount to the top of ambition. Our eyes and senses make it clearly appear that they and their cunning courses are the immediate causes of the poverty that daily assails our glorious kingdom, as I shall instance some particulars within the land before I engulf myself into the open sea, which are as follows.

\* Instead of this paragraph B. and R. have, 'If gentlemen, and others, neglect the offer and proposition following they were worthy to be whipped with the scourge of foreign nations, and unworthy to live and enjoy the blessings God hath poured upon this land above all others he hath pleased to create. And that this is true our eyes and senses do make plainly appear in our homely neighbours the Hollanders who are the immediate causes,' etc.

What trades and artifices of all kinds do they set up, to the ruin of many a poor Englishman that has lived an apprentice and bondman seven years to attain his art and occupation? What trades are there in which they have not stocks going, or scriveners with money to lend?

What land is to be sold, or mortgage to be had, that they have not the first refusal of? What marriages of man or woman falls amongst them that they will enrich the English with so long as any of their country or tribe is found amongst them? What maritime town, or other of account within twenty miles of the sea, opposite to Holland, that is not stuffed and filled with their people, to the impoverishing of the inhabitants and dwellers? What masses of money and gold have they, against the laws of the realm, transported out of it as truth has made it plain? What loss did they to the King and kingdom when they and their faction opposed the brave work of dyeing and dressing of cloths, after it was in a good way of going forward? \* What hurt or hindrance do they to our navigation when they freight strange vessels and refuse the English ships? What an innumerable wealth have these people attained to, whose beginning was nothing when they made their first entrance into this kingdom? If it be considered, it will appear to be admirable.

And for all these domestic damages the subjects receive his Majesty has no more excise from them than from his subjects but in his subsidies, which seldom come.†

\* This, and the next accusation, do not appear in MS.

† Monson seems to be referring to the Dutch settled in England, or to those of Dutch origin, in all these complaints.

These are the least to what shall appear when I launch myself into the ocean and there encounter them. But in the mean time I will unmask their craft and cunning, and discover the subtlety of their English friends to entrap us in the snares of their policy under the false colours and pretence of security to the State.

As well the one as the other desires it may be held a maxim of State that the security of England must depend upon the fortunes of Holland. A foul imputation they cast upon us, when we remember the noble and victorious actions of our forefathers, who made other nations fear them, and they to fear none: but this position is devised to serve private men's purposes, contrary to truth or reason, as I will make it appear to the judgment of wise men.\* But under this conceived colour the Hollander plays the part of a panther, which has a sweet scent but a loathsome face, which makes other beasts follow till he has got them into his clutches. And the Hollanders have so entrapped us that we are caught in their nets, and by nets we must be freed. We are made silly fishes to be ensnared by the subtlety of those fishermen, but I hope we shall be released and relieved by fish, with our endeavour and pains.

Now to hoist sail and put to sea to encounter, at least to discover, the Hollanders' insolences, their practices, their deceits, and designs, wherein I will make the indifferent reader wonder, and after judge, how dangerous a thing it was to put arms into their hands, and how necessary it is to bring them into the same state of shipping they were before the wars.

\* Instead of this sentence B. and R. have only 'I will make the contrary appear to wise men, but under,' etc.

I will begin with the days of Queen Elizabeth, speaking to the watchmen of our commonwealth of that time, and use an old phrase without application, 'That profit and bribery makes a judge blind.'

Was it discretion and safety in those men, after the Hollanders had engaged us in the war with Spain, that our ships were arrested, our goods forfeited, and from thenceforward prohibited traffic, yet to suffer the Hollanders to continue as absolute a trade into Spain as in time of peace, and supply them with ammunition, shipping, mariners, and intelligence against us? And rather than their manner of war should cease, by which they engrossed the entire trade into their hands, if ever the King of Spain's army in Flanders, or his armada in Spain, should have wanted powder, or other habiliments for the war, they would have supplied him, for all their drift was no more than to keep us severed from Spain and to prolong the war for their benefit of commerce and traffic. This was the beginning of their rising, to our ruin; and from this very day we must reckon, as from the birth of a child, their first life and prosperity.\*

Was it security for us, when our watchmen procured Monsieur, brother, and next heir apparent to the Crown of France [and who had succeeded his brother if he had outlived him] to be invested Duke of Brabant [who had then enjoyed the Low Countries with France], and who was no

\* Instead of this sentence B. and R. have 'They brought us to that pass by a feigned shew of a war that we only defended their trade, and they not driven to defend themselves by sea, as is apparent in that they never sent out ships to molest Spain until 1599 when they were debarred that trade, and therefore it is perilous to have neighbourhood with danger.'

sooner placed in it but he began treacherously to practise, by example of Antwerp and other places? \*

Was it the part of friends, and with whom they had lately leagued, that when the King of Spain employed any fleet against England or upon defence of his own coast, he had ships, men, and his principal pilots, Hollanders, who were either pressed in Spain, or willingly served against us?

Was it not cunning in the Hollanders, and fraud to us,† when the greatest trade of the Spaniards and Portuguese into the West Indies, Guinea, and Brazil, was in Holland ships, which defended the Spaniards' goods from the English, with more slaughter to the English when they encountered than ever we received from Spain? Here they supported an enemy by nature, to hurt and injure a friend by fact and proof.

Was it safety to us, or honesty in the Hollanders, in the year 1599, that her Majesty rigged and furnished her Royal Navy upon a sudden service, and expected assistance of ships from them by contract, that in conclusion they sent but seven ships, and such that the worst of ours was better than the best of theirs? Here they left us unprovided to encounter a danger; for a foe is as good that hurts not, as a friend that helps not.

Was it security, honour, or profit to us that with an expense of more men and money than we have conquered kingdoms heretofore, we have maintained their principality, making mechanic persons equal with princes, raised an oligarch

\* The phrases within brackets are not in MS. Francis, Duke of Anjou, attempted to seize Antwerp by surprise in January 1583.

† The MSS. only say 'Was it good to us,' etc.

commonwealth against a monarchy, trained up their people in discipline of war? That of a base and timorous generation we have put valour and knowledge of arms into their hands? And for all these unspeakable good turns done them, we have no more assurance from them than discourtesies we receive in all parts where we meet : and no marvel, for the fruit of a popular State is to show itself an enemy to monarchy, and it is an old saying that the good one doeth to a friend makes him unfriendly.

Was it security, in all the time of war, to suffer our prime soldiers, and of all degrees, to be under their subjection, the most part of our wealth exhausted thither, and by consequence to be in their power to dispose of this kingdom as pleased most voices of their select council, which in their government is opposite to monarchy? \* For whereas monarchy propounds honour as the first thing, the second the public good, and the third interest, a popular State prefers private profit, makes the common good the second, and honour the last.

Was it security to let go the cautionary towns, Flushing and Brill, being bridles to their insolences? For by them we could at any time either curb, or give them their reins, as since we find by enjoying that liberty all their injuries towards us began, which before they durst not offer outwardly. And considering we had experience of their friendship to be like music at a feast that a man hath no more than a sound for his money.

Was it, or is it, security to us to suffer yearly three thousand vessels of theirs to fish upon his

\* This sentence is not in MS.



Majesty's seas and infringe his Majesty's laws of England and Scotland, in which seas they are bound to acknowledge a sovereignty to the Kings of both kingdoms? And under that pretence of fishing, they may use this stratagem, cunningly and secretly to put ten or twelve soldiers in every buss, and under colour of fishing to land in some of his Majesty's dominions where it is to be feared they will not want a party. The seas they shall be sure to be masters of by means of twenty or thirty ships of war that do usually attend them for waftage and of whom we can have no more suspicion than of the rest.

Is it safety, when we enter into consideration, by the multitude of their vessels increased out of fishing, how they insult upon us at our own home and abroad, as, namely, in the East Indies, a thing able to move pity for the fact, and revenge for the doing it? And besides many other scorns and disgraces they put upon us, which need no repetition, because they are fresh in our memory? They resemble Hecuba, that has a human voice, speaking like a friend, but is a wolf ravening like a fiend, or the flickering fires that sweetly sing the sailor's wreck.

Is it good and beneficial to us to see the Hollanders enjoy the absolute trade of the world, as after shall appear, and not contented with the moderate gain to themselves, labour by all indirect means to impoverish us in uttering their commodities at an under rate, purposely to weary us of all such trades? For such is their covetousness, and such their unthankfulness, that they regard neither favours done, nor to be done them. And when there is no fear of revenge, there is little conscience of offence in a covetous man: Lycurgus says, as we find in these people,

'That riches and trade produce a scarcity of virtue,' therefore how can we expect gratitude from them that have showed themselves ungrateful to us. And it is a rule 'That prove a man unthankful, and disprove him in all his other actions.'

\* By this false invented position, that England's safety must depend upon the upholding of Holland, we were driven to a war with Spain and by that war to defend their commerce, for they never undertook hostile act by sea against Spain till obliged by necessity that they were prohibited that trade. But the greatest mischief of all others was tolerating their fishing, which we only might have enjoyed; by means whereof we have resigned our weapons, which are the ships increased out of it, into their hands out of our own, to dispose of to their advantage and our hurt if at any time they comply with their King and make him thereby mighty by sea, or if they cast themselves upon the protection of France, as they will do if France can bestead them more than we. This is a way, out of our cinders, to kindle a fire to burn and consume us.

It may be compared to a subtle woman who, to abuse the simplicity of her weak husband with her hypocrisy and indirect practices, draws him to rely on her for the managing of his estate being made believe he cannot otherwise subsist, according to the former proposition. But he dying, her voluptuous desires discover her foul intentions and she despises his friends and children. In this simile Holland is the unnatural

\* The bitter attack on the Dutch in Book IV (*ante*, iv. p. 422), removed to that place by the Churchill editor, occurs between this paragraph and the preceding one in the MSS.

mother, this kingdom the silly husband, and the subjects the outcast and unrespected children.

\* Our watchmen, in their wisdoms, might have foreseen this and prevented it by enjoying the fishing. For then had England kept the same strength by sea which Holland has since attained to; then had England undertaken the same courses in fishing as the Hollanders did; then would not England only have outstripped them, but all the world, in strength of ships and wealth of subjects; and by consequence have caused not only an admiration but a terror to all the world that should but hear of us, as now we are brought to reproach and scorn by that mean nation of Holland in remote countries, as far as the Indies, where they cast the imputation of a petty nation and poor people upon us, and make themselves sovereigns and kings over this part of the world. And as vermin gnaw upon meat so do they detract from the worthiest persons.

In this trade, as in all others, they either

\* Instead of this paragraph the MSS. run: 'Mistake me not, for in the 9000 fishing vessels repeated I do not include all the ships of Holland raised out of our fish. There are more of greater import, though not of number, that by consequence are maintained out of fishing as, namely, the ships of the East Indies whose greatness and number doth far exceed ours, which makes them so peremptory with us in those far remote parts where they stick not to call themselves kings and us a poor and petty nation. The Indians are made to believe it because there is no way to disprove ["reprove"] or gainsay it, being so far from us. This detraction is a poison of the Devil, and as rats gnaw their meat so do detractors upon the worthiest persons.'

It does not appear that the Churchill editor had any substantially different text, but throughout the 'Tracts,' and particularly in this Sixth Book, he has paraphrased freely, with the result that he has often created a text of his own—of a far higher literary quality than the original.

deprave us or deceive us. By example of a merchant of note, who above five years since freighted a ship of red herrings, from Yarmouth to Marseilles and departed in company of some Hollanders. It happened that by advantage of wind and weather the Hollanders arrived at their port and made sale of their herrings to an exceeding gain before the other's coming. The English finding the Hollanders unburthened of their lading, some two hundred barrels excepted, desired to buy them at the rate the others had been sold, thinking thereby to keep up the price, but the Hollanders sold them at a low price to hinder and prejudice the others' sale. This envy of the Hollanders was the greater in that it was grounded upon malice, and not founded upon injury: for Macrobius says, 'That anger is increased upon occasion, but malice upon ill condition.'

But if we enter into consideration of our other trades, which they seek to deprive us of, let their carriage in Greenland, in Newfoundland, and Russia appear, three places first known to us. In Greenland they contested with us in our whale-fishing, and were like to bring it to a naval battle, though the law of nations casts it upon us as the first discoverers. Here their envy appeared, and they shewed there is no such dangerous foe as the seeming friend. Newfoundland being our ancient discovery, and that no nation could challenge interest therein but ourselves, not many years since the Hollanders practised to convey threescore or fourscore mariners, out of the west country, to instruct them in that manner of fishing but it was discovered and prevented. Beware therefore of them; for they are like a serpent that never stings so deadly as when it

bites without hissing. Notwithstanding, as I have shewed before, that they have brought the trade of Russia, from two ships of theirs to sixty, and the decrease of ours from fifteen to two, yet this would not satisfy them, but they practised with the Muscovia ambassador at the Emperor's court at Prague to forbid us the absolute trade of Russia; like envious persons that desire no good to any but themselves.

It is no less admirable how they take advantage of us upon all occasions offered, as namely in the year 1628, when our wars with France prohibited our trading thither, whereby we were compelled to be served by the ships of Holland with the greatest part of wine that furnished this kingdom. This prohibition much increased the Holland shipping; and they thereby raised their freight to their own price and brought it from twenty-four shillings to four pounds a ton, a sum never heard of but upon that occasion, and by their trade to Bordeaux in one year they gained the entire value of one hundred ships.

One instance I will make apparent by a merchant of great account, himself being witness, and to whom it happened. A Holland ship being in the river of Thames to be sold, this merchant offered two hundred and fifty pounds for her, but could not have her under three hundred pounds. Whereupon they parted for this difference of price and the Hollander repaired to Bordeaux with his ship, and there procured a freight for England which cleared three times the value of what he would have sold her for. To this merchant's knowledge he gained nine hundred pounds by that voyage.

One great advantage the Hollanders have of us is in the build of their ships, there being little

difference betwixt the Hamburgers, or Easterlings, and them. This gives them a freedom of trade into all parts, as well friends as foes. As friends they pass for Hollanders; as enemies, they take upon them the name of Easterlings; so that betwixt the one and the other we feel the smart of it and it gives them good reason to laugh at us, though this usage we well deserve that have patience to bear it under pretence of safety to the kingdom. The hundredth part of the commodities brought into Holland by themselves is not there spent, but from thence transported as they shall understand the scarcities and wants of other countries which they supply in their own shipping. This way of covetousness hath need of many lessons to do well. It is thought that Amsterdam is never without 700,000 quarters of corn in it, which they keep until they are certified of the dearth of other countries. Sometimes such scarcity hath happened in Spain and Italy that they have enriched themselves for seven years after. They seek not after works of charity to feed the poor but to fill their purses.

They have many enticements to draw people and trade to them; they debar no man, be he Turk, Jew, or Christian, the freedom of religion, which made one truly say that the true religion was professed in Amsterdam. For all sects, be they never so diabolical, are there allowed and maintained by some or other.

As for their customs and excises, though they be high, and indeed intolerable within the land, for those mechanic people being in love with the word liberty though they find it not in effect, [live in excessive slavery and pay impositions for every thing they eat or wear]\*, yet

\* The passage in brackets is not in MS.

any thing brought in by sea goes at a low rate. As, for example, the wine from Bordeaux which pays nine hundred pounds custom in England will not come to above fifty pounds in Holland ; and all other merchandize after that proportion. [And this is the only cause of their great trade in their provinces above all other parts.] \*

As these are their policies at home so have they no less deceits abroad, but far less justifiable by the rules of honesty. For to make a man honest, is to take away the occasion of being dishonest, and to tie him to the ancient law of Solon that every one shall have a feeling of injury done to another as if it were done to himself. But contrary to this law of honesty they injure and will give no redress ; they will suffer no wrong, nor yet give satisfaction in things of right. They think everything good for themselves, how ill soever it is to others. But to come nearer home to them more particularly.

You shall not be ignorant of a policy of theirs, wherein they shewed subtle craft, in the using of Dunkirkers to abuse us withal. For when it is their chance to take one of them, which was not often, and that with the advantage of three ships to one, most inhumanly they would slay them, purposely to make us believe their malice was implacable and irreconcilable. And yet, notwithstanding these barbarous acts, they made their daily resort and trade into the ports of Dunkirk and Flanders, where they supplied them with victuals, powder, shot, or any other things they stood in need of.

And since then, as in the days of King James, in the view of all people and though our articles

\* Not in MS.

of peace with the Archduke did warrant our traffic thither, yet they would forbid it and seize upon ships of ours as they entered the ports of Flanders, seeking to force us to Calais, from whence they knew our merchandize would be carried to Flanders, their drift being only to enrich France by our loss with the customs we there paid. To thankful people the remembrance of benefits should never wax old ; for no man is more bound to be grateful than they who have received such deep obligations, as I have proved the Hollanders have done from us.

Many grievances our merchants have received in Spain came by their foul practices, as namely, by their carrying counterfeit brass money into that kingdom and laying it upon us ; for which we have found a displeasure and punishment due for such an offence. These are the dragons that bite the ears of the elephant to suck his blood, knowing that he cannot reach them with his trunk ; so they presume on their friends in England and the vulgar position that our safeties must depend upon them, so that we shall not only suffer but dare not question any evil of theirs.

In time of peace, in the reign of King James, the Hollanders spared not to disperse rumours throughout this kingdom of fleets and preparations in Spain against us, to our no small scandal, as though we were born to fear, or that our intelligence seemed so weak as to receive it from them. When indeed they did it to nourish jealousies betwixt the two States, to eat us out of that trade, as they have done in all others, and to make both of us poor and less powerful than themselves.

He that shall read what is gone before shall find that their ingratitude does as much appear



as a crow that picks out the eyes of him that first nourished him. There are many more grievances they offer us. And now I will apply myself to the watchmen of our time for them to consider of these collections following :

\* 1. Whether the ground and foundation of their positions, to make Holland equal in power with England, was laid with mature judgment, yea, or no? Or out of some private ends to advance themselves, fortunes, and credit?

2. In the second I would have them consider in what estate Holland and the people in it was in, before they contested with their lawful prince for sovereignty, to that they are now brought to?

3. The third is to consider what a height they are now in by our conniving with them; and we lessened and diminished by it.

4. The fourth is the damage and hazard we have run in labouring to continue their greatness, and not seeking to abate it.

5. The fifth is the discourtesies done us out of a covetous desire of gain, and we still to bear and permit them?

6. The sixth is the condition of their English friends that still uphold their faction, and what the end of their designs are like to prove if they be let alone?

7. The seventh is their strength by sea, and to think of a means to equal them in number of shipping, and how to bring their fishing and other trades into our hands. Which may easily be effected if I may be believed, and if my former proposition of fishing be prosecuted.

8. And, lastly, it is to be considered what tie or security we can have of them as long as we yield

\* No. 1 is not found in MS.

to their insufferable injuries and insolences? For they may well presume, that we bearing so many blows at their hands without revenge, demand the more.

\* And this shall suffice for a discovery of the Hollanders' first beginning in greatness, their sixty and odd years of continuance,† and their present state now in being, wherein their ingratitude to England is laid open, which the Persians define to be a spring of vice, the enemy of nature, the poison of amity, the ruin of gentleness and benignity. All men must confess they have found the true affection of friendship in us, described by Plato, 'That he is a good friend who does his friend good, but a mighty friend that defends him from harm.'

\* This paragraph is not found in MS.

† Thus, if the Churchill editor really had this paragraph before him in its present form, it would appear that this portion of the Sixth Book cannot have been written earlier than 1640, when Monson's feelings would have been still further embittered by the knowledge that the Fishing Association was a failure.

Some other Things I forebore to insert in this Sixth Book of Fishing, concerning the Islands of Hebrides, and especially the Lewis, worthy of Consideration.\*

I FORBORE to handle the conditions of those islands, and the use the Hollanders may make of them, for the same reasons expressed before, as too tart a sauce for Hollanders' tastes and unfit to be published to the view of the vulgar sort.

But before I look so far to the northward as those islands I will take a survey of my own country of England, and gather such collections as to make me understand the other the better. I will not speak as I am an Englishman, for all men naturally are partial to the country and soil that first gave them life and food. But I will speak according to sense and truth, to make my argument and reason the stronger, in what I shall say of the state of the islands of Hebrides.

God hath given a blessing to England above all other lands He hath placed and seated in this world. For, as it were, with His own finger he

\* R. is the only MS. which contains this section. The heading runs: 'Considerations are these that follow, convenient for all faithful Englishmen to take notice of as Things of greatest Peril and Importance to his Majesty and his three Kingdoms that I, out of my Experience and Travels, [*i.e.* travails] can collect.' It begins below (p. 320) at 'And as it has been an ancient position,' etc.

hath settled it in a sea for its own security, an annoyance to all other countries in permitting and impeaching universal trades and navigations, as that we may truly say to that point that we are only happy above all others. For whereas the southern and richest part of Europe cannot subsist, nor the traffic of the Indies be maintained and upheld without such materials as are sent out of the northern regions; as, also, that there is a necessity in the same case for the north to receive benefit of the south. All these navigations, as well the one as the other, must necessarily have their passage through our seas and Channel, and by consequence fall into our mercies, as I have handled in my First Book.

And as it has been an ancient position of State for the kingdom of England to have an eye to its back door, which was then Scotland, till both the kingdoms were blessed and united in one, whereby the occasion of jealousy and the opportunity and practice of France ceased, that was wont to do ill offices and set one nation against the other.

\* So I may say of these islands of Hebrides that they may be made as dangerous a back door to Scotland and Ireland, as Scotland has been in former ages to England, being placed and seated with most advantage to annoy the two kingdoms aforesaid if the Hollanders hold their footing they now have in them. The condition of the people of Holland being considered, with their popular government which other nations begin naturally

\* This, and the following paragraph, have been freely paraphrased by the Churchill editor from the original, which, however, does not differ in sense sufficiently from the text to make it worth while to print it separately.

to affect by the example and encouragement of their late successes and fortunes, by their wealth increased out of their trade, and by the excessive number of shipping, which are the dangers of islands, for without shipping they cannot be invaded.

By the Hollanders possessing those islands they may make their rendezvous and staple of all their southern navigations, as well in peace as war. They shall find sufficient succours in those islands of victuals, both flesh and fish, to give them relief. They shall find that in those islands they shall be secured with several harbours of more importance and goodness than their own coast can afford them. Those islands will furnish them more natural helps against an enemy to defend themselves, if any attempt should be made against them; but, above all, when they have thus settled and seated themselves, we shall lose our ancient and accustomed advantage of their passage through the Narrow Seas, which is the only aweing power we have over them and all other nations. For they, enjoying those islands, will be enabled to resort to them nine months in the year, and so to pass to Holland by the northern parts of Ireland and Scotland and avoid our Channel and us, and our means to intercept them.

Moreover, in those islands which are seated as a back door to Scotland and Ireland, as I have said, and in so remote a place and distance from England, the danger is that the people who are untamed, uncivil, and apt for all commotions, will easily rebel by the insinuating practices and instigation of the Hollanders, who are ready to allure, entice, and undertake any unlawful action, which shall tend to the overthrow of monarchy,

and to settle their own form of usurped government.\*

And therefore it behoves us to have a circum-spect eye over the Hollanders. For if errors and dangers are not remedied in the beginning, after follows great and unavoidable mischiefs, like what is past ; which is sooner to be repented than recalled.

This shall suffice to those points I have treated of in this Sixth Book, wherein I have unmasked and discovered, out of my own experience and observations, the Hollanders' long and subtle deceits to abuse us, for all true-minded Englishmen to behold with an eye of indifference † how with cunning and craft they have still laboured to nourish divisions betwixt the two mighty kingdoms of England and Spain, merely for their own profit and gain, till the death of Queen Elizabeth, when they could no longer support their politic practice, King James succeeding, who brought the blessed effect of his motto, *Beati pacifici*.

I could follow this subject of the Hollanders, but for making the bulk of this book too big ; and that I would not do injury to another book that is written by the same author, entitled, 'Certain Observations that are not worthy the name of History, that happened to England since the Year of our Lord 1558 and a little before.' ‡ Which book contains these particulars :

The favours England hath done Holland.

The state of Holland from the beginning of

\* The MS. runs : ' . . . Hollanders will be allured to undertaking any desperate or unlawful act that they shall be incited unto by them.' The 'Tracts' end here in MS.

† I.e., in a fair and impartial spirit.

‡ Harl. MSS. 1579, is a copy of this.

their insurrections. The continuance, and what the end is like to prove.

Collections gathered out of a book written by Sir Roger Williams, and printed 1618.\*

Whether Holland do injury to their prince, yea, or no?

The desperate condition Holland has been often reduced to.

The difference of times betwixt the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's reign and the latter end.

\* *Actions of the Low Countries*; Lond. 1618. Reprinted in vol. i of the *Somers Tracts*.

A Relation of some Things that happened  
in the Reigns of Queen Mary and Queen  
Elizabeth.

THOUGH I have made a description at large of the Hollanders' inconstancy, faithlessness, and manifest injuries they have offered to us, yet I must say there is no man so wicked or vicious but some kind of virtue will appear in him, for which he deserves cherishment, as well as chastisement for the other. But, naturally, they are people that desire rather to live without virtue than to die without money; and this that followeth shall set forth their praises in the worldly carriages.

They are frugal in expense, the benefit whereof themselves and country find. They are industrious, as their actions at home and abroad do witness. They are just in contracts, holding a conscience, in the little religion they have, not to defraud any man. They labour to seek out the secrets of lands not inhabited and countries undiscovered. They are inventors of arts, which to their praise they have enriched the world with. They are willing without excuse to contribute for the good of the State, not standing so much upon privileges or petition of right, as to neglect any occasion of advantage to benefit their commonwealth. They are laborious and painful of body, not



admitting a beggar in their provinces, and willing to relieve and comfort one another in strange countries. They are enemies to the expense of law and the griping of lawyers, and end most of their controversies by arbitration of friends. Their expenses in drinking are saved and mitigated by their misery in eating, for out of their excessive covetousness they almost starve their bellies, and by their unmeasurable frugality they scarce clothe their bodies; for it is verily believed the people in one of their chief cities spend not so much in apparel as is spent in a prince's court.

But all these virtues are drowned in a covetous ingratitude that holds friendship with nobody but for interest, which ends in the self-same interest. And no marvel; for popular States are no longer thankful than they receive benefits, nor nothing is of shorter life amongst them than the memory of pleasures or favours past. They are so careless to give satisfaction for the ill they do that if it be demanded it is as much as to speak of valour to a faint heart, or charity to an unmerciful man, or of courtesy to a churlish disposition, for it will prove but the telling a tale to him that is asleep. The definition by a philosopher in matters of friendship is as followeth:—

‘A friend is long sought for, scarce to find, and hard to keep; a friend is always ready to comfort in adversity, to help in necessity, to bear with one's infirmity, and reprove his errors gently.’ But the Hollanders are contrary in their friendship; for they are like an ill bird that lays an ill egg, an ill tree that brings forth ill fruit, or a young cub that grows crafty like his dam. They practise and follow the

steps of their predecessors ; they make riches the heaven of their thoughts, and as it is held no hurt to know ill, but to do it, these people are perfect artists as well in doing as knowing mischief.

Yet, to speak truth, their natural ill has been nourished and made worse by us. For if we had not connived at them and their actions, to our own prejudice, they had wanted power to have executed their ingratitude. Therefore it had behoved us to consider what we gave before we gave ; as also to whom we gave and how we gave it ; for States ought to be governed by wisdom, and not by popular affection or passion. Wise men should not measure things by outward appearance, but by discretion and reason, or else they behold their actions in a false glass.

But now let us at last seek to avoid that evil we have done in making the Hollanders too great for us to tolerate, lest we feel the effect of repentance. It is not the meanest point of wisdom to doubt and mistrust the worst, for doubts beget understanding, and thereby prevention. And as in natural bodies the longer one lives in health, sickness is the more dangerous when it comes, so it is with us and the Hollanders the longer we have lived in a mutual and inseparable peace. Now that they have over-wrought us with cunning and made us feeble by the strength they have sucked from us, it will behove us to recover our ancient vigour and valour and be no longer deluded with false pretences of safety to us and the commonwealth. Let us follow the old rule in seeking to put out the fire of our neighbour's house, though he be our enemy, lest it should flame into our own. For it is an easier


thing to oppose danger abroad than to repulse it at home.

I have had occasion to insert some part of this last leaf in my former Fourth Book, which is there to be seen.\*

\* Cf. *ante*, iv. p. 421 *et seq.* There are only verbal differences. In the MSS. collated for this edition the only copy of this outburst is found in this Book VI., as noted on p. 310, and not in the Fourth Book.

It will be noticed that the heading of this section is a very inaccurate description of the contained matter.

### *The End of the Sixth Book.*



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
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
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



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